As of now
With Zarb-e-Azb not far from coming full circle – according to the military itself – the new attack-response scenario seems to fit a pattern. Granted, the operation has decimated the enemy’s command and control structure enough to cut down their strike capability considerably. Yet there is the odd hit, not as frequent as before, but often quite deadly. Regrettably, though, another pattern seems to have emerged. After each hit – whether or not relevant security agencies are able to contain it – the all too usual intelligence loopholes, etc, are revealed.
And so it was in Badaber. The perpetrators were not captured at any point since the plan’s inception – allegedly somewhere in Afghanistan – despite the fact that a good number of them were foreigners. And at no point did intelligence agencies pick up chatter of the terrorist operation, even though it must have taken weeks and months, not days, to plan. Also, it is important for all stakeholders to understand that merely ‘taking out’ the attackers should not be counted as success. They come as suicide attackers. It is the damage they are able to cause that determines the potency of their strike. Therefore, the need for the so called rapid response force to be forever alert cannot possibly be stressed enough.
These persistent breakdowns are often attributed to insufficient and inefficient followup of the National Action Plan (NAP). Among its most prominent features was integrating the scores of intelligence agencies littering our security landscape into a more cohesive working machine. Unfortunately, though, like much of the action plan, this step too has not been worked on. Surely those conducting this war do not need reminding that urban warfare is often more intel-intensive than the bombs and bullets taking care of business presently in the tribal area. Understandably, intelligence is being improved as the war progresses, and the right lessons are being learnt. Unless all parts work towards the bigger goal, Zarb-e-Azb will leave a little to be desired.
