In his present avatar, Nawaz Sharif seems to be infused with a crusaders spirit in taking on the establishment while always making a deliberate attempt to further reinforce his own democratic credentials. And his espousal of popular causes means that he is consciously trying to forge a new identity for himself and for his party.
Given the PMLs profile (of whichever hue, this has forever been a handmaiden of the establishment), this is an awesome undertaking. To be fair to him, he has so far stuck to his guns. But is this reawakening for absolutely altruistic reasons? Or is it that the Musharraf coup has put him in such a spot with the army where this has emerged as his only option?
After being weaned and raised by the very same establishment in the 1980s, he was installed in the highest executive office of the land in 1990 through an election which if not entirely rigged wasnt by any means devoid of some smart work by agencies efficient in the extreme in the dirty tricks department (how IJI came into being overnight, where the inspiration and resources came from, is now undeniable. And there are no prizes for guessing who benefited from the exercise).
For his part, Nawaz subsequently showed a belligerent bent and had run-ins with four successive army chiefs two apiece in both his tenures. Though he managed to do Gen. Jahangir Karamat in, the victory indeed was pyrrhic. His historic mandate not coming to his rescue, the next most carefully hand-picked incumbent sent his government packing and him to the slammer.
For the first time in his political career, he countenanced the full measure of the wrath of the establishment. To him the fall, followed by the ordeal of imprisonment and exile, must have been soul-searing, as it seemed to transform him both as a person and a politician. A most obvious outcome was his accommodation for the erstwhile arch enemy, Benazir Bhutto and the PPP that resulted in the Charter of Democracy.
But post-October 12, 1999 the disdain between him and the establishment has been mutual. In fact, the army at least the brass at the top and close to it is said to have as little a penchant for him as it once had for the Bhuttos.
The dilemma for Nawaz is that the causes close to his and his core supporters rightist hearts are the same that the establishment (albeit now tacitly) devotes its not inconsiderable energy to and that includes a soft spot for the ideological, militant elements whom the whole world defines in a much different refrain.
The bulk of the right and ultra conservative vote in the Punjabs urban and rural centre and north the N country, so to speak whom Nawaz courts and whose unstinted backing has made him the political force to reckon with, is also in terms of its ideology wedded to the establishment. There is one exception though: since the Musharraf coup, the non-military component of the right has distanced itself from the latter.
Thus, despite the force of circumstances turning the two into antagonists, there remains a similarity in the world view of Nawaz and the establishment. The only slight bit of divergence is that whatever his faults, Nawaz is no Shaukat Aziz or Zafarullah Jamali not a mere camp follower hungry for the fair and foul perks and privileges of office.
That is why while Nawazs image-makeover endeavour bodes well for strengthening democracy, he is treading on uncharted territory. And he must have found out from the jeers and sneers his sympathetic response evoked after the Ahmadi communitys two places of worship resulted in scores of casualties, that a few wrong steps could alienate his own rightist constituency.
The politics of right in this country has for so long, to be precise from the days of Nawazs first mentors Gen. Jilani and Gen. Zia, been so enthusiastically dedicated to the militant strain that it is now difficult for it to disentangle itself completely from the now taboo purveyors of terrorism.
There are other political spanners in the works too.
If he pushes the PPP too far on the governance and transparency issues, where no doubt Prime Minister Gilani and his cabinet is seriously wanting, it would not just be seen as giving the establishment an opportunity to asphyxiate it further. Another unintended consequence of this could be bringing his own partys equally undistinguished rule in the Punjab in the spotlight.
Also, his party which once had presence in the other provinces too, has mostly been reduced to the Punjab.
And unlike the 1990s, when carefully constructed alliances with wink and nod from the puppeteers, Nawaz no longer has the privilege of primacy on the rightist vote. There are others competing for space. And now Pir Pagara being trotted out as unifier of the myriad Leagues and the Q flirting with PPP to erode his constituency would not amuse Nawaz either.
So, in essence, the major dilemma facing Nawaz Sharif is whether he can do the politics of right, still take on the establishment and increase the depth and spread of his vote bank. Whether he juggles it right or bungles remains to be seen.
The writer is Sports and Magazines Editor, Pakistan Today.
