- Nuclear war offers neither side much advantage
AT PENPOINT
One of the apparently most disturbing aspects of the current Kashmir crisis was that it could cause an Indo-Pak war, and that such a war could go nuclear. Behind this assumption lies the fact that Pakistan and India have gone to war because of Kashmir twice, and their third war, essentially over East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, also involved fighting in Kashmir, and as recently as 1998, there was almost a war in Kargil.
Both India and Pakistan have got few advantages, either political or military, from nuclear war, and much to lose. Both are also aware that any conflict can lead to escalation. India may have an advantage for the time being, in fact until September-October, because the general direction of winds is east-west. That means that any nuclear explosions on the Indian side will have fallout (radioactive dust) blown to Pakistan. After September, till around June, the winds will blow west-east, meaning that nuclear explosions in Pakistan will result in fallout over India.
It should not be mistaken by anyone: if India’s abrogation of Kashmir’s status is ignored now, it will have won the war without firing any shots except for the shells lobbed over the LoC. Standing in protest will not be much help
Apart from the fact that nuclear weapons use will be fatal for both countries (one from bombing, the other from the fallout from its own bombing), there is the problem of how the world community, increasingly the USA, would view such use. The world would take a very dim view if, as is likely, the nuclear exchange not only destroyed each other, but plunged the world into nuclear winter. Of course, the world would only take a dim view if human civilisation survived, which is unlikely.
Under such circumstances, it seems that war is unlikely. Then why the talk? One reason is that the Modi government is in office in Delhi. There may be someone within it who is himself convinced that a nuclear war is winnable, and who has the power to persuade his colleagues.
The statement by Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh that India will decide when exactly to use nuclear weapons has been taken to mean that India has abandoned its ‘no-first-use’ nuclear doctrine. It is possible that the ‘no-first-use’ doctrine is not worth the paper it is written on. In which case, Singh was only being frank and up-front about Indian nuclear doctrine.
Pakistan has not made any ‘no-first-use’ pledge, because it is a smaller power which might need nuclear weapons to balance out a conventional disadvantage. Indeed, one use that has been contemplated is a nuclear strike on Indian armoured formations as they mass (but before they attack) for the expected tank battle in the Rajasthan-Cholistan desert. India has made such a pledge, mainly because it is a larger power, and hopes to achieve its war aims by conventional means.
Another factor is historical. During the Cold War, India was allied to the USSR, which had made such a pledge. However, defectors had also made clear that, if there was to be combat in Europe against NATO, the USSR intended to commence battle with nuclear strikes, followed by advancing its motor-rifle divisions into areas irradiated by nuclear blasts, so as to occupy that territory. Singh could well be hinting at this. Some potential Indian targets, such as railway marshalling yards (such as in Lahore, Khanewal or Rohri), or dams (Mangla, Tarbela, and various barrages), should also be struck before battle is engaged. There is also the question of decapitation strikes. Would India be able to resist the temptation of carrying out such strikes as a commencement of hostilities?
One factor that should give both sides pause is that it is not just war that is uncontrollable, but international crises. If a shooting war breaks out, it may not be possible to prevent the use of all weapons. It is also not possible to prevent a crisis leading to shooting, especially if there are elements on either side who think war is winnable. It must not be forgotten that it just needs some (not all) people on one side for the use of nuclear weapons. It is possible that there are such people on the Indian side.
Even then, India seems prepared for the outcry that has not finished coming out. It has managed to neutralise Arab opinion for two reasons. First, Arab leaders are not very interested in Kashmir. The investment of $15 billion announced by Aramco in the Reliance group indicates why, and also indicates why the UAE gave Indian PM Narendra Modi its highest civilian award: greed. Another reason is that it is assumed that Arab leaders represent opinion on the street. They do not.
The amount of Indian trade with China should give Pakistan pause. Indo-China trade was $125 billion in 2017, including Hong Kong. If national interest is the only gauge, the interest of the UN will consist of the self-interest of individual states. To say that Pakistan should improve its economy is another way of saying that it should forget the Kashmir cause.
That leads to the question of how far the elected government of Pakistan is in line with the opinion on the street, and how far it is trying to resist it. Its biggest problem is that war does not seem to provide any solutions. There is the old wish to internationalise the issue, but the manifestations so far do not seem to have led towards a solution. The UN Resolutions have not led to the promised plebiscite, and the recent UN Security Council meeting on the issue did not lead even to a resolution.
The Pakistani strategy has always relied on the world powers stepping in to end any war. Since nuclearisation, it has included a reliance on them to stop a war. This is weirdly reminiscent of British strategy in World War II, of resisting Germany long enough ‘to allow the New World to step in and redress the balance of the Old’.
Expecting anything from internationalisation has not been justified so far. Perhaps it should not be forgotten that Pakistan’s fascination with Kashmir is because of religion. Pakistan does not take quite as much interest in other Indian separatist movements, and has intervened in them only to buttress its case for Kashmir.
One of the problems for Pakistanis is that there has been so much investment in the Kashmir issue. Letting things go would render that investment useless. But it should not be mistaken by anyone: if India’s abrogation of Kashmir is ignored now, it will have won the war without firing any shots except for the shells lobbed over the LoC. Standing in protest will not be much help.
