BY (LATE) BRIGADIER MOHAMMAD YOUSAF
I served under General Akhtar Abdur Rahman for four years at the height of the Afghan war. He carried the enormous responsibility for the struggle against what was then, the Soviet superpower, for over eight years. I call him the ‘Silent Soldier’ because of his great humility and modesty. Few people, apart from his family, knew him as well as I did until he was assassinated, along with President Zia-ul-Haq, in the plane crash in August 1988. In one blow the Jihad lost its two most powerful leaders.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, President Zia sent for General Akhtar, who had recently taken over as Director of ISI. At that time, nobody in authority in Pakistan, and certainly no overseas government (including the US), had thought that the might of Soviet military could be confronted. Afghanistan was written-off as lost. The only person within the military to advocate supporting the Jihad by Pakistan, and the only person to come up with a plausible plan for doing so, was General Akhtar. He convinced the president that not only was it vital to Pakistan’s interests to fight the aggressors but that there was every chance of defeating them. Some years later, Zia told him that he had produced a miracle and there was nothing worthy of his achievements; only God could reward him.
General Akhtar was my superior, charged with devising, controlling and supervising the strategy to bring about victory in the field. Put in its simplest form, he was the strategist. At the outset, he was almost alone in thinking that the Soviet Union, with all its modern aircraft and armour, could be brought down by a few thousand poorly trained and armed Mujahideen. It certainly seemed an impossibility at the beginning.
As events were to show, he was right. Under his leadership, under his order and strategy, the communist menace was not only confronted but turned back—forced to retreat. Little wonder that the chief architect of this humiliation was on the top of the KGB’s hit list with a huge price on his head. Nevertheless, during the time that I knew him, he never wavered or showed concern at the danger but continued to press on with the Jihad.
I would venture to highlight two main areas in which General Akhtar’s influence was critical. The first was strategic. The whole concept of how to fight the war was his. He understood how even a guerrilla army can defeat a superpower in the battlefield if it applied the strategy of death by a thousand cuts. Gradually, over the years, as the Mujahideen became better armed and trained, this strategy of avoiding direct confrontation, of concentration on soft targets, communications, supply lines and depots, brought about a full-scale Soviet withdrawal.
The second area of crucial influence was in the political and diplomatic field. I do not mean international politics or diplomacy, but rather internal affairs. General Akhtar seemed to me to be the only person able to bring about a degree of unity among the fractious Mujahideen political parties. Without that degree of cooperation, nothing of importance could be achieved on the battle field. He was able to unite, sometimes only temporarily I admit, leaders who were lifelong enemies. He was able to convince men who would not normally sit in the same room with each other to fight, together for the common goal of the Jihad.
An important part of his success was his ability to resist the ever-growing pressure by the US to run the war. Through the CIA, the US sought to control the clandestine supply pipeline, arms distribution, and the training of the Mujahideen. That they were not able to do so was entirely due to General Akhtar’s efforts. It was a major contribution to avoiding operational chaos.
Unfortunately, General Akhtar was removed from the ISI by a promotion he did not seek, just as the Mujahideen were on the brink of success. His tragic death a year later prevented him from witnessing the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan—the ultimate proof that he had won. I believe that Pakistan and Afghanistan owe a debt of gratitude to him. I certainly count it a great privilege to have served under the only general in Pakistan’s short history to have masterminded a victory in a major war and earn a name for his military genius. I salute him.
(The Late Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, was head of the Afghan Bureau of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence from 1983 to 1987.)
