The Afghan Policy Review that is inextricably linked to the US exit from the region, was presented as another US document to reinforce the American viewpoint and future undertakings in a legalised manner with the announcement of the imaginary triumphs and victories attained, so to speak, of the US/Nato forces in Afghanistan with a renewed focus on Pakistan.
The review clearly reveals that the US military objectives in Afghanistan are more or less similar to those presented in the previous year which were ; to deny Al Qaeda a safe haven, to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government of President Hamid Karzai and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take the lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future, for which Obama had ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 American troops to Afghanistan.
This signifies that there has been very little on ground achievements for the Nato forces, which is explained in an American policy magazine aptly as; Despite a huge infusion of money and troops, we appear to be standing in place, thus confirming the fact that one whole year of launching various military operations in Afghanistan has led to no apparent change in the peace and stability of the area.
This brings us to the consequent policy shift that spells; if American troops are failing painted as undefeatable and infallible super heroes of a superpower hich does not go down well with the popular American image, then the blame must be shared by someone with an equal involvement and significance in the war with a strong background of facing the odds. And guess what? Pakistan fits the bill to perfection as it has all the US desired attributes with an exemplary history of collecting the American leftovers and being grateful for it too.
Coming towards the famous counterinsurgency operation that can be explained as a complex phenomenon that have to be seen in relation with all the phases integrated to ascertain whether it has achieved what it was drawn out to.
The outcome is in most cases passive with results seen only at tactical level and needs, predominantly to be inferred from opinions and attitudes of the local populace. With a large majority of the local Afghan people opting for peace through negotiations as they have lost faith in the capabilities of the Nato/ US forces that have, for a long time now, been suffering various degrees of psychological ailments, communicate a clear message.
Among the three main phases that underlie a successful operation, more stress is attached to the building and construction stage that confirms and consolidates the gains from the previous phases. The conceptualization, analysts argue, should include the statement of the purpose of the reconstruction, the description of essential elements, a general schema of reconstruction activities, guidelines for assigning responsibility, and guidelines for assessment, but the US strategy adopted in Afghanistan so far is a deviant version that aims largely on clear, hold and hegemonise. Therefore, the shortcomings of the current counterinsurgency-based plan of using military force to facilitate better Afghan governance needs to be reviewed in this backdrop.
The US role in completely backing the Karzai government is no state secret as a majority of the Afghan officials on the CIA payroll for decades to facilitate US interests in the region. Evidently, the US through its intelligence agency, allows neither corruption to die down in Afghanistan nor to mend the impoverished and fractured structures of its institution lest they become strong enough to defy the US manipulative tactics.
LUBNA UMAR
Islamabad
