When the brave stood up and fought

An eyewitness to India’s role in East Pakistan

In the last few days, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has openly admitted that India had an important role to play in the massacre of West Pakistanis in 1971. Posted at Flight Aviation command of 4 Army Aviation Squadron in Dhaka, where I remained from January 1971 to the Fall of Dhaka on 16 December 1971, I bore witness to India’s role in the war. The actions of my unit, the only army unit that did not surrender to India in 1971, gave me first-hand experience of India’s critical involvement in the separation of East Pakistan.

In the past 44 years, a lot has been written about the Fall of Dhaka but the majority of the analyses have been conducted by those who weren’t in East Pakistan during the riots and fighting and were unaware of the true conditions. Instead of an accurate assessment of the army forces’ excellent performance, these people have constructed a narrative contrary to reality and disrespectful to the soldiers who withstood horrifying conditions to combat bravely with the Indians and the Mukti Bahani. Baseless blame was directed at our courageous soldiers who were deemed to be responsible for the Fall of Dhaka.

For the record, the responsibility for the Fall of Dhaka cannot fall on the military of that time which was under-equipped, with a paucity of weapons, tanks and airplanes, but on the leadership which could not compete with the constant meddling and political manipulation by India. It did not take any resolute step to counter Indian propaganda. In fact, from the very beginning, our political representatives did not solve the conditions of East Pakistan and did not give them due importance. Our Bengali brothers harboured deep-seated feelings of neglect, making the region fertile for meddling by Indian leaders. Pakistani leaders, on the other hand, were silent spectators who left East Pakistan to the mercy of Indian exploitations.

In the general elections in December 1970, the Awami League won 160 seats and the PPP won 81 seats. Upon winning the elections with a heavy mandate, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman demanded that Awami League be invited to form the central government. When President Yahya Khan, the supreme leader of the country at that time, hesitated, a wave of resentment and hate directed against and the leadership of West Pakistan spread across East Pakistan. Interestingly, when General Yahya Khan got off his helicopter after landing in Dhaka and reporters had asked him who Pakistan’s prime minister would be, he had gestured towards Mujibur Rehman who had come to receive him and said, “Ask him, he is standing in front of you.”

In the past 44 years, a lot has been written about the Fall of Dhaka but the majority of the analyses have been conducted by those who weren’t in East Pakistan during the riots and fighting and were unaware of the true conditions

Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had the complete support of the very powerful Student League. Paltan Maidan, Dhaka, which was the centre of political activity, was under the complete control of the Awami League and Bengali students. India took maximum advantage of the situation and provided the Bengalis with economic aid and used poisonous propaganda against Pakistan. Indian propaganda slowly convinced the Bengalis that they had more cultural similarities with India, which was their friend whereas West Pakistan was withholding their rights.

From the very start of the conspiracy of 1971, the conditions of East Pakistan had become dismal and hopeless. When on the first of March, 1971, the announcement to postpone the first session of the National Assembly was made in Islamabad, the East Pakistanis made calls to separate from Pakistan. On 2 March, a complete strike was observed. On 3 March in Chittagong, 102 Pakistani men, women and children were slaughtered one by one. On 4 March, the student organisations announced an independent government. On 7 March, after Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s address to the nation, the civil administration of West Pakistan was left shocked. The civil militia of Mukti Bahini Bangladesh was being trained by the Indian army. With the help of the Indian army, they managed to destroy all the bridges of East Pakistan. Railway lines, roads and river transport were also rendered ineffective. Only the orders of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, who was under complete Indian control, were obeyed and all the recommendations of the Pakistani administration were completely ignored.

All of Eastern Command’s Bengali officers were sending the Indian army important documents moment by moment. In these conditions, on 25 March, the army experienced a grave setback. The entire East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), who numbered 120,000, rebelled. 80,000 Mukti Bahini, in which Indian soldiers were also involved, began to massacre West Pakistanis. For this purpose, elaborate slaughterhouses and riverside torture centres were made. Apart from jihadis loyal to Pakistani in a few big cities, all of East Pakistan was under the control of rebels and Indian soldiers. In Dhaka University’s Iqbal and Jaganath hostels, West Pakistani students were kidnapped and molested, after which they were brutally killed.

