The Afghanistan conundrum

0
149

2011 was a year of turmoil as far as US-Pakistan ties are concerned and was marked by three major events; the Raymond Davis incident in January, Operation Geronimo in May, and Salala check post incident in November. Shah Mehmood Qureshi fell victim to the controversy surrounding the Raymond episode while Husain Haqqani is still dealing with the Memogate scandal.
After each of the above developments, Pakistan took punitive actions. For example, soon after the Raymond Davis incident, the nation asked for the US security personnel to leave the country. In the aftermath of Osama operation, the country suspended intelligence cooperation, which included the closing down of Shamsi airbase. And, after the Salala tragedy, Pakistan shut down Nato’s Afghan supply lines, demanded a formal apology, and initiated a serious review of its policy and ties with the US.
Moreover, each incident is followed by a predictable pattern of activities. Immediately after a mishap, a media blame game starts, followed by a cooling off and patching up period. Business returns to normal only after a flurry of high-level visits from US and behind the scene agreements on new set of rules.
Along these lines, this week a number of critical meetings have taken place. Gen Mattis and Gen Allen visited Pakistan to meet with senior military officials, including Gen Kayani. PM Gilani and President Obama also met in Seoul on Tuesday. The media reported the meetings between the military officials of the two countries to be the first since the Mohmand incident. On the contrary, Gen Dempsey claimed he had met Kayani on five occasions during this timeframe. Reportedly, Lt Gen Pasha also had a number of encounters with his counterparts. On the political side, Foreign Minister Khar recently met Hilary Clinton in London, and according to reports, she will be travelling to Pakistan in April.
So it can be said that behind the scenes political and military officials of the two nations have continued to have exchanges, while publicly maintaining distance, though little is known about the substance of these meetings.
These high-level gatherings are taking place as the Afghan war has taken a turn for the worse. Mistrust between Afghan Security Forces (ASF) and NATO troops is on the increase. According to media reports on Tuesday, more than a dozen Afghan soldiers were arrested on allegations of plotting to attack the Afghan Defence Ministry, and 10 suicide jackets were found inside the heavily guarded ministry. The arrests of afghan soldiers have also raised fears of backlash from Afghan forces, following spike in attacks on Nato troops. The incident has once again put a question mark on the ability of afghan forces to take over the security responsibilities after US withdrawal, which has been the bedrock of Nato strategy.
In the aftermath of the killing of 16 civilians by a US soldier in Panjwaii District, Taliban and Hizbe Islami both have suspended the peace talks. Meanwhile, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had informed the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta that foreign troops should be pulled out of Afghanistan’s remote areas, and the transition process of security responsibilities should be completed by 2013, instead of 2014.
Despite the setbacks, US officials have emphasised to carry on with their strategy. Gen John Allen recently stated that he has not decided yet on launching offensive in eastern Afghanistan. However, he stated, “We anticipate shifting resources to the east in any case because it remains there that the principal COIN (counterinsurgency) fight will ultimately be shaped in 2012.” He also criticised Pakistan for allowing Al-Qaeda to operate with impunity, and Iran, which he said fuels insurgency.
Speaking at the Brooking Institute in Washington DC on March 26, Gen Allen emphasised on the potential for complementary operations to purge safe havens from terrorists. Depending on Pakistan’s parliamentary review, he commented, the US and Pakistan could talk about combining capabilities for joint operations. He was probably sending a message to Pakistan, indicating flexibility on the joint use of drones. However, Pakistan wants to end the drone strikes altogether or put some kind of conditionality on it.
On the other hand, one of strongest supporter of US presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014, Sen Lindsey Graham recently stated that if Karzai did not change his stance on two key US demands, the US military might as well pack up and leave Afghanistan ‘sooner rather than later’.
Graham said, “If the president of the country can’t understand how irrational it is to expect us to turn over prisoners and if he doesn’t understand that the night raids have been the biggest blow to the Taliban … then there is no hope of winning. None.”
The tensions between military and political objectives continue to complicate US relations with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. While the emphasis remains on achieving military objectives, the attaining of political goals has become more distant. It is not that Karzai and Zardari do not want to go along with the US strategy but that it has become politically untenable for them to do so, and this represents a paradigm shift on the ground.
The type of conflict in question can only be won by winning over more people than losing to the extremists, and the tactics and strategies that help achieve this. At this juncture of the war, the military approach is only complicating and delaying arriving at a political solution. And the longer it takes to reach a negotiated solution; the room to wiggle is only going to shrink.

The writer is the chief analyst for PoliTact (www.PoliTact.com and http:twitter.com/politact) and can be reached at [email protected]