The state cannot afford to bow down before the clergy again

There is only one option

The Women Protection Bill, which was enacted into law a few weeks ago, has become a test case for the PML-N government – provincial as well as federal. The law provides some bold but fairly requisite legal protection to women from domestic, sexual and psychological violence.

Undoubtedly, the enactment of this law has come as a surprise to everyone as traditionally the PML-N has been considered a right wing party which has always attempted to appease or partner with other right wing political or religious parties. In 1998, Nawaz Sharif proposed an amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan to introduce Shari’a as the law of the land. Had it been passed successfully, it would have nullified the existing civil code, virtually giving him unlimited power as Ameer-ul-Momineen.

The Women Protection Act should be seen in the larger scheme of things: after the formation of the National Action Plan (NAP), the state has not only tried to tighten the noose around militant groups but has also attempted to limit the space for Islamic political parties which, in one way or the other, fan and exploit prevailing militant narratives for political ends, hence challenging the state sovereignty by blindly quoting Islam and the constitution.

Mumtaz Qadri’s execution presents the latest challenge in this regard: while the Pakistani judicial system declared him a murderer, leaders of various Islamic political parties, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, attended his funeral – hence directly defying the state’s verdict.

Moreover, the clergy cannot hold Pakistan hostage for its internal wars. While the head of Council for Islamic Ideology (CII), which counsels the government on the compatibility of laws with Islam, declared the Women Protection Act un-Islamic, Pakistan Ulema Council (PUC) chairperson, Hafiz Mohammad Tahir Ashrafi, in a statement said that there was nothing un-Islamic about the law.

“These people are speaking in ignorance, but the women protection bill will assist in ending violence against women,” Mr Ashrafi said.

“There is no point in the criticism by some scholars that this bill will distort the family system of the country,” he further said. The head of CII, Muhammad Khan Sherani and PUC Chairman Hafiz Mohammad Tahir Ashrafi is said to have developed some differences over the working of CII.

The clergy’s threat to launch a 1977 like revolt, which led to the termination of the Bhutto government, cannot succeed in the current milieu. The movement against Bhutto was anchored to bring down a regime which had developed political differences with various political stakeholders. However, in the present case, any such movement will not only be against the federal government but also against the state: the military establishment, which itself enacted the NAP, will not allow the breakdown of the civilian structures by a religious mob.

Michael Kugelman, Senior Associate for South and Southeast Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said that “the government is in a really tight spot here. There is clearly political will to see this landmark legislation through, and it would build on the Nawaz Sharif administration’s other recent efforts to push back against the religious hardliners that wield great clout in Pakistan.”

But he warned that pushing the bill as it is might result in a serious backlash:

“At the same time, pushing the bill through could spark a backlash that would send shivers down the spines of PML-N leaders — a backlash in the form of a protest movement, which could conceivably turn violent, in Punjab.”

According to Michael, one of the reasons which might be of serious concern for government is the threat of any grave violence erupting in Punjab.

“Punjab is the PML-N’s stronghold, and it has not experienced the same levels of terrorist violence and unrest that other Pakistani provinces have. However, if religious forces follow through on their threats, Punjab could be convulsed by all kinds of trouble that is very unpalatable for the PML-N leadership.”

“In an ideal world, the government would allow the moral imperative to trump the political risks, and move to finalise the bill as it is. But we don’t live in an ideal world,” argued Michael.

“The provincial government may quietly send the bill back to parliament to make some subtle alterations. This would appease the religious hardliners while allowing the government to maintain the moral high ground, so long as the alterations are relatively modest,” Michael further said.

“For good reason, many would condemn such an act for caving to the demands of the hardliners — and that would be a fair accusation. At the end of the day, though, the government will not want to antagonise some of Pakistan’s most powerful vested interests,” he further noted.

While the Women Protection Act is not likely to become a successful pre-emption tool as far as its implementation is concerned, it does entail substantial symbolic significance. The PML-N government needs to remain firm as simply caving in to the clergy’s pressure would directly lead to outright failure of this slowly building resistance narrative, which has endeavoured to challenge the latter’s de facto control on legislature; the CII has before struck down many laws, if not through verdict than by street power.