According to a news report, the American CIA is giving the US military an extended say in the debate over how the war in Afghanistan is going by allowing battlefield commanders to weigh in on the analysis at early stages. Seen as a campaign to enhance the poor marks that the CIA had already given to the military efforts in Afghanistan in the previous years, the endeavour is attracting a lot of criticism from within the US, and rightly so.
The newly arrived commander, General Patraeus has cooked up this brilliant plan to further blindfold the audience back home into painting the US forces in Afghanistan as a triumphant force. Ground realities, however, have proven this claim as a completely false notion as no tangible change has occurred in the security situation. With increased militant commotion in Afghan territory, this scheme is surely a much needed one for the morale and image of the US troops in Afghanistan?
The question arising here is that does anyone ever criticize oneself? Would the US commanders and troops be able to provide an objective and unbiased view of their own performance? Who provides the version of the other side? And who decides which version is correct?
Night raids and drone attacks are being classed as a complete success according to US standards, which is totally in contradiction to how the locals hail such endeavours. The US, for the Afghan populace is an invading force, while the invasion of Afghanistan is legitimised by the US for the genuine purpose of curbing terror.
What has been the outcome of previous analysis? Has any workable policy been formulated so far by the US policy makers? What does the CIA plan to achieve from this obviously skewed analysis?
What is actually needed in this backdrop is evaluation and not a subjective self analysis. Evaluation is defined as “the comparison of actual impacts against strategic plans. It looks at original objectives, at what was accomplished and how it was accomplished.”
For a holistic and comprehensive picture the US objectives and accomplishments need to be viewed and instead of concocted stories of success, actual battlefield facts need to come to the fore upon which clear and effective policies ought to be based.
LUBNA UMAR
Islamabad
