Spirited
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s plan for dealing with the many crises afflicting his country might be a little spirited, but it is not entirely without merit. He plans not only to cut the large central government – which is the centre of intrigue, corruption, nepotism, etc – and make way for a smaller yet, finally, more inclusive government. Of course, this happens as regional and international efforts to dislodge Da’ish from Iraq and Syria are clearly failing, and Baghdad has been financially struggling for years. Yet al-Abadi has vowed to go ahead with the overhaul even at the cost of his life.
It makes sense to opt for a more cohesive, and representative, form of central government, especially considering the type of Iraq’s civil war. Surely everybody remembers that one big reason for ISIS’s advances last year – when it took Mosul – was the disenfranchisement of Sunni tribes in the periphery, whom the new Shi’a government had left out of the political and financial loop. Those with slightly longer memories will recall how the Americans faced similar problems with the al Qaeda uprising in Anbar and Mosul. But they were able to placate these Sunni tribes against the more vicious al Qaeda mould, and the ‘Sahwa’ campaign (meaning awakening in Arabic), flushed militants out of their strongholds. Abadi seems leveraging similar tendencies in areas overrun by ISIS. There is enough resentment in most areas for the government to feel confident, apparently, of tapping.
It seems the wider Middle East situation, too, is on the verge of another change. ISIS has also put the Syrian government on the back foot. The Iran nuclear deal has affected long standing alliances. The al Saud no longer enjoy the ‘regional policeman’ status. Libya falls ever deeper into the abyss. Israel is learning to get used to Washington’s snubs. And Da’ish is the most dominant, most potent, regional reality. Abadi is right to toggle his options in favour of a more pro-people outlook, counting on the people in turn to help eliminate militants. But he must be mindful of the political storm he is unleashing in Baghdad. Not many people will like his axe, especially those on whom it will fall. Others will not be happy about the sectarian shuffle. There will be the danger, therefore, of the policy dying out before it becomes effective. Yet this experiment will also set important precedents for the whole region.
