Long road to negotiations
Once more Pakistan is called upon to broker peace between Kabul and the Taliban – or at least facilitate negotiations – and once again the life or death of the militia’s commander can stop the process dead in its tracks. First, the sudden revelation of Mullah Omar’s death reversed the Murree initiative. President Ghani caved into opposition – and Abdullah Abdullah part of the coalition government – that was critical of his engagement with Pakistan. And Washington reverted to the “do more” demand. Now, news of Mullah Mansour’s “severe injuries”, or possible killing, threatens to take the wind out of a renewed attempted even before it has taken off.
But peace was far from certain even without this complication. And the mystery surrounding Ghani’s visit is indicative of the many obstacles that litter this long road. Hopes were raised recently when Pakistan’s nationalist Pakhtuns – Achakzai, Sherpao, Asfandyar Wali, etc – succeeded where the foreign office and even the military had failed – getting Ghani to talk again.
The breaking of the ice in Kabul was followed by a shaking of the hands between Ghani and Nawaz in Paris. Other things have also changed since the Murree breakdown. The Americans, once again dragged into the Middle East theatre of war, are eager to wrap up Afghanistan as soon as possible; and an outright military solution is not possible in the foreseeable future, not when cities like Kunduz are falling to the Taliban.
“It seems, at the larger level, the principal parties have realised that they have still spring to settle AfPak”, said Raoof Hasan, executive director of the Islamabad based Regional Peace Institute and a prominent political/security analyst.
The breaking of the ice in Kabul was followed by a shaking of the hands between Ghani and Nawaz in Paris
“If this opportunity is lost, Pakistan and Afghanistan will be locked in long term bickering and confrontation”.
This year’s Spring Offensive was the most successful for the Taliban since the war began. It was the first time Afghanistan’s US-trained military was without nato/isaf cover in the field. And it could not contain growing Taliban momentum, even in the Northern Alliance heartland, where insurgents briefly took over Kunduz and other smaller cities.
Therefore, as fighting enters its traditional ‘winter lull’, all sides will weigh options before it resumes when the snow melts. It is in this window that the US is eager to push negotiations through. And the Pakhtun leaders’ game-changing visit to Kabul could not have been better timed to help kick start the process.
Problems with Pakistan
Yet while the Afghan president agreed to come for the Heart of Asia Conference on Dec9, there are already doubts about what another round of engagement can really achieve. Ghani has gambled on Pakistan before and lost. He will need something concrete, to say the least, to calm unrelenting pressure at home. And there is hardly any convergence of interest to speak of – except the general desire for peace – in stiff positions adopted by both Kabul and Islamabad.
“I don’t think there is any commonality at all in the two positions, there are just multiple grounds of divergence”, Raoof said.
The Afghans, according to him, were clearly displeased that we had kept Mullah Omar’s death hidden for so long. They think that, among other things, it was meant to give the new chief time to consolidate, which deprived Kabul of an opportunity to strike at a rudderless insurgency. Such incidents fuel the diplomatic row as well as the proxy war; where each country’s intelligence machinery is aiding the other’s insurgency.
“The Afghans are also very sensitive about our concerns regarding India”, Raoof added. “They don’t like it that our relationship with them should depend on their relationship with India. This is a major stumbling block”.
To the Afghans, this shows that Pakistan is still stuck in the old mindset of controlling Afghanistan rather than having formal relations with it.
Then there is the case of Pakistan promising and not delivering. Nawaz promised in Kabul that “your enemies are our enemies”, yet said in New York that “we can’t fight them (Taliban) and talk to them at the same time”.
For the Afghans, who perceived the first statement as an announcement of termination of patronage to the Taliban, it was simply a case of a promise not honoured.
“There is a world of difference between not fighting and patronising an organisation”, Raoof pointed out.
When four thousand Afghan Taliban are escorted to Quetta – for the new chief’s announcement – “it is not not fighting, it is supporting and patronising”, he added.
But Kabul must have factored in these concerns before Ghani met Nawaz in Paris, and long before he agreed to come to Islamabad.
“This progress is significant”, said Ayaz Wazir, former ambassador and political columnist and commentator.
“The fact that they met in Paris and decided to meet again in Islamabad shows that they have decided to take the process forward”.
Problems inside Afghanistan
As much as Kabul holds Pakistan responsible for the deadlock, Afghanistan’s own internal problems are no less a hurdle. There are two broad blocs fighting over the fate of the talks and fighting with the Taliban.
“One is the old guard that is in the game since the Soviet war”, Raoof explained. “They are in their 60s and 70s”.
The others are newer, who came into prominence in the Karzai and post-Karzai years. They are in their 30s and 40s. They have studied in universities in the US, UK, India, China, Pakistan, etc, and are educated and progressive.
The older lot considers the Taliban a possible component in the peace process but the new lot rules out long term coexistence altogether. If they make it to the government, goes the argument gaining currency in Kabul, sooner or later they will want to take over completely.
As much as Kabul holds Pakistan responsible for the deadlock, Afghanistan’s own internal problems are no less a hurdle
“The new ones are gaining, they have age, education and relevance on their side”, he added. “The more time lost on getting the talks going, therefore, the more time is given to this bloc to become more assertive”.
And on top of these complications has come the news of Mullah Mansour’s possible killing in an intra-Taliban firefight.
“If Mansour dies, Ghani will be less inclined to engage”, said Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the Centre for Research and Policy Studies.
“The Taliban will further fragment. Kabul would then prefer to fight them out as opposed to talking to them”.
He gave Pakistan’s TTP example. It was all the rage when Baitullah Mehsud started it. And it did well for four years under Hakeemullah. But after he was taken out TTP was in tatters.
“The Afghans will expect a similar fallout there if the Taliban lose their commander at this stage”, Gul added.
Should such events unfold, and Kabul rule out engagement, the Heart of Asia exchange will not amount to much. The Afghans would still like to show up, though.
“Kabul immediately needs $5.5b for its government and army, now more than 300,00 strong”, Gul went on. “And if its chief donor, the US, doesn’t see progress on the talks, it will not be able to sell the grants to Congress.”
Mullah Mansour’s life, or death, therefore, may well hold the key to Kabul’s real decision, regardless of how it postures at the Heart of Asia, and however much America or Pakistan maneuver for the talks.
