A no-win situation

The country totters on the brink

The price of apathy towards public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.– Plato (428 BC – 348 BC)

The inevitable is going to happen. The NATO supply route to Afghanistan, closed in the wake of the dastardly attack on the Salala checkpost, is likely to be reopened in the next few days. Why was it closed in the first place, and what are the compulsions that have forced the government to reverse its earlier decision (understandably) based on ‘principles’? Is it really the pressure from our NATO friends and the fear of us being ostracised from the community of civilised nations that has done the trick, or is it acknowledgement of a grave national policy mistake as having been made?

The nature and dynamics of the original decision and the manner in which a reversal has been planned have both remained subjects of intense public debate within and outside the country. This scribe has repeatedly contended that inter-state relations are not conducted by taking extreme positions, particularly with countries you are engaged with through bilateral and multilateral agreements encompassing critical aspects of the civil and military functioning. Conceded that it was an unprovoked and barbaric attack that merited the most severe condemnation, but the question that was overlooked at the time of falling prey to a knee-jerk reaction to the US/ISAF onslaught was the need for formulating a pragmatic policy for handling its fallout to Pakistan’s advantage. Instead, after six painstaking months, Pakistan has been forced through a combination of events to reverse its earlier decision – and this in spite of the PCNS’ cumbersome guidelines for redefining Pakistan’s relations with the US.

When the Salala attack took place, there was widespread condemnation propelling Pakistan to a high moral ground. What should have been done was to engage the US bilaterally to force a solution which would have come by way of an official apology and also a form of undertaking that such assaults would not be repeated in the future. Instead, under pressure from the military, wearing the yoke of the NRO and thinking of salvaging political points, the government responded by closing the supply route and announced the formation of a bi-partisan PCNS to devise the future shape of the US-Pakistan relations.

Principally, policy making is an executive function and, preferably, that is where the matter should have rested. The foreign office, for all that it is worth, should have spearheaded the parleys with the US. Instead, and before things could be negotiated advantageously to secure Pakistan’s interests, the matter was ceded to the domain of PCNS which, after a laborious effort spread over months, came up with a formulation containing sixteen guidelines for revised terms of engagement with US/NATO/ISAF. In the process, theparliament’s relevance and legitimacy, if still left with any, had been effectively put on the line.

When this false bravado did not lead anywhere and Pakistan started receiving threats of stoppage of aid and the prospect of confronting the combined brunt of the US/NATO alliance including some of our dependable friends, the entire national leadership including the prime minister, the foreign minister and the defence minister started warning the people of the imminent disaster that would strike if Pakistan refused to cooperate with the international community’s demands.

But the political leadership, weak as it is, did not want to carry the albatross alone. It wanted the army to take equal responsibility – that, too, publicly. So, a meeting of the Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) was convened to arrive at a consensus. But, in spite of deliberations spread over four long hours, it remained deadlocked failing to evolve a common ground with regard to reopening the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs). In the meanwhile, and ostensibly in view of the behind-the-scene promises made in the wake of the much criticised visit of (the convicted) prime minister to the UK and unremitting pressure applied on him through multiple sources, a face-saving NATO invitation was finally secured for President Zardari to attend its moot in Chicago. The question that looms large is whether Pakistan will go to the Chicago conference with the decision on a platter, or whether some breather would be salvaged before the inevitable is announced?

The corrupt, inept and enslaved national leadership is solely to blame for the predicament it has plunged the country into. The GLOCs have to be re-opened. But, was it also essential to have built an unnecessary hype, thus pushing Pakistan to a no-win situation? Who will take the blame? Or will this also go the way of the contempt of court decision with a convicted prime minister doing the international rounds urging Pakistanis to leave their country? When the CNN anchor, quoting a recent Gallop poll, asked why more than a quarter of Pakistanis wanted to leave their country, the prime minister contemptuously responded: “Why don’t they leave? Who is stopping them?”

Maybe he is right. Maybe, they should actually leave. So should all those who ever had a dream of living in an egalitarian and equitable society that would provide them opportunities to excel by virtue of their abilities and expertise. So should all those who remained wedded to the concept of a genuinely free and tolerant society banishing the curse of obscurantism and regression. So should all those who believed in the rule of law being the fundamental premise on which the edifice of a sustainable polity and nationhood could be built. So should all those who adhered to the enshrining principles as enunciated by the Quaid in his August 11 address to the Constituent Assembly. They should all leave. They should leave because, through their continued and disdainful disinterest, they have allowed evil men to take charge.

The writer is a political analyst and a member of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. He can be reached at [email protected]