Can early election put a lid on factors besmearing law and order landscape in Pakistan? Is there something really magical in elections which can morph the country into a soothing place for its citizenry? Beyond political rhetoric, the answer may be a serious doubt which asks for capturing a bigger picture.
The doubt comes from a number of reasons. One reason being the thought of elections as only expression of democratic accountability. While democracy values voting out a government instead of booting out, it requires multiplicity of institutional arrangements which generate accountability of the legislature and political executive. It requires, more than early elections, existence of civil society-based think tanks generating enlightened understanding amongst masses, multiple channels of information sharing on issues of public policy, and sufficiently efficient system of judicial dispensation.
In the absence of strong resolve to create diversity and redundancy in institutions designed to hold political representatives accountable, mere elections might matter less for good governance. On the contrary, this is possible that repeated early elections cast a negative shadow on the possibility of representative democracy in Pakistan by eroding public trust in stability and accountability potential of the arrangement.
Amongst the less-developed countries, who are struggling with pseudo-democracies, there is a tendency to use elections as a tactic to pressurize the regime in power. This belief is embedded in cold war situations. Fixing a regime with terror of elections may be effective weapon against authoritarian and totalitarian regimes but political parties seldom fear ballots more than bullets. Under the current political situation in Pakistan which does not show any unambiguous political favourite, the tactic may not address the desire for early change of guard.
Elections which form the core of democratic transfer of power or regime change may not be a sure catalyst for a radical change in worrisome social arrangements. Social institutions such as ethnic identities and sub-national loyalties play a significant role in determining who might adjust on the driving seat in elections. In countries such as Pakistan, people usually do not use ballot for a change in political elite for better governance. In fact, expectations for a rule-based, meritocratic, and egalitarian regime is seldom on the radar screen of voters. These are ethnic and parochial interests which decorate the political shelves in election markets. Ability to handle thana, patwari, and naukri is a more desirable trait than competence to govern better.
Interestingly, there is some economics involved in having better democracy and governance. Many researches across countries show that certain amount of increase in income levels is necessary to create demand for good governance. More than election-fetish, Gross Domestic Product going beyond US$ 5000-6000 per capita is a fuel which makes social change travel beyond superficial democracy to establish equality of civic rights in a polity. Along with the works of visionary leadership, economic growth throttling good democratic governance is a hard earned equilibrium under rapid socio-economic transformation of society.
What has been argued is not to get elections out of Pakistan. These are indeed important component of democracy. What is indeed argued is the need to understand the social and economic factors which cause and influence violence, ethnic identification, local loyalties, and repression. A full understanding may ask political leadership to work for more fundamental changes in national ecology than early elections.
ZUBAIR FAISAL ABBASI
Islamabad
