The bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States have become increasingly complex, manifesting convergence and divergence at the same time and reflecting varying degrees of distrust from time to time. Both apply pressure on each other, although the US has more levers to pull to off-balance Pakistan.
The major reason for the games the US and Pakistan play with each other is that they share the goal of elimination of terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan but diverge on the strategies to achieve this goal. What kind of policies should each pursue at a particular point in time? Whether Pakistan should follow the directions from the US about undertaking military operation against the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups or decide about it on the basis of its own experience and calculations? Should Pakistan cultivate some Taliban groups either for immediate reasons or for long-term political accommodation?
The US impatience on these issues has increased because the NATO/US troops have not been able to stem the Taliban tide in Afghanistan. Their problem is to sustain the military gains they periodically make because of insufficient Afghan military and administrative back-up. The other problem is the failure to assure a secure and better future to the ordinary Afghans living outside the main Afghan cities. The ordinary Afghans are under pressure, both from American troops and Taliban fighters, not knowing who their genuine friend is.
The US military authorities place the main responsibility of the military impasse in Afghanistan on cross-border movement of the Taliban fighters from and to Pakistans tribal areas and Pakistans duplicity of selectively targeting the Taliban entrenched in its tribal areas. At times, Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is accused of cultivating the elements of Afghan Taliban.
The US task in persuading Pakistan to accommodate its concern has become difficult because the civilian government has a limited, if any, role in the operational management of counter-terrorism operations and security-related interactions with Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army and the ISI call the shots and they are tougher bargainers than the civilian leaders whose basic job is limited to building support for counter terrorism policy within Pakistan and dealing with its diplomatic dimension.
The Pakistan Army is playing tough because it is facing resistance beyond expectations. Though the present phase of counter terrorism has been going on in the tribal areas since 2009, the Army and the paramilitary forces have not been able to consolidate their positions; the end of the war is not in sight. The Army and the paramilitary forces have lost more people in the counter-insurgency than in any single war in the past.
Like the US, Pakistans military authorities think that the roots of their problems in the tribal areas and Balochistan can be traced to the Afghanistan side of the border. Cross-border movement of the fighters, weapons and funds is viewed by them as a serious problem. This view is shared widely in Pakistans civilian sectors, especially amongst the Islamists, who hold the US policies in Afghanistan as the main cause of Pakistans current security problems. This view can also be found in the military circles, forcing the civilian and military leaders to pursue their interaction with the US with caution.
The US and Pakistan appear quite impatient in pursuing their agendas to satisfy their respective domestic political circles either by building direct and indirect pressure on the other side or pursuing the agenda by non-diplomatic means. These strategies are likely to increase distrust and create psychological barriers that will make it difficult to overcome the divergence in their disposition and policies.
The intelligence agencies of the two countries have recently been playing interesting games against each other. The direction by a New York based court to Pakistans ISI chief and other officials to appear before it in a case for compensation relating to terrorist attack in Mumbai cannot be viewed as a routine matter. This tactic will neither change Pakistans counter terrorism policy nor enable the initiator of the case to get compensation from Pakistan.
This could be a rejoinder to what happened in Islamabad a week or so before the New York incident. A group from the tribal areas staged a protest in Islamabads high security zone against the drone attacks. This protest got enough media coverage and later they filed a complaint with the Islamabad Police against an official in the US embassy by name, described as the chief of the CIA operations in Pakistan. Such an activity is not possible in Islamabad without the blessings of Pakistans security authorities, especially the ISI, who appear to have used the Islamists for this purpose. The said US official had to leave Pakistan to avoid controversy.
The well-known methods of building pressure on Pakistan are news leakages in Washington or publication of select stories in the US media. The US administration can deny such stories but they leave their impact. The recent story in a leading US newspaper about the US approaching Pakistan for the use of its ground troops in North Waziristan appears to be part of this strategy.
Pakistans intelligence authorities also play similar games. They use their linkages in the print and electronic media to plant stories or encourage propaganda campaigns against the US. The best illustration of the Army and its intelligence agencies playing the media game was the Armys decision in 2009 to publicly criticise the provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) relating to the military and the intelligence agencies. This amounted to publicly reprimanding the civilian government for agreeing to such provisions. The ISI used its linkages in the media and the Islamist and right-wing political circles to mobilise support for the militarys perspective. Consequently, for a month or so, Pakistans civilian government and the US were subjected to the harshest criticism in Pakistani media, especially by the Islamist parties, the PML(N) and the TIP.
There is a need to think seriously if Pakistan and the US should play games of diplomacy through these ways. There is a need to understand each others political and security dilemmas. The key Pakistani concerns relate to the regional situation the DAY AFTER the US/NATO quit the region while Afghanistan is in turmoil. The US can leave the region but Pakistan cannot change its geography.
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.
