Reality check

What a superpower wants, a superpower gets

Suddenly it has dawned upon our policymakers, civilian and khaki, that it is time to ‘move on’ beyond Salala. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) in its meeting chaired by President Zardari, with the COAS General Kayani and the PM in attendance, has decided to reopen the land routes for NATO supplies suspended for almost six months.

The foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar has underscored the need for closure on the impasse with Washington. Although Prime Minister Gilani has claimed that the invitation for Zardari to attend the NATO summit in Chicago is unconditional, it is obvious that the formal announcement from Brussels came only after Islamabad had agreed in principle to let NATO supplies pass through its territory.

Surely, it’s time to restore a modicum of normality to ties with Washington. And it is welcome news that Islamabad has taken a decision to move in that direction. Better late than never.

Whatever the reasons behind this sudden about-face, its redeeming feature is that the civilian and military leadership are on the same page on the issue. Perhaps, there is a belated realisation that foreign policy and security decisions should be taken not merely on misplaced emotional considerations but on the basis of hard-nosed realities and enlightened self-interest.

Since the Salala incident, in which Pakistan lost 24 of its soldiers in an unprovoked attack, Islamabad had repeatedly asked for an unqualified apology from the US. Till such an apology came, NATO supplies were to remain suspended. Added to this was the demand for an end to drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas.

Islamabad in the immediate aftermath of the Salala episode made US personnel vacate the Shaheen Airbase. Interestingly, before this, it had always been officially denied that Islamabad was facilitating drone attacks on its own territory by providing a base to the US.

Although it has been decided in principle to resume supplies, none of our demands have been met. A spokesman of the Pentagon has reiterated that the US had already expressed ‘deep regret’ and offered condolences to the Pakistani government, the people and the affected families over the incident, and that was sufficient.

It is generally claimed that Washington was willing to proffer an apology at one stage, but changed its mind after last month’s attack on Kabul by the Haqqani group allegedly launched from N Waziristan.

In the last few months, Washington has visibly hardened its position towards Pakistan. Apart from increasing hostility being expressed towards Pakistan by various Congressmen and scathing criticism in the media and academia, Pakistan is increasingly being considered as part of the problem in Afghanistan rather than the solution.

Since 9/11, Islamabad had been considered a friend, but of late was being referred to as a ‘frenemy’. But after Osama bin Laden was discovered and killed in Abbottabad a year ago, Pakistan graduated to the status of a virtual enemy.

The past few weeks have been singularly detrimental to Islamabad’s strategic and economic interests. The State Department (as opposed to the Pentagon and US lawmakers on both sides of the divide), even in the worst of times, had kept Islamabad engaged. Of late, even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been losing patience with Islamabad.

Clinton’s recent visit to Bangladesh and India, while bypassing Pakistan, was a deliberate snub to Islamabad. While in India, her scathing criticism of Islamabad’s alleged complicity with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and its harbouring of Hafiz Saeed proved to be a bit much for the already strained relationship.

Moreover, President Obama’s sudden dash to Kabul on the eve of the first anniversary of Osama’s killing and signing of a ten-year strategic partnership agreement with Karzai was another indicator that events were overtaking Pakistan.

Thanks to a flawed and jaundiced strategic paradigm based on a misplaced and disproportionate sense of strategic importance in the region, Islamabad has become increasingly isolated. Our policy makers have now been forced to change course. If the purpose of our ostensible hurt from the US was to keep India out of Afghanistan, our policies have achieved just the opposite.

Not only a budding strategic partnership with regional designs is flourishing between New Delhi and Washington, Kabul has also been assured that it will not be left at the mercy of Islamabad after ISAF eventually withdraws from Afghanistan in 2014.

On the flip side, Pakistan has legitimate security concerns and outstanding issues with the US. Billions of dollars (according to Islamabad’s reckoning) under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) remain stuck.

Despite the acknowledgement that most terrorists including Osama bin Laden could not have been eliminated without the support from Pakistan, there is widespread opposition amongst US lawmakers to approve the $2.4 billion aid package. On top of this, military assistance and cooperation also remain suspended.

Apart from the predictable adverse comments from the likes of Imran Khan and Munawar Hassan of Jamaat-e-Islami, the reaction to the agreement on restoration of NATO supplies has been relatively muted. The mainstream opposition headed by Nawaz Sharif has criticised the government for buckling under pressure. But despite his criticism, Nawaz knows exactly where the shoe hurts.

As prime minister in July 1999, Sharif was made to dash to Washington to request President Clinton for a ceasefire in Kargil. The disastrous insurgency started by Musharraf turned out to be a fiasco and had spiralled out of control. Nawaz was pivotal in extracting a withdrawal deal courtesy Clinton. However, the military accused him of capitulation only a few months later and showed him the door.

It is perhaps the first time in the chequered history of civil-military relations in Pakistan that the government has been cautious enough not to be negotiating terms of engagement with the US without visibly taking all the stakeholders on board. This includes not only the military leadership but the parliament as well. Hence, the past pattern when civilians were made to fall on their own swords by the ubiquitous establishment will not be repeated.

The restoration of the NATO supplies could be beneficial for Islamabad once the ISAF withdrawal process starts. If relations are not as frayed as they are today, the military could successfully negotiate to use much of the military equipment used by the NATO forces. But for that to happen, the present trust deficit will have to be reduced.

President Zardari will have to play a crucial role at the Chicago summit this weekend to bring back Pakistan into the critical negotiations for the endgame in Afghanistan.

The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today