After Zarb-e-Azb
Sections of the press tend to associate, quite wrongly, any questioning of the security policy as an attempt to sabotage Zarb-e-Azb. It doesn’t take much to conclude, of course, that Zarb-e-Azb has been an outstanding success so far. It has completely wiped out the enemy’s habitat from the badlands. It has driven much of what is left of the TTP across the Durand Line. And, along with the fine points noted in NAP, it is sure to extend its writ to urban centres, where intel-based and combing operations will form the next, perhaps even more crucial, phase of the Operation.
Yet, despite the Operation’s many successes, it is also true that the enemy is still able to strike at vulnerable targets, with deadly force, and quite successfully. The Quetta tragedy from last week is just one example. And the more analysts and stakeholders have dug into this issue, they more they find non-compliance with NAP as the central problem with the security policy. And that, of course, gets fingers pointing immediately at the interior ministry. The army did its part of the job very nicely. And the civilian effort, headed by Ch Nisar, did not even get off the ground. Hence the many security lapses that compromise the Operation’s successes, in addition to wasting precious lives, of course.
Once again, though, both civilian and military leadership have promised to ensure all 20 points of the action plan are implemented in letter and spirit. Ch Nisar did not like taking responsibility for his ministry’s shortcomings regarding NAP, which is why it is better that its implementation is no longer his responsibility alone on the civilian side. When NAP was first conceived, after the Peshawar tragedy, everybody believed that the time to finally rid the country of terrorists, proxies, etc, had come. With time, though, people lost trust. Now, after Quetta, the government will have to back its tough talk with strong actions, for once, or lose the people’s trust forever.
