Speculations abound about Pakistan’s nuclear programme
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme came about in retaliation to India’s nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1974. The second set of nuclear tests by India in May 1998 forced Pakistan to cross the nuclear threshold. From the very outset, following its Independence, Pakistan followed a non-nuclear policy. On 8 December 1953, Pakistan media welcomed the U.S. Atoms for Peace initiatives, followed by the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1956. In 1953, Foreign Minister Muhammad Zafarullah Khan publicly stated that “Pakistan does not have a policy towards the atom bombs”. Following the announcement, on 11 August 1955, the United States and Pakistan reached an understanding concerning the peaceful and industrial use of nuclear energy which also includes a $350,000 worth pool-type reactor. This peaceful plight continued till India bared its fangs. Pakistan had suffered in the 1948 Kashmir War, which was a limited conflict, while the 1965 Pak-India War was a stalemate but the 1971 war between the two neighbours resulted in the dismemberment of East Pakistan. It was natural for Pakistan to pursue a nuclear weapons program to maintain a modicum of military balance with India both in conventional and non-conventional weapons.
Since 1998, after coming out of the closet, Pakistan has been seeking a nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India. Pakistan’s concept of deterrence is based on the renowned deterrence theory, which holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD). Deterrence theory had gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. The theory had serious ramifications since even an inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful adversary, provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. Modifications to the deterrence theory continued as Bernard Brodie opined in 1959 that deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent must be always at the ready, yet never used.
In 1966, Thomas Schelling conceptualised that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory. Instead, he argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. Schelling reiterated that the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state’s behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarised that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory, and is most successful when it is held in reserve.
A successful nuclear deterrent requires that a country preserve its ability to retaliate, either by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or by ensuring a credible second strike capability.
At the superpower level, the policy of containment gave way to détente but with the advent of US emerging as the sole superpower after the demise of USSR, former hawks turned to doves. Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz criticised deterrence and advocated nuclear disarmament, calling upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear deterrence equation between Pakistan and India is much more complicated. Pakistan seeks a modicum of parity and military balance with its eastern neighbour.
The situation is exacerbated by US apprehension regarding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Since 2004 the U.S. government has reportedly been concerned about the safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and weapons. Press reports have suggested that the United States has contingency plans to send in Special Forces to help “secure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal”. In 2007, Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation, while giving testimony before the United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation, and Trade, concluded that “preventing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the hands of terrorists should be a top priority for the U.S.” However Pakistan’s government has debunked claims that the weapons are not secure.
Diplomatic reports published in the United States diplomatic cables leak revealed American and British worries over a potential threat posed by Islamists. In February 2009 cable from Islamabad, former US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson said “Our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in [Pakistani government] facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.”
A report published by The Times in early 2010 states that the United States is training an elite unit to recover Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organization. According to former U.S. intelligence official Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, U.S. concerns are justified because militants have struck at several Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been denied access to most of them. However, during a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the US Secretary of Defence Robert M. Gates denied that the United States had plans to take over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.
Detractors of Pakistan’s nukes Bruce Riedel et-al have been taking swipes at Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, painting doomsday predictions where miscreants steal a nuke and threaten the west by its use. They forget that nuclear weapons are not like hand grenades, which a ragtag militia can hide under their armpits and lob at intended targets with impunity. Nuclear weapons require sophisticated knowledge of the intricate system, which envisages in depth knowledge of the technology.
Lately, the US has resorted to the use of Benedict Arnolds of Pakistani origin to carry disparaging accounts of Pakistan’s nukes. A former ambassador of Pakistan, whose animosity with the Pakistani military has been more than evident in his lobbying against the acquisition of US arms by Pakistan, has been a harsh critic. In the near past, an educationist of Pakistani origin, currently employed in the US has come up with a number of Op-Eds, which are highly critical of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. He is considered to be liberal, arguing passionately the restrained nuclear weapons policy. He has written some controversial stories about Pakistan’s policy to develop tactical nuclear weapons. He has also faced criticism for his views on Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture.
These staunch critics lose objectivity, when they present only the obverse side of the picture, remaining oblivious of the fact that India has developed the “Cold Start Strategy”, which envisages a Blitzkrieg style operation, in which conventional forces strike with ferocity, decimating Pakistan before nuclear weapons can be called into play. Pakistan’s riposte lay in developing tactical nuclear weapons as deterrence against any such Indian adventurism. Checkmated, India turned to the US government and think tanks to blackball Pakistan for developing the tactical nukes. The rationale they present in painting the threat from Pakistan’s tactical nukes is that the weapons can be pilfered during transportation while the level of the command, which will have its finger on the nukes’ trigger will be midlevel, who lack the maturity and sagacity to use restraint thus enhancing the risk of the launch of nuclear weapons at the slightest pretext.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority and a sound Nuclear Doctrine must be given credit and credence for maintaining nuclear discipline.
