And the prime minister’s fate
The nation including the media was entirely consumed by the future of the government in wake of Panamagate during the past few months. Resultantly a lot of pressing issues were not properly addressed or not addressed at all
The Panamagate hearings implicating the prime minister and his family have finally drawn to a close. The three members of the special bench of the apex court examining the evidence provided by the JIT will announce its final verdict on a yet to be determined future date.
The much-awaited volume-10 of the copious JIT report has finally been unsealed. And perhaps after the event the prime minister’s lawyer Khawaja Harris has been provided a copy as well. Sharif and his cohorts, unable to explain the fount of their enormous wealth, have been badly mauled in the findings.
But the (now defunct) JIT probing the prime minister and his family has not come out in flying colours either. The prime minister entirely ballistic the other day rightly accused the JIT chief Wajid Zia of nepotism by appointing his own cousin based in London to verify some documents at a whopping cost of US$49,000.
This strengthens the perception that the JIT chief was working under a predetermined agenda to nab the Sharifs. The only institution that has come out unscathed from the whole process is the apex court itself. It gave ample opportunities to the defendants to prove their innocence.
The nation including the media was entirely consumed by the future of the government in wake of Panamagate during the past few months. Resultantly a lot of pressing issues were not properly addressed or not addressed at all.
The US State Department in its country report for year 2016 on terrorism has again accused Pakistan of not taking “significant action” against militants operating from safe havens within its territory. These include the Haqqani Network, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and Lashker-e-Taiaba (LeT).
The report, on the other hand, lauds Pakistan army for effectively clearing the country’s badlands of terrorism with a significant decrease in civilian casualties. It also commends Islamabad for successfully decimating the TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan).
Of course Pakistan vehemently denies these allegations, repeating its mantra that it does not distinguish between the good (Afghan Taliban) or bad (TTP) terrorists. It also rightly claims that it does not harbour India-specific terrorists.
Nevertheless, the world at large is skeptical about such assertions. It believes that Pakistan is doing more than merely providing medical facilities to the families of Afghan Taliban, as advisor on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz, repeatedly contends. The head of TTP Mullah Haibatullah succeeding Mullah Mansoor, who was killed last year in a US drone attack, reportedly teaches at a seminary near Quetta.
The Afghan Taliban have no such qualms. They perennially host TTP and other groups like Jamaat-ul-Ahrar that play havoc in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s security czars might be still patting themselves on the back for successfully playing the game of thrones by keeping Afghanistan on tenterhooks. However, the new Trump administration in Washington views things differently. Islamabad needs to take a fresh look at its options.
The US military has been bogged down in Afghanistan for the past 16 years, the longest war in its history. Trump, with virtually no foreign policy experience and hardly any ideological bent, wants to take a fresh look at his options in Afghanistan.
A review of the US Af-Pak (Afghanistan-Pakistan) policy within the next few days is reportedly in the offing. Of course Pakistan is pivotal to their policy review. Islamabad will be directly affected by what happens in its backyard.
Hitherto a carrot and stick policy has been effectively used by successive US administrations to keep Islamabad in check. But under a new dispensation this policy is being reviewed.
Ostensibly all options are on the table. But it is obvious that the stick is now being used more frequently than the carrot.
US economic assistance has been modest in recent years. US Congress dominated by the Republicans has even made the coalition support fund reimbursement contingent upon its foreign secretary’s certification that Islamabad is not harbouring or supporting the Afghan Taliban.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan’s strategic location is its biggest asset. That is why there are limits to the extent Washington can squeeze Islamabad.
Pakistan’s possible role in initiating talks with the Afghan Taliban is crucial to any deal on power sharing. However, quislings ruling the roost in Kabul makes this task most elusive.
Why would the Taliban cut a deal if they were militarily gaining ground within Afghanistan? And more importantly, after throwing the Afghan Taliban out how is Islamabad expected to bring them to the conference table.
This is the conundrum facing not only US policy makers but also our own security and foreign policy mandarins. Pakistan, despite Indian propaganda, is no banana republic to be dismissed.
It has the sixth largest professional army in the world. It is a nuclear power that, according to some US estimates, in a decade or less will surpass France and China by possessing the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal.
On the flip side (a la former Soviet Union) despite claims to the contrary Pakistan, in dire economic straits, is only buttressed by frequent IMF bailouts and foreign assistance from the west. Similarly, the country is infested with fissiparous tendencies, abject poverty and terrorism.
Knowing Islamabad’s strengths and weaknesses fully well, the Trump administration has treated Pakistan with kid gloves. Too much is made of the budding honeymoon between Trump and Narendra Modi.
True, Washington effectively needs New Delhi’s services as a bulwark against China. But it needs Pakistan to extricate itself from Afghanistan.
For the time being the US administration has decided to send more troops to Afghanistan. The exact number will be decided after the review.
Post 9/11, about 3,000 American soldiers have died in a war 12,000 miles away. Continued bleeding in terms of human lives as well as trillions of dollars spent has domestic implications for any US administration.
This could perhaps be Islamabad’s biggest leverage but at the same time its soft underbelly. It all depends on how it plays its cards.
If Pakistan is unable to deliver the Taliban by bringing them to the conference table the Americans are bound ramp up their diplomatic pressure. On the other hand, Islamabad needs to mend its fences with Kabul. Not an easy task under the present circumstances.
It is convenient for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to blame Pakistan for all his shortcomings at home. In this context, the rumpus created by him about Khyber-4 is totally unnecessary.
On one hand Afghanistan wants Pakistan not to let Afghan Taliban crossover into Afghanistan, but contrarily it is not willing to condone Islamabad securing its borders.
In the meantime the nation waits with bated breath for the Panamagate verdict. Facing possible disqualification, the fate of the prime minister hangs in the balance.
