- Al-Baghdadi headed a military organisation, not a political
AT PENPOINT
By killing Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the USA might well have disposed of the greatest threat it faces, but it has also killed a claimant of the Caliphate, and thus someone more important than Osama bin Laden, who at best claimed to be head of an organisation. However, Osama did claim that his organisation was a preliminary to the forming of the Caliphate, or rather its re-forming.
Al-Baghdadi seemed to have lacked one of the most basic qualifications of the caliphate, the ability to move around freely, but he did highlight one of the most basic problems of the Muslim world since the Caliphate was abolished in 1924: that essentially, Muslims can only exist within the confines of an Islamic state, and must have a government carrying out the functions of implementing the system of Islam. Further, that orthodoxy specifies a particular form of government, the caliphate.
Just as the Mamluks converted the Caliph from a ruler into a source of legitimacy for their military coups, Al-Baghdadi tried to use the institution for the narrow purpose of providing a cover for militancy. That might explain why he was unable to convert the declaration into the sort of reality that Muslims want
It should be noted that the caliphate had been abolished before, rather more savagely than in 1924. In 1924, the abolition was by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Caliph became an ex-caliph. In 1258, when the Mongols took Baghdad, the Caliph was killed, and no successor installed. In 1261, a survivor of the Abbasi family declared his Caliphate, in Cairo. Actually, this was a means of legitimation for the Mamluk rulers of Egypt, and the Caliph was limited to giving legal cover to the latest Mamluk coup. (The Mamluks were military rulers, and the only means of transfer of power was a coup. The caliph then declared the coup-maker legitimate). The caliphate transferred to the Ottomans in 1517 as part of their conquest of Egypt, and the Ottoman caliphate was separated from the sultanate in 1924, and then abolished. The present interregnum, at 95 years and running, has thus been very much longer than at the fall of Baghdad.
The declaration of his Caliphate by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi began a process, but was not followed by an important component, public oaths of allegiance. The ascension to the Caliphate is not a hole-and-corner business. One of the essentials of the office, which Al-Baghdadi lacked, was security. Going back to the founding of the State of Madina, made more famous as the Riasat-i-Madina by Prime Minister Imran Khan, there was the Second Pledge of Aqaba, made by 72 representatives of the Aus and Khazraj, who pledged obedience to the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) including a readiness to fight for the security of his person.
It is true that of the Khulafa-i-Rashidin, the last three were assassinated. However, of the Umayyid Caliphs, only one was assassinated, Yazid ibn Walid, in the beginning of the troubles that would lead to the coming of the Abbasids. None of them were assassinated until Al-Mutawakkil in 861, after which the Caliphate became the plaything of the soldiery, and Caliphs were made and unmade depending on which military faction dominated. Security of person, therefore, must be guaranteed.
The USA manged two assassinations, and they have involved command of the air, as troops were flown in by helicopter. In both bin Laden’s and Al-Baghdadi’s cases, the landings were unopposed by any air defences. The crash of a helicopter in the Abbottabad attack on bin Laden showed that air assets are vulnerable even if there are no air defences.
One of the things noted about the Islamic State is its global outreach. It was a demonstration of the effect of having a state, but it also reflects how Muslims want a state to act as a protector. The OIC, though its members are impeccably Muslim, does not do enough, except provide an example of impotence. The Rohingya, the Kashmiris, the Palestinians, the Uighurs, the Syrians, the Afghans, the Kurds… the list only seems to grow. How far did Al-Baghdadi help any of these?
All of these would like a Caliph to help defend them. However, the Caliph should then not have to worry about his own safety, go about scurrying to find safety. The option of turning to the USA also does not exist for these people, as the USA is either ignoring them or is actually supporting their oppressors.
Al-Baghdadi’s method of claiming the Caliphate was also problematic. Previous claims had been made because of dynastic relationship, or because the holder was unworthy (Imam Hussain refused to swear allegiance to Yazid because he felt the latter was unfit, not because he felt he would do a better job. As a matter of fact, he never laid claim to the Caliphate.) The Abbasids claimed it because of Abbas ibn Abdul Muttalib, the ancestor who made them of the bloodline of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). The Usmanlis made the claim when they took Egypt, but ever since Muhammad Al-Fatih had taken Constantinople in 1453, there had been calls for the dynasty to take the Caliphate. Was Al-Baghdadi basing his claim on being the successor of Musab Az-Zarqawi as head of Al-Qaida in Iraq? Osama bin Laden never made a declaration, even though he was the head of Al-Qaida overall.
A Caliphate will not be established by a military organisation (of which a militant group is a type), but by a political one. True, such an organisation will need a military organisation obedient to it, so that it can perform such functions as providing the political government (not just the Caliph) security, securing the borders, bringing other areas within its ambit, and performing normal military functions. But if the political organisation is not committed to forming a Caliphate, it will not be able to so.
Perhaps that was the flaw that Al-Baghdadi never succeeded in overcoming; he made the claim, even though he had only been a militant commander. That may have sharpened his organisational skills, but he never grew beyond his origin. His claim to the Caliphate may have rested on a declaration, but its attraction relied on a feeling among Muslims that they needed protection.
That protection might not be actual help, though that too has been recorded (Muhamad bin Qasim came to India because of one such appeal for help). The protection is mental, and the very fact that Al-Baghdadi attracted so many recruits from various diasporas in Europe, and allegiance from so many groups ranging from Africa to Afghanistan, shows that Muslims, and not just militants, want a Caliph, an overarching authority to permit jihad or otherwise. It must not be forgotten that jihad cannot be performed, except locally, without orders from the Caliph.
Just as the Mamluks converted the Caliph from a ruler into a source of legitimacy for their military coups, Al-Baghdadi tried to use the institution for the narrow purpose of providing a cover for militancy. That might explain why he was unable to convert the declaration into the sort of reality that Muslims want.