To re-establish control over the perilous situation and run the civil administration of East Pakistan, a division of Pakistan army, armed with weak and obsolete weapons, was forced to contend with internal and external threats. Attacks on the Pakistan-India border by Indian forces had become a routine occurrence and internally, the army had to fight the rebel Bengali units and the Mukti Bahini, which had the latest weaponry as well as ample aid. Pakistan’s air forces were as good as nonexistent. In Dhaka, there was only one squadron of 14 old F-86 planes.

In 4 Army Aviation squadron, I had a force of only three cargo and two small helicopters to provide weaponry to 14 Division’s positions spread all over the thousands of miles long India-East Pakistan border, evacuate the wounded to hospitals, conduct operations with commandos, report on units’ movements and transport West Pakistani women and children to camps in Dhaka.

In comparison to the combined force of Indian soldiers and Bengali rebels, Pakistan army had a much smaller and poorly armed force. In response to Indian military preparations, to prepare for a formal attack by India, Pakistani forces were spread thin on the hundreds of miles long border. The region’s internal part was at the mercy of rebels and in terms of numbers Pakistan army was no match for the Indian military. Even then, Pakistani soldiers fought spiritedly for a long time, fully prepared to die fighting. But unfortunately, instead of help and support, we received hate and resentment from the local population that had been influenced by Indian propaganda. In the face of this resistance, we were helpless. To fight against the enemy was easy but to fight one’s own countrymen was very difficult.

On 23 March (Pakistan Day), Sheikh Mujibur Rehman announced a day of protest in East Pakistan. On TV, Firdous Begum repeatedly sang Bangladesh’s song of independence, “Sohnar Bangla”. Pictures of Quaid-e-Azam were burnt and Pakistani flags were taken off and burnt and replaced with flags of Bangladesh. Bengali shopkeepers refused to sell West Pakistanis daily supplies. Shops belonging to West Pakistanis were looted, set on fire and their owners were killed.

On 27 March, 1971, Major Zia ur Rehman, who did the Staff College Quetta course with me in the same syndicate and later became the president of Bangladesh who was killed at the hands of his own soldiers, called his commanding officer – who was my course mate in the 9^th PMA course – into the CO office and shot him dead. After this, he declared the independence of Bangladesh and himself as the Commander in Chief of the Bangladesh Armed Forces.

There, he murdered all the West Pakistanis, including their families, with extreme brutality. The situation grew worse. With the help of Indian soldiers, a formal declaration of war was made. Chittagong became a battlefield. Every single Pakistani soldier was martyred while fighting.

From 25 March to 17 December 1971, my unit 4 Army Aviation Squadron conducted 861 successful operations with only five helicopters. Among them were certain historic achievements (including the Belonia Bulge heli-borne operation, Akyab, Chittagong, Jesore, Khulna, Rajshahi, etc) that most of the world’s armies had not even conceived of. The officers and sepoys of this squadron conducted extremely dangerous operations with determination, spirit and courage. During the Fall of Dhaka, this was the only unit of the Pakistan army that did not surrender and returned securely to Pakistan via Burma, taking 130 women and children along with it.

On 27 March when I was flying low to allow Major General Khadim Hussein Raja to see the advance of the Comilla Brigade and evacuate wounded Pakistanis, Indian soldiers and Mukti Bahini started firing at the helicopter with anti-air weapons. Some of the bullets hit the middle area of the helicopter and tore through the helicopter between General Raja and the wounded and some hit the rear area of the helicopter. With God’s grace, we reached our destination safely.

I have a year’s worth of personal experience that the Indian army is a cowardly army on the battlefield. India is adept at conspiracies, spreading unrest in other countries and stabbing them in the back.

Bairab Bazaar Railway Bridge was the only land link between Dhaka and Chittagong. Recognising its military importance, the Indian army and the rebels of EPR and EBR, comprising about 1000 soldiers in total, were entrenched on the bridge. In addition, 38 mines were placed along the bridge in order to blow it up in the event of any unfavourable circumstances. India’s plan was to disrupt all kinds of contact between Dhaka and Chittagong by destroying the bridge. By capturing Chittagong warehouses and airfields, all means of providing aid to Pakistani forces from West Pakistan were to be made ineffective. General Raheem Khan, GOC 14 Div, made the decision to obtain the bridge from the enemy at all costs.

