What was missed out?
Never was a meeting of Pakistani Ambassadors, an otherwise routine affair, given so much publicity as the one held earlier this month. The moot was presented as a seminal event in this country’s diplomatic history as if its decisions portended to impact critically on the direction of Pakistan’s foreign policy. The initial impression that this may indeed turn out to be true, preceded and accompanied as the event was by uncharacteristic hype, dissipated when details of its deliberations filtered into the media.
The real issues, it seems, were left unattended.
The participants, as widely reported in the media, called for the renegotiation of two important agreements signed between the Pakistani government and NATO and the United States. The first allowed the use of our territory for the transfer of supplies to Afghanistan and the second pertained to the provision of logistical support to the Americans in their war effort against Afghan bred terror. Pakistan is fully within its right to review these agreements yet some points are noteworthy.
The agreements were made in the context of a broader strategic calculus. Suspension of NATO supplies, closure of the Shamsi airbase, retaliation in self defence are tactical measures but how do these relate to the bigger picture. What role Pakistan envisages for itself in the emerging regional scenario in which economic and energy linkages are considered pivotal? Would it be in our national interest to be a part of this arrangement and accordingly adjust our policies in the region or should we impede its realization. Are alternatives available and of what kind? Revisiting operational arrangements is fine but the exercise, to be meaningful, needs to be conducted within a strategic framework, which should have been defined first.
It was recommended that Pakistan should organise its foreign relations on principles of equality and mutual respect. Yes, but how? It is axiomatic that economic dependency diminishes national sovereignty. The Pakistani economy, as the consensus amongst our economists suggests, is in the throes of a serious crisis likely to be compounded by the recent Congressional decision to provisionally suspend 700 million dollars in economic assistance. The European Union, possibly on a nod from Washington, continues to procrastinate on our application for GSP plus concessions. Dying foreign investment, widening trade deficits, galloping inflation, rising unemployment and collapsing state enterprises do not provide an ideal basis for staking a claim for a position of equality in the comity of nations. A unique opportunity for underlining the vast disconnect between our external policies and economic performance, mandating concomitant adjustments on both counts, was allowed to pass.
For the past several months Pakistani officials and analysts, including the undersigned, have urged that durable peace in Afghanistan requires Pakistan’s full involvement in the Afghan endgame. Obviously the Americans have not been listening. Reports of direct US engagement with the Taliban, including Mullah Omar’s emissaries, have surfaced sporadically. Recently, it has come to light that negotiations between the two have been going on for nearly a year in Germany and Qatar. Reportedly six rounds of talks have produced hopeful results with both sides now poised to address hard issues. Apparently, even the Afghan leadership was kept in the dark prompting Karzai to consider recalling his ambassador from Doha which is believed to have offered to host a Taliban office.
Evaluating Pakistan’s stance on these talks should have been an issue of immediate interest for the envoys. Should we support or obstruct this initiative? How should we use our influence with some Taliban factions in regard to these negotiations? An objective analysis of the pros and cons of Pakistan’s choices would have been an immensely useful input from the conference.
It was suggested that irrespective of the US approach, which was deemed to be disinterested in reconciliation, Pakistan should reach out to Europe to advance the peace process. In short, reconciliation is to be sought in partnership with marginal actors on the Afghan scene to the exclusion of a country which maintains over a hundred thousand troops in Afghanistan and has spent close to half a trillion dollars in the war effort. At least the envoys based in western capitals should have known that no European country would ever contemplate teaming up with Pakistan in the Afghan end game contrary to US interests. Unpleasant realities need to be confronted and addressed, not glossed over.
Revisiting these agreements is timely and given the turn of events, necessary. However, the outcome of these reviews would be meaningful only when conducted within an overall strategic context in which Pakistan’s regional objectives are clearly defined consistent with ground realities, domestic and external.
The Parliamentary Committee on National Security will now deliberate on the recommendations of the envoys. It is hoped that the depositories of public trust will not hesitate to take up these crucial matters and give a clear direction to the nation in these troubled and confusing times. Chartering an unsustainable course may well land us irretrievably on the wrong side of history.
The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at shaukatumer@hotmail.com