The Sakhi Sarwar shrine attack offers some interesting insights which must be heeded for developing a better understanding of the nature of extremist insurgency and terrorism facing Pakistan. Consider.
The first point relates to the nexus between the insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and urban terrorism. Investigations reveal the attack was planned in Bajaur Agency. The plan included at least five people, including the three suicide bombers, though the number of people involved will most certainly be higher.
The two dead attackers, 16-year-old Ismail and 18-year-old Umar, were both from North Waziristan. They received their explosive vests from handlers based in Dera Ismail Khan, reached Dera Ghazi Khan on March 29 and stayed at the Madina Hotel. Their hotel room was booked under the name of Zara Ali, son of one Shah Wali.
A third suicide bomber, whose belt did not fully explode, is 14-year-old Omar Fidai. This boy is also from the Khati village of North Waziristan. His school certificate says he is the son of Akbar Khan and a student of grade 7 in Noor public school Husso Khel, Waziristan. At least 11 people have already been arrested as a result of information given by this boy.
Lets connect the dots here. Planning in Bajaur; attackers from North Waziristan, all teenagers; handlers in DI Khan; target in DG Khan; responsibility taken by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.
Many commentators have been arguing that the shrine attacks and other acts of urban terrorism are not committed by the TTP. They say that such un-Islamic acts can only be the job of rogue, hostile groups. They are wrong in a major way and only partially right in one respect. Even if it were accepted that hostile agencies are involved in planning such acts, it is staring us in the face that the executors are not only Pakistani but are fired up by a terribly misplaced religious and denominational zeal.
The planning in Bajaur is interesting because the agency abuts Afghanistans Kunar province and is linked to it through four passes. The trouble in the Agency has been traced to the Khan of Kunar to the extent that he has been supporting extremist elements in Bajaur and also allowing infiltration of extremist Afghan Taliban into the area. There is some information on his links with the Indians but much of that is circumstantial.
The second issue relates to linkages among various groups in FATA. While groups also fight among themselves, they help each other in planning operations and mounting attacks. In this case the attack seems to have been planned and carried out by the confederation of groups that makes up the TTP.
While 95 percent of the territory in Bajaur is in physical control of Pakistani security forces, and an operation is underway in Mohmand as these lines are being written, cells in various areas retain their capacity to plan and execute terrorist attacks in urban centres.
The choice of suicide bombers in terms of age throws up two observations. It is of course easy to indoctrinate young boys and turn them into walking smart bombs, a known-known, but more importantly it shows the terrible inadequacy of the public school system which does nothing to prepare students for a modern existence or make them harder targets for this kind of indoctrination.
This is the most dangerous aspect of the threat faced by Pakistan. I was talking to Corps Commander Peshawar, Lt-Gen Asif Yasin Malik, and he said that while the army can use kinetic force, it has no tools to counter the extremist narrative. He is right. So far, the use of force has been akin to mopping up the floor while the tap remains open. We have prepared minds that are easy targets for extremist propaganda. How does one counter that? The only way to do that is to introduce drastic changes in school curricula so we can produce students given to asking questions and by so doing developing and honing their analytical skills.
Knowledge is about doubt and questioning. We have, on the other hand, created human automatons that sorely lack a deeper understanding of religion but nonetheless are prepared to commit the most heinous crimes in the name of religion.
One consequence of this, though not the only one, is to think in supra-state terms. These suicide bombers struck the shrine because they consider the sufi tradition and shrine-going as bida (innovation) which is unacceptable. For this they are prepared to attack and kill the Barelvi sect. But heres the irony. The Barelvi police guard who killed Governor Punjab Salmaan Taseer acted in the same vein, though on a different issue. Both sects, inimical though they are to each other, are ready to go supra-state when responding to their misplaced religious bigotry, making a mockery of humanism and the legal-constitutional structures that sustain a state.
What gives strength to the current insurgency and terrorism is not arms and ammunition. It is this mindset which does not accept the state on the basis of some narrow, denominational interpretation of religion. I would not call it exegesis because an exegetical approach presupposes a degree of scholarship that is completely absent in this case.
The point is not to argue against the use of kinetic force to counter insurgency; or to say that effective policing is not the answer to urban terrorism. Both are vital to countering the threat currently facing us. But both provide only partial answers, and in the short to the medium term. In the medium to the long term, we have to challenge the mindset that does not allow us to dislocate the insurgent/terrorist from the context in which he operates.
That is where a counter narrative and good education come in. These are precisely the areas we have neglected. Without addressing these two issues, among others, we cannot translate the use of force into utility of force.
The writer is Contributing Editor, The Friday Times.