For this, elaborate preparations were made for the first heli-borne operation of its kind – to capture the bridge intact so the enemy would not get the opportunity to destroy it. This mission was given to 4 Army Aviation Squadron.

On the morning of 15 April, the first helicopter, carrying myself, Major Liaqat Bokhari, and Major Ali Quli Khan took off with 30 commandos under the command of Major Tariq Mahmood (TM). On the second helicopter, Colonel Latif Aiwan and Major Riaz ul Haq also flew with 30 commandos. At exactly 6:30 AM, the first helicopter landed at the eastern side of the bridge and the second helicopter landed on the western side amidst a hailstorm of bullets.

India soldiers and Bengali rebels started firing at us from all directions. As soon as they disembarked, the commandos attacked the bridge from all sides like lightning. All this happened with such swiftness that the enemy was left stunned. That the Pakistan army could conduct an operation with such speed and ferocity had not featured in their wildest imaginations. 1000 well-entrenched Indians and Bengali rebels, using the latest weaponry and laden with machineguns, were defeated by only 60 Pakistani commandos. In the entire operation, only one Pakistani was martyred whereas the enemy lost 500 men. In this operation, Colonel Latif Aiwan, Major Liaqat Bokhari and Major Riaz ul Haq were awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat.

These two major heli-borne operations make it clear that the Indian army has always been extremely cowardly and prone to defeat on the battlefield

Belonia Bulge’s 4-mile wide and 20-mile long area, which was close to the mountainous region of the Indian border, had been captured by the Indians. When on 1000 hours on 18 June, the 24 FF Regiment and 20 Baloch battalions advanced to recapture the area, they were impeded by Indian mines and gun posts. Just as the Pakistani army reached the area, the enemy started firing from the surrounding hillsides. In only two hours, 28 Pakistani soldiers were martyred. In these conditions, continuing the advance became very difficult. Major General Rahim Khan decided that to continue the advance there was no alternative to a heli-borne operation. During planning, he said that in the cover of darkness at night, two helicopters would land in the middle of the enemy positions and unload troops who would then recapture the area. This was the first operation of its kind. Just two unarmed helicopters were to conduct an operation by landing in the middle of strong enemy positions. It was a suicidal mission the likes of which have never been attempted by any army.

At nightfall, Major Ali Jawahir and I took off with 24 commandos. After three minutes, Major Ali Quli Khan and Major Patrick took off with 24 soldiers. As soon as the helicopters reached the enemy positions, bullets rained from all directions. Front, back, right, left, the tracers of anti-aircraft guns were all that could be seen. I took the name of God and plunged the helicopter into the darkness to commence landing. It seemed as if we were descending into a well with our eyes closed. As soon as the helicopter touched the ground, Captain Nadir leapt out with his team of commandos. I took off immediately to make room for Ali Quli Khan to ensure that the two helicopters did not collide in the darkness.

With the grace of God, the landing had taken place precisely in the middle of the Indian army positions. Their forward positions assumed that the rear positions had been captured by commandos and the rear positions thought that the forward positions had been captured. The two positions exchanged fire with each other all through the night, thinking they were firing at the enemy. This heli-borne operation spread such terror in the Indian army that before our forces could act, they left their posts and even their heavy weapons behind. In this way, we captured Belonia Bulge without any loss –not a single one of our soldiers was wounded or killed whereas the Indian army suffered massive casualties as a result of friendly fire.

These two major heli-borne operations make it clear that the Indian army has always been extremely cowardly and prone to defeat on the battlefield. But conspiracies and the persecution of disadvantaged Muslims have been a cornerstone of Indian policy.

After these successful operations, 4 Army Aviation did not lay down arms during the Fall of Dhaka and despite flying in range of the Indian aircraft carrier, Vikrant, with complete Indian air superiority, safely reached Pakistan via Burma.