Interview – Ahmed Rashid: ‘Pakistani policy is difficult to understand’

International community is not happy

From the latest statements coming out of Islamabad, it seems Pakistan has transferred all the pressure onto Afghanistan. And the latter is in no position to handle it. It has a weak army and a weak government

That ties with Afghanistan are worsening very fast is no longer breaking news. Things have moved so fast since the last Kabul attack, in fact, that even the QCG moment might be behind us. Kabul has, for all intents and purposes, finally closed the book on Pakistan facilitating talks, etc. That led to speculation about the Quadrilateral becoming redundant. But then there was a half-attempt, of sorts, of some Taliban from the Doha office hinting at talks. Kabul didn’t buy that either. And there was little to say after the QCG sat down in Islamabad on Wednesday; perhaps for the last time.

The Afghan government made it clear that since talks were not really on the table, the other part of the commitment should be honoured. That, if you go by Kabul’s understanding, is physically attacking the Taliban wherever they are found on Pakistani soil. But when the Chinese explained to them that the Quadrilateral was for discussions only, the Afghans, seemingly, found it hard to see how the platform mattered for them anymore. It’s not like a QCG condemnation of Taliban attacks will take any sting out of the Spring Offensive.

And the blame, naturally, falls squarely on Pakistan. To give credit where it is due, Ghani did go out of his way to gamble on a policy turnaround from Islamabad. That, from his point of view, has turned out to be a mistake. Now, he has not only lost precious time and credibility preparing his country for peace, but he has also lost face before the opposition that warned him never to trust Pakistan. Even the Abdullah Abdullah faction of the government did not back Ghani completely on this one. Now he will have to retreat on the internal political chessboard also. And for that, too, he will blame Pakistan.

To make sense of the situation, and Pakistan’s position in it, DNA talked exclusively to noted journalist, writer, and an expert on Afghanistan and Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid.

Question: Afghanistan is clearly not happy with Pakistan. And since the main purpose of the QCG was facilitating talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban – which are not likely anytime soon – is there any life really left in the Quadrilateral?

Ahmed Rashid: I think, for the time being, it is safe to say that the Quadrilateral is dead. Pakistan’s position is really difficult to understand. After Sartaj Aziz’s latest statement especially – where he mentioned a lukewarm Taliban response – it is clear that the QCG is going nowhere.

For some reason, Pakistan is just not interested in pushing the Taliban towards talks. Clearly they can put more pressure than they have. The government itself admitted that the Afghan Taliban have enjoyed its sanctuary for a while. Why, then, does the government have so little influence over them?

From the latest statements coming out of Islamabad, it seems Pakistan has transferred all the pressure onto Afghanistan. And the latter is in no position to handle it. It has a weak army and a weak government.

Pakistan’s policy is very negative, I’m afraid. And it will generate very harsh feedback very soon.

Q: What do you make of Ghani embracing Hekmatyar? Does the move carry any intrinsic value or is it just largely symbolism?

AR: Whatever value Hekmatyar once had no longer exists. He is politically and militarily insignificant. That is most likely why he reached out. The people are also not likely to think much of this move. They remember Hekmatyar’s past well. They remember his atrocities; during the civil war as well as during his association with the Taliban.

I cannot understand the wisdom of this policy. Do we really want a Taliban victory in Afghanistan? I can’t believe that. Do we want another nightmare of refugees, deaths, disabled people on both sides, especially now when nobody will help us?

It does carry propaganda value, though. Ghani will sell it as an example that he is willing to accommodate whoever will lay down arms. And once again everybody there will point fingers at Pakistan for not doing enough to bring the Taliban.

But in reality everybody knows that the Hekmatyar card is irrelevant.

Q: Was this a case of Pakistan really not doing enough, as its critics say all the time, or is Afghanistan being unnecessarily harsh in its criticism?

AR: Pakistan made clear and specific commitments. It was to nudge along the Taliban to the talks if possible; and resort to a bit of arm-twisting if necessary. But it has clearly not put as much pressure as it could have. It could have stopped their supplies, stopped their businesses. It could have put pressure on their families. It could have forced them to accept the QCG’s conditions by a number of means.

Yet, unfortunately, Pakistan didn’t do anything, even as the talks collapsed. This is very bad news for Pakistan. And there will be blowback.

Q: What about the Americans? They, too, are obviously not happy? How far will things like the F16 subsidy and asking for Shakeel Afridi’s release go? How angry do you think they are?

AR: Of course the Americans are angry as well. They were just as eager as Kabul to finally wrap up this war. They had invested a great deal of time and energy in making the negotiations a success. And now that the effort is collapsing, it isn’t surprising that not just ‘do more’ has come back, but things like the F16 and Dr Afridi issues are also coming to the fore.

And it’s not just the Americans that are fuming. Much of the international community is unhappy. Europe may not be saying much, but its dissatisfaction is clear enough. There’s definitely nobody singing Pakistan’s praise in Nato at the moment.

And, again, it’s not as if this will not have serious consequences. Everybody tied hopes with peace in Afghanistan. And we told everybody we’d be able to deliver. And we weren’t.

Q: The government has hardly ever been in a position to call the shots on Afghanistan. It’s not even bothered with a full time foreign minister. And everybody knows where the security policy comes from. Why, do you think, they let the Afghan situation slip despite making admirable advances on the home front?

AR: This is really the most difficult part to understand. When the army followed a positive no-favourites policy for two years, and was able to convince everybody of its sincerity, why did it choose such an ineffective policy with regard to Afghanistan? When it has been making all the right moves inside Pakistan, why did it stay soft on the Taliban?

I cannot understand the wisdom of this policy. Do we really want a Taliban victory in Afghanistan? I can’t believe that. Do we want another nightmare of refugees, deaths, disabled people on both sides, especially now when nobody will help us?

This is an unrealistic and irresponsible policy. Despite actively partaking in the QCG, Pakistan has chosen not to pressure the Afghan Taliban beyond a certain soft point. Where this policy will take is not immediately clear. But it will have serious after-effects. It has already started straining our relations with almost all important countries. If there is any wisdom in this policy, it is not readily apparent, and it has not been explained to us.