Operation in North Waziristan

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Operation clean-up in North Waziristan is capturing the headlines of the newspapers and becoming a part of the highlights of the news on the radio as well as television. More importantly, it is one of the most hotly contested topic of debate in the military as well as diplomatic circles of both Pakistan and the US. North Waziristan has been a source of mistrust in relations between the two allies. Tensions escalated further as the US began pressuring Pakistan to attack the Haqqani Network (HN) in North Waziristan. Pakistan showed its reluctance for obvious reasons of consolidating the gains achieved during previous operations in Swat, Bunner, Sangla, Bajaur, and South Waziristan. The standoff reached its new heights when the US accused that the militants who launched a 22-hour assault on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul, came from North Waziristan. Admiral Mike Mullen, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lashed out against Pakistan, saying the HN was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Nonetheless, Pakistan claims that terrorists from Afghan side of border move to Pakistan and had killed 13 Pakistani troops, beheading seven of them during the month of June 2012.
It seems quite logical when Pakistan military says that they will undertake the operation into North Waziristan on the following pre-conditions: 1) operation will be carried out at a time of army’s own choosing, 2) It will have political backing via parliament, 3) It will not be a joint operation with the US, 4) It will be against foreign militants only, and 5) Pakistan-Afghanistan border should be sealed by ISAF/NATO forces with the guarantees that the withdrawing militants would not be given safe passage to embark attacks against Pakistan.
Besides pushing rogue element from North Waziristan, a friendly and stable Afghanistan is in the best interest of Pakistan. Therefore, negative perception about Pakistan with regard to forth-coming operation clean-up is detrimental to its documented strategy. Nevertheless, speedy rehabilitation and developmental work after successful military operation is absolutely essential to compensate ‘local lashkars’ fighting with the army in driving away the miscreants from the region. The development of economic activity zones in tribal area marked by poverty alleviation programs, as promised by the Americans, would definitely dilute some of the after effects of the operation.
DR ISHRAT ALI KHAN
Karachi