Why Bajwa will not be an “Establishment General”

Redefining the “savior”

 
The media outlets are abuzz with tributes to the retired Army Chief, and expectations of seeing the identical messiah if not lesser in the persona of the incoming incumbent – General Qamar Javed Bajwa.

General Raheel Sharif rose to wider acclaim indeed surpassing many if not all previous army chiefs. He bolstered the army’s image to newer heights, not justamong the Pakistanis but beyond and across regions. The Army was able to scuttle terrorist infrastructure to a reckonable degree under his command. The genesis of transformation of CPEC into empirical reality similarly owes a great deal to him. Continuing the tradition of his predecessor, he consolidated constitutional role of armed forces, despite the luring calls and opportunism to the contrary. Smart dribbling to avoid involvement into messy international conflicts in the Middle East, albeit not without a cost, was sagacious too, not to mention the restoration of peace in Karachi. Sharif also set standards to measure generalship in Pakistan Army by purging those found guilty of mal-financial practices, and disposing almost entire personal property for harnessing donations to the good of martyrs’ families. The prompt emergence at the scenes of national disasters was also a peculiarity associated with his corporal image. How he bade farewell to arms, has added to his enduring aura. Indeed, he was able to initiate and accomplish some noteworthy achievements for the nation.

A general consensus underlying the repertoire of existing opinions reveals that Bajwa is being compared with Raheel Sharif, and by implications is being nudged to take the course similar to his predecessor.Moreover, he has been called as an “Establishment General” by the former Indian Army Chief, General Bikram Singh – an observation that corresponds with the prevailing perception in the country. These projections are at best speculative, misleading and hence materially tenuous if not wholly misplaced without first conceding that the former Chief entered the scene in a set of environments wherein terrorism was brooding the citizenry as the major national challenge, democratic transition had just commenced, Kashmir was marginally volatile, Afghanistan was inching closer to Pakistan and Pak-India relations were less not more intense, and his exit is marked by another complex, different and rankling landscape of difficulties for the successor. More importantly, a worthwhile assessment is possible by embracing fair knowledge of the stream of service experience that Bajwa has been exposed to, groomed by and relishes, and the value system and the martial indoctrination that he espouses. This writer argues that Bajwa will not only fundamentally break from the past in meaningful ways but  engendering novelty will be his identity marker both inside the military and across civil-military divide in Pakistan during his tenure of duty. Following presumptions underpin this assertion.

First, General Bajwa has risen to the present rank by going through an ideal military career. A text book vocation in Pakistan Army entails serving on three appointments in each rank – command, instructional and staff though with less frequency at senior levels due to the competitive and pyramid nature of the rank structure. Secondly, general staff branch of the army and within it the operational staff is acknowledged as increasingly more prestigious to become a potential candidate for higher seats. This pathway becomes further elite with experience on hazardous assignments and foreign tours in conflicted regions. Without exception, Bajwa has followed this route in entirety. He is consequently a custom made soldier for operational crises. The battle hardened military leaders are historically less flamboyant but reside far closer to the heart of fighting echelons. He can hence exemplify various shades of leadership – the symbolic which is the preserve of more ceremonious flag officers and the combat as in the field but by far more distinctly the transformational. It is this latter trait which makes him persuasively unique as a motivational inspiration and self-actualised war fighting resource. Indeed, he will be accessible to all ranks,not in the sense of socially or literally KhullaDullla – as Wajahat Khan writes. What it substantively means that Pakistan Army under him will transform and be willing to venture across evolving range of scenarios with renewed vigor, foresight and professional surge. General Singh describes only the half-truth that Bajwa will make “impulsive” or “quick” decisions. In fact, he will furnish decisions, nevertheless these will be characterised both by alacrity as well as pragmatic strategic appraisal with focus on implications for the grassroots.

Besides, the genre of general officers that he hails from e.g., including Ishfaq Nadeem, Javed Iqbal Ramday, Wajid Hussian, Noel Israel and General Zubair Hayat, comprises some of the more avid readers not only of the military art and science but having grounding in interdisciplinary and scientific scholarship. He is thus an intellectually fully developed leader who has sophisticated advisors, can sustain rational argument and is well versed with own as well as the undercurrents constituting international setting. Bajwa will therefore, not only consolidate existing gains in war on terror, but can and arguably shall shift qualitative attention into more emergent and subtle domains that have not been addressed by the National Action Plan. It can be expected that to accomplish this task meaningfully he will set his gaze at the distant future by relocating or juxtaposing the warfare dominant counter terrorism strategies within the conceptual space of conflict transformation and peace building framework and by drawing upon expert knowledge to deal with the menace effectively. Even though, the army may not have neither the constitutional warrant to perform this role single handedly nor it might be so appreciated by the politicians or even the polity, Bajwa can use his personal charisma and organisational clout to integrate the entire vision of countering violent extremism and terrorism into a single national effort delineated by shared responsibilities by other instruments of national power. Thus, Army under his command may redraw the contours of counter terrorism approach among other measures also by reviving the so far dormant National Internal Security Policy, which will usher a legitimate human rights centred or at least a criminal justice system driven matrix to curb non-state violence.

If noticed with care, his maiden statement on Kashmir question referenced solution of the dispute by recourse to U.N. resolutions. What is unusual is the employment of legal jargon by a military commander. A qualitative analysis of his discourse on Kashmir would tell that the General is a genuine exponent of dispute settlement through peaceful rather than the military means. It might sound radical to many, I would emphasise that a major de-escalation should be in the offing along Line of Control specifically the constriction but preferably the denial of space to proxies thereby leaving the arena to the Kashmiris and the political leadership for handling the India-Pakistan contestation. Intervention in Afghanistan might reduce as well.

Further, since his leaning for continuation of democratic system has been cited as one of the important reasons for selection to present rank, he is expected to respect civilian rule, but where he might depart significantly from his predecessors is the willing appetite for constructive critique by mainstream political leaders and the civil society. It is improbable that during his tenure, we will witness conventional oppressive role of the deep state in homogenising the traditional security narratives by muzzling the media and forced crowding out of the dissident left. The assertion also means army’s non-interference in political conspiracies and real-politik. Concurrently, he will hopefully internalise the fact that the forerunner of the reputational ethos of military institutions in democratic politics should not be the Army Chiefs or their spokespersons; it is the nation and its elected representatives. If materialised, this systemic reorientation will strengthen the performance audit of the Army.

As a man of substance than rhetoric, the Pakistanis should gradually be accustomed to a less visual but more of a behind the scene performer. Many of his contributions will thus remain unknown to people and the media. Decidedly however, General Bajwa is unlikely to be a typical “establishment general,” he will instead be an apolitical trailblazer and set new trends in founding a post-modern force structure capable of simultaneously dealing with a broader spectrum of security challenges with grit and in accord with popular aspirations well through the 21^st Century. To be fair, he needs to be judged based on his own credentials, and not through the lens of what General Raheel was. Bajwa will be a savior too, but he is another creed altogether.