They are down but not out-
Our policymakers will have to rethink and chalk out the entire security paradigm. Unless this happens, the tap will remain open and we will keep mopping up the floor
In the backdrop of horrible Army Public School attack in Peshawar in 2014 that killed more than a hundred children, it became evident that elimination of terrorist networks is not an easy task.
“Terrorist networks lurk in the shadows and thrive on a strategy of invisibility and ambiguity. They operate in an ideologically motivated environment to embroil the state on physical, psychological and ideological levels,” the national internal security policy document reads.
Hence, a 20-point National action plan (NAP) was evolved to deal with the threat holistically, to crack-down on terrorism and to complement the ongoing operation Zarb-e-Azb. The plan not only develops counter-narratives to militants but pledges a resolve to strengthen the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA).
Unfortunately, despite its formulation and implementation terrorists are still capable of carrying out major attacks in urban areas of the country, although with lesser frequency. In the recent terrorist attacks targeting lawyers and on the police training centre in Quetta record numbers of people have lost their lives which proved that many rampaging militants are still operating in Pakistan fearlessly.
According to the statistics presented by South Asia Terrorism portal (SATP) if we look back in time, 10,919 terrorism-related deaths occurred in Pakistan between 2011-2013, but over the course of less than three years since Zarb-e-Azb the number had dropped but yet stands at 4,329 deaths from 2014 to 2016.
According to SATP those killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2014 included 1,781 civilians and 533 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies. Those killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2015 included 940 civilians, 339 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies.
However, those killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2016 included 532 civilians, 204 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies.
NACTA’s newly compiled figures revealed that around 4,307 civilians and security personnel lost their lives and 11, 400 injured in 5,000 terror attacks after 2013 in Pakistan.
The country witnessed a reduction in violence in 2016 as compared to last ten years, recording 600 deaths of civilians and security personnel in 480 terror attacks. Those injured in these attacks included 1,200 civilians.
Around 838 innocent people were killed and 1,706 injured in 1,139 terror incidents in 2015, 1, 172 civilians and security personnel were killed and 3, 185 injured in 1, 816 terror incidents in 2014, according to Nacta’s official figures.
Political analyst Marvi Sirmed while talking to DNA last year said that “After a year, Zarb-e-Azab progress stands where it was last year. After so many casualties of our soldiers, we have no idea where the operation stands because the fight keeps recurring in the area already declared ‘clear’ by the army.”
The question here arises as to why the terrorist activities are persistently occurring mostly in provisional capitals despite the fact that provincial committees and coordination units within the provincial home departments have been assigned to monitor and implement NAP points.
DNA reached out the interior ministry for their comments on the issue, as they have been made the focal ministry at the federal level for the implementation of the plan, but the officers refused to comment.
Returning to NAP, post-Quetta attack targeting lawyers the civil-military leadership held a high-level meeting to discuss loopholes 15 months after the formulation of NAP. Even after the commotion, the emphasis was on NAP’s implementation but the need to revisit the scheme has apparently not been realised. Moreover, a report presented to the prime minister stated that eight out of 20 points of NAP have not been implemented.
On the contrary, no reference was made during the latest discussion on terrorism as a need for a counter-narrative to defeat the terrorists’ rhetoric.
Other committees formulated to monitor the execution of the plan on the provisional level, very few committees later meet to review progress and the prime minister’s own involvement also became diluted with time.
Resultantly, the criticism regarding the implementation and efficiency of the NAP grows ever louder and being extensively debated.
Similarly, if the strengthening agent lacks behind the activation of NACTA becomes wishful thinking.
Nacta National Coordinator IhsanGhani, post-Quetta attack while talking to a private newspaper, said that despite criticism on NAP, the general sense of security and law and order situation in the country had improved.
“The gains of Zarb-e-Azb and NAP will have to be sustained through long-term measures. NAP and Zarb-e-Azb have made a visible impact on the law, order and security in the country where terrorist attacks have climbed down to pre-2005 level,” Ghani added.
Despite tall claims, the security situation doesn’t seem to improve in circumstances when the internal security is being a shared domain of 33 provincial and federal organisations. This draws our attention to the fact that the inter-service mechanism in countering threats and terror actives is not properly chalked out and there is an absence of a coordination apparatus in the fight against terrorism.
Moreover, the military operation is likely to lose momentum because an overambitious operation with vaguely defined objectives (NAP and others) can turn a timely victory into a prolonged defeat.
A strategic and holistic security plan, therefore, should be chalked out and drill-practiced precisely to thwart the terror threat.
NAP is a dream, it is napping. There seems to be no end to the terror attacks. Even if the next army chief takes over the charge the least army can do is create situations to negotiate but at the end, someone from the civil leadership has to step in
Senior journalist Brig ShaukatQadir in a telephonic conversation with DNA said, “Military operations have dismantled and dislodged banned outfits, but they have not yet been destroyed.”
“Defensive mythology in countering banned organisations could never succeed unless the grassroots problems are analysed and solved.
“Our policymakers will have to rethink and chalk out the entire security paradigm. Unless this happens, the tap will remain open and we will keep mopping up the floor.”
The problem in Pakistan is that legislation is made on fast-track basis but implementation is not monitored. If NACTA is made proactive it can prove to be an effective coordination mechanism for the counter terrorism effort. This would also enable threat assessments to be functionalised and coordination among 33 groups would be seamlessly done.
Thus, we come back to NAP, the fact that the plan is not being effective shows that the greatest crisis facing Pakistan is not the threat from militants, but the lack of political will, bad governance and civil-military coordination.
“NAP is a dream, it is napping. There seems to be no end to the terror attacks. Even if the next army chief takes over the charge the least army can do is create situations to negotiate but at the end, someone from the civil leadership has to step in,” Brig Shaukat said.
Moreover, de-radicalisation and de-weaponisation must also be incorporated as top priorities of the plan. The government must place NACTA on top political priority.
Currently, it is not a happy situation for Pakistan to be in but in the end, these moves will actually turn out to be productive and will actually show results. Nothing is likely to rid Pakistan of the spectre of terrorism except paying heed to the counter-terrorism strategies, plans and activating organisations.
