Focus at Al Qaeda and its various associates
As part of the 2014 forecast, PoliTact has been examining the ground situation for the regions impacted by the campaign against extremists. Towards this goal, it was noted that western interpretation of the reality has evolved. At the same time, the lack of indigenous understanding of what may be transpiring has aggravated the predicament. In the previous article, the dynamics of Egypt and Syria was looked at, in this article the focus is on Iraq and the transformation of Al Qaeda (AQ), and how that is impacting the Afghanistan, Pakistan region.
While the nation-states of the region have struggled to contain the extremist and nationalist/separatist elements, these forces have operated across the borders, in the same manner as the war against terror has. This has been most visible in Iraq; a state stands as an example for more than one reason. In the after math of US withdrawal from Iraq, the regime seems struggling to contain the onslaught brought upon by AQ linked Sunni extremist groups, such as Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), which recently took over Ramadi and Fallujah. The correlation with the situation of Afghanistan is alarming; where a complete US withdrawal can result in similar consequences i.e., take over from Afghan Taliban with the help of AQ and other affiliated groups in Pakistan.
The fall of Saddam changed the balance of power in Iraq where now a Shiite led government is in power while the resentment is growing amongst the minority Sunni population that had ruled Iraq in the past. The government is fighting the Sunni extremists with the help of moderate Sunni tribes.
In Syria, it’s the minority Alawites that has controlled power in the majority Sunni country and whose fate now hangs in the balance. The goal of extremists in both Syria and Iraq is to rid the Shiite led governments backed by Iran, and supported by the West in case of Iraq, and Russia in case of Syria. In the long run, these AQ linked extremist groups want to become serious contenders in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in the same fashion Hezbollah has been.
Since the elimination of Osama bin Laden, the hype about Core AQ has decreased and the new narrative presents the organization as a much-diminished threat. There are political and psychological reasons for this change. Under increased economic stress, the death of Osama bin Laden provided a key symbolic victory in the war against terror and opportunity to turn the page. However, on the ground, a different picture is emerging that defies this version. It’s increasingly the affiliates of AQ that have taken on its mission in Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Middle East, and the Islamic Maghreb.
To prevent the region from further instability, France intervened directly in its former colony Mali by sending troops. It also conducted air raids against extremists, reportedly using the airspace of neighboring Algeria in the process. As a reaction, AQ linked Islamic militants took over an Algerian Amenas gas field last year, which is located near its border with Libya. The jumbled operation conducted by Algerian forces to take back the gas field caused the death of about 24 hostages, including foreigners. The situation has raised French resolve to increase military presence in the region.
Through the use of Special Forces and drones, the NATO and the US have been intensely involved against the core AQ in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The contention was that if the core leadership is dealt with, other offshoots such as AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq), AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), and AQIM (Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb) will also lose their vitality. The constant pressure, however, has produced two outcomes: while many of the leaders have been killed, others migrated to create new flashpoints.
As the US withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, it does not in anyway indicate AQ is a mute concern. Increasingly, the extremists and militant groups that are linked to AQ are spearheading its mission. This is evident in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region where a conglomeration of militant and extremist groups led to the formation of Shura-e-Murakebah in 2011. In the Middle East and North Africa, AQ and its affiliates are suspected of exploiting the Arab Spring afflicted hot spots, such as in Syria, Egypt and Libya. The assassination of the American ambassador to Libya in 2012 is a case in point.
While the emphasis of the US and NATO strategy is to prevent AQ from finding a safe haven, from where it can plan attacks against the West. In actuality, AQ and its affiliates are relying less on safe havens and more on simply exploiting the chaos and vacuum created by weak or collapsing regimes. These governments are operating under the dual pressures of viral war against terror and Arab Spring.
One of the key challenges in this regard is that while these nations are being expected to control the situation within, they have minimal influence over the instability in the surrounding neighborhood. As noted previously by PoliTact, this has put the nation-state structure under considerable pressure.
The conflicts of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria did not remain within the confines of these countries. One of the reasons for this being that AQ, with the help of its affiliates, has operated across borders. Overtime, to confront this, the response did the same, with the area of operation for the drones and Special Forces spanning the whole region.
It has thus become critical to understand the nature of these AQ affiliates. In a majority of the cases, the associates are mostly local extremist and militant organizations, with regional ambitions. They usually have their own religious, nationalistic and political agendas that further complicate the ground reality. In return for their cooperation, AQ turns a blind eye to their activities. Similarly, these associate organizations use the cover of AQ for their benefit. However, the cross-pollination amongst extremists groups has produced disastrous results. Consider, for example, the interplay of AQ and TTP, Haqqani network and LeT.
Working through a network of local extremist and jihadi organizations has several strategic benefits for AQ. Firstly it gives them a reach and penetration that is impossible otherwise. AQ members simply embed themselves and can go undetected for quite a while. Secondly, it gives AQ sustainability.
When AQ members feel threatened, they migrate to other less hostile areas of incubation.
Meanwhile, the local affiliates provide the continuity in the absence of direct supervision. As NATO moves its attention based on shifting threats, it too depends on regional allies to keep a check on local affiliates of AQ. The net result is that while the NATO and the US may move on, the conflicts still simmer while producing economic drain at a time when no one can afford it.
To counter this conglomeration of extremists, the efforts are to separate the local and more moderate extremists from the hardened AQ linked ones that have regional and global ambitions.
The application of this model in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region has proven to be difficult, as it has in Syria and Iraq, and remains a work in progress.
Even before the war against extremists got initiated and the Arab revolts spread, many states impacted by the above phenomena’s were also inflicted by separatist movements of one form or the other. Most of these were the byproduct of how new states were crafted at the end of World War II. In a majority of the cases, AQ has stayed away from such nationalist oriented insurgencies.
On the other hand, in the unfolding Arab revolts, the West usually sides with the liberal anti-regime and moderate Islamists that accept democratic norms, and not necessarily the separatists. This is obviously is a difficult balance to maintain and may change in the future depending on the nature of global politics.
As the state structures crumble under the triple pressures of war on terror, Arab revolt, and separatist movements, AQ and associates are striving to fill the vacuum and create new flash points. This is in turn is creating even more opportunities for Western intervention when they can hardly afford them.
In the next article, the focus will shift to understanding the response from the regions impacted by extremism, and how that is getting intertwined with the regional and global power tussles.
Arif Ansar is chief analyst at PoliTact, a Washington-based futurist advisory firm (www.PoliTact.com). He can be reached at: [email protected], and on Twitter at: @ArifAnsar.
