Multiple dimensions of the Saudi upheaval

Turkey siding with Qatar and a power game in Syria help explain recent developments

The recent upheaval in the Saudi Power circles cannot be taken as an isolated incident, but one with very far reaching regional consequences. The ruffle and shuffle in the name of an anti-corruption campaign has placed the power conveniently in the hand of a single Saudi royal: the instigator of this power restructuring, Mohammad bin Salman.

The royal is reported to be the most powerful figure in the kingdom in exercise of authority, and is also next in succession to the current King Salman. The beneficiary of all this virtuous pretense of cleansing the corruption cabal is being propagated to be the general public, though only time will testify to that.

But why the power needed to be consolidated in one person in such a meticulously planned and menacing fashion so as to leave any other member of house of Saud paralyzed in the matters of the kingdom? Has there been any recent precedence in the neighbouring lands of the Saudi Kingdom that initiated the need for such an action?

One has to connect the dots.

The Turkish coup does comes to mind. While the coup itself dissolved quickly, what evolved was a picture of a Turkey with its reins in an ever stronger Recep Tayyip Erdogan having his fists full of all the legislative and executive paraphernalia he could ever wish for.

Be it a nurse working in a hospital or a teacher in a school all were now a nod away from being on job to being behind bars. It is that kind of a despotic countenance that Erdogan took after the Turkish coup.

This led some to believe that the coup was carefully orchestrated by those around Erdogan to give unmatched control of the Turkish fate to him; and that it was a controlled explosion with its fallout intended to be exactly where it ended up.

At the same time Saudi Arabia was in the midst of creating a military alliance dubbed, IMA: Islamic Military Alliance. The charter of the alliance was an anti-terrorism force made up of Muslim majority nations that would be Saudi lead.

While it is a known fact that terrorism is best dealt by employing intelligence sharing regarding individuals and finances; a military alliance, on the other hand functions to challenge other military blocks and power centres. This made some analysts suggest that, perhaps, IMA was a euphemism, as far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, for a counter force for the Shia regimes present in the middle-east.

Erdogan’s Turkey did join Saudi Arabia’s much touted anti-terror alliance but went as far as deploying its forces supporting Qatar during Saudi-Qatar crises.

That was a rude awakening for Saudi Arabia; the fallacy of whose lead role in IMA was visible when a member state, Turkey, had practically drawn its forces against Saudi interests, and next to the Saudi border in Qatar. In doing so Turkey also put in jeopardy the future of IMA as a vibrant and functional body.

It was in this environment that someone stood up to the challenge, from the house of Saud, to rival, in his stature and role, the might of Turkish President Erdogan in, perhaps, gearing up for a vitalized regional posture for the kingdom.

But why would a powerful Erdogan and Saudi rulers find themselves in competition regarding their foreign influence?

The answer can be found in the plight of Syria.

There is no doubting the fact that since Assad’s regime has been targeted by the western powers, it was both Turkey and Saudi Arabia who gave their fullest consent to the idea.

With the possibility of a Shia regime being replaced by a Sunni-led government both these countries could imagine an influence in the future Syria. This was luring enough for Syrian neighbours to support the forces working for the demise of Assad’s government. Only to the disappointment of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and to the surprise of western powers, Russia took too stubborn a stance for outside interventions to be more fruitful.

The Russian role did change the geopolitical strategy of both Turkey and Saudi Arabia. While this led the reluctant relationship of Turkey and Russia take some solid foundations, Saudi Arabia had to tilt for the first time towards Russia in its history, strategically speaking.

Earlier, in November 2015, Turkey showed its ambitions by downing a Russian plane but when USA could not formulate a decisive war plan to restrict Russian relevance in the Syrian equation, Turkey understood its meager status in front of a restrained but militarily powerful Putin.

Soon Tayyip Erdogan reverted to the path of trade agreements with Russia, which in modern international relations sometimes amounts to a signal of strategic respect of other nations. This was also replicated, in an unprecedented and least expected move, by a Saudi King visiting Russia last month resulting also in some trade agreements.

To be able to intervene in a post Assad Syria, Saudi Arabia could not have asked for anything better than a war with Yemen. This war could strengthen its claim as an anti-Shia leader in the masses, and hence the Sunni forces in Syria could welcome its footprints there.

Strategically, Tayyip finds himself in a better shape when it comes to influencing Syria’s future for it being better connected to Iran and Russia, both being major players when it comes to the crisis.

Prince Salman with all the decision making powers at his disposal has got the necessary power setup to keep in his hand all that is at play on the chess-board, and to be able to move as fleet-footed as need be. And that might have been the thought process in the house of Saud to exact greater influence across its borders through a dynamic change in leadership.

This takes us to the impending dimensions of Saudi power shift. Mohammad bin Salman has been riding a wave of shunning ultra-conservatism to gain support from home and abroad which may lead to a more vibrant Saudi society, hopefully initiating an end to a century long gender bias in the country.

If Saudi Arabia’s fresh policy of moderation is true to its claims then the minority Shia shall also be benefiting from this change. Also, to affirm a newly found moderation, the highly disproportionate response to claimed Yemeni facilitation of terrorism backed by Shia-regimes must also seize, to the benefit of helpless and poor Yemeni civilians.

If that is the case, the Saudi-led military alliance could be seen true to its anti-terrorism pretext and Iran may then have a chance to approach this alliance with confidence. That would be a better way to compete with Erdogan in assuming a lead role in the region rather than continuing the policies of the past.