Does who fund it control it?
While it remains difficult to know for sure how much stronger or weaker ISIS is getting, some things can still be quantified. One, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are now being targetted by the forces they helped create in the Levant. Two, few others, contrary to previous trend, are calling for Assad’s downfall
Did anybody notice that Istanbul was attacked the day after Erdgan apologised, quite out of the blue, to Putin? Now, if the two were related, someone who funds and arms ISIS has suddenly developed some serious problems with Turkey (they have obviously been pretty cross with Russia for a while). But the caliphate has not had many problems with Turkey since, say, when Erdogan suddenly bombed a Russian jet on its way to Syria to bomb ISIS.
What, if this is true, could have happened between then and now to change the calculus so dramatically? Everybody knows that Erdogan wanted Bashar out so bad that he gladly turned a blind eye to all kinds of funds, arms and militias crossing over into Turkey. Also, if you believe the Russians – and the Syrians, Iranians and Iraqis – the Turks had no problems buying Syrian oil ISIS was selling on the black market. And at the time of the jet incident Erdogan said “If anybody should apologise, it’s not us”, before going on to imply that, push come to shove, a nato invasion of Russia would not take a week.
It seems, connecting the dots, that the Russian jet incident was less nato pushed and more an Erdogan gambit. Invoking nato’s all-for-one clause – which no doubt Erdogan had in mind when he spoke of the invasion – could have pushed Russia out of the Syrian war, where its jets, and Spetsnaz advice, had brought the initiative back to the Assad government.
This, not quite by chance, was a time of great change in the Middle East. It was no coincidence that the US warmed to Iran and grew cold towards Saudi Arabia at the same time. America’s own limited involvement in Syria had made it clear by then just where the money and arms were coming from and just who was benefitting from them on the ground.
And the Obama administration did not like this new brand of Riyal politick, to say the least. Hence, most likely, the nato no-no to Ankara. These boys were going a little too far in their obsession with Damascus, and there was no way Obama would leave renewed US involvement up for debate in the US election.
This left Pasha Erdogan with a little egg on his face. This was a different Erdogan, and a very different Turkey, from the ‘no differences with neighbours’ model that became the Muslim world’s ‘ideal to be aimed at’ when Erdogan was rising a decade ago. Now, isolated abroad and ISIS bombs choking Turkey’s hot-money dependent economy, Erdogan made peace with Moscow.
Who would that have upset the most in this great game? And why, around this time, did ISIS go ballistic? Remember, it had just made a couple of very strong showings in Europe. And now, suddenly, there were big hits – physically or symbolically – in Turkey, Iraq, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia.
We know that even prolonged US/allied air strikes did not harm ISIS infrastructure at all. In fact, when the Russians entered, they were surprised to see ISIS pumping and selling oil quite comfortably. It was only when Russian jets took out thousands of ISIS trucks, in hundreds of convoys, heading for the Turkish border that this little enterprise collapse. That, and subsequent events, most likely made Pasha Erdogan realise that his ISIS and Assad policy was just as flawed as his foreign policy since the Syrian uprising.
But even beaten and on the run, ISIS has increased its footprint dramatically. Bangladesh was a minor surprise. It had outwardly very little to do with ISIS, etc, but Dhaka’s onslaught against the religious right of late was bound to invite some sort of reaction. Unfortunately, it turned out to be the worst kind.
This was a different Erdogan, and a very different Turkey, from the ‘no differences with neighbours’ model that became the Muslim world’s ‘ideal to be aimed at’ when Erdogan was rising a decade ago
But Saudi Arabia is a very different story. The attacks there were very different too. There were no coordinated and well trained madmen on the loose with live weapons in crowded areas; like they operated in Europe. And, despite their shock value, they weren’t exactly targeted operations to hit soft, vulnerable targets to inflict maximum damage. Yet somebody is clearly mad enough at Riyadh to get some bombs exploding in the kingdom – a rarity in the worst of times.
This terror war has changed many colours, especially since it came to Syria. Now Turkey is less likely to be a big player. And Saudi cover, on both sides of the Atlantic, is shrinking. However, that is not stopping ISIS from expanding. Maybe it’s desperation from a dying militia. Maybe it’s an exhibition of the ease of inspiring and facilitating terrorism practically around the world.
And while it remains difficult to know for sure how much stronger or weaker ISIS is getting, some things can still be quantified. One, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are now being targetted by the forces they helped create in the Levant. Two, few others, contrary to previous trend, are calling for Assad’s downfall. And three, and most importantly, ISIS is so far coming good on its promise of spreading terror all over the world, and there’s little most countries can do except react.
This is the new wave of terrorism, and even those who bankrolled it are struggling to control it.
