Perpetual state of war

Proxy wars have infiltrated India and Pakistan.

Ever since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the borders between India and Pakistan have been murky, while both armies continue to engage in proxy wars in surreptitious peace. There have been several standoffs since partition and several overt as well as covert attempts to annex territory, but at the end, only the general population suffered an all-inclusive blow of anarchic turmoil.

India, on the other hand, has a similar narrative of induced hatred, genocide in the name of xenophobia, and sheer manipulation of the public narrative to add fuel to the fire. The clerics, religious leaders and nationalist leaders in both countries equally contribute to hate speech and the process of ‘otherisation’. The same policy of otherisation can be seen in the form of state-regularised educational curriculums.

India and Pakistan cannot come to terms with the fact that these states have been partitioned, and refuse to function as independent states, because the obsession with otherisation requires an entity to blame. Both countries have been responsible for numerous attacks on each other’s soil through banned outfits engaged in proxy wars, and untraceable funding sources. Both these states obsess over and blame each other for their own intrinsic failures like typical fuming neighbours.

The current firing at the Line of Control is another striking phenomenon, which seems to be getting varied responses from Sharif’s regime and a different response from the military. This tends to highlight the difference of opinion in terms of political and military strategy between both the organs of the state even though the current regime has been shed off its real power.

Just to recap, Nawaz Sharif’s initial foreign policy was considerably amicable towards India but then the ‘Islamabad dharna’ happened, and things drastically changed. The tussle for balance of power ensued between the executive, legislature and the army for several months whereas the dharna was used as a pressure tactic. After the Peshawar incident, tides of ‘change’ subsided, and the Pakistani population saw the rise of the military establishment once again in a non-coup coup form.

The basic bone of contention between the state and the military establishment revolves around the control of the foreign and defence policy of Pakistan. The military has been accustomed to an overbearing influence within this ambit of governance for decades. The military believes that it fails to justify its utility to the nation if the population is not made to believe it is in a state of perpetual warfare with its neighbouring countries, which is the justification for an ever-growing demand of funds, war on terror and a larger share in the country’s overall budget.

The Peshawar incident and the current state of terrorism in Pakistan, and its failed counter-terrorism policy, has raised new questions. The National Counter-Terrorism policy under the banner of NACTA has failed under the current regime. Nawaz Sharif is solely to blame for this mishap because of his selective attitude to various militant outfits. Similarly, like always, there have been numerous claims of India’s involvement in terrorist activities across Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan recently granted bail to the alleged mastermind of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, which struck another violent chord within the ambit of Pak-India relations. The Indians were furious while Pakistan tried to downplay the incident, as if nothing had happened, and it was not an act of retaliation intended at India’s alleged involvement with terrorist activities within Pakistan. Both countries have been harbouring opposing forms of terrorist groups while using Afghanistan as a space for fighting proxy wars, other than defined national borders.

The recent firing at the national border by India is evidence of the fact that it is employing the “Cold Start Doctrine”. This military doctrine was developed by the Indian Armed Forces as a response to the possibility of war with Pakistan. The Indian military denies the existence of such a doctrine but reality speaks otherwise. The aim is to perpetrate attacks through conventional warfare in small pockets in order to prevent a retaliatory nuclear attack from Pakistan. Pakistan developed its own strategy to deter India from employing this military strategy via various forms of proxy fighting and other manoeuvres of retaliation. This proposed ideological version states that India should be restored and reunited with all the territories that have been separated from it. This shows another perspective to the whole conflict and gradual suppression of Pakistan through all corners including the use of Afghanistan. Allegedly, banned outfits operating from within Balochistan also have had some sort of assistance from India, which may be in financial terms probably. Banned outfits like Jaish-e-Adl and Jindullah have been known for instigating and perpetrating sectarian violence against the Shia population of Pakistan and Iran. These two sister terrorist outfits have safe sanctuaries within the deserts of Balochistan from where they orchestrate their operations, and are funded by external sources.

The military has successfully shifted the balance of power in its favour by disbanding Nawaz Sharif’s illusions of unrestrained power. Sharif has been harbouring selected extremist outfits, and has been using them as an arm-twisting technique to legitimise his political standing as a solid democratic leader, but has utterly failed. In response, the military used Imran Khan to sway public opinion, and created various problems for Sharif. The result of this internal rift backfired as an aftermath of the Peshawar attack, and external players benefitted most from it, but yet Pakistan refuses to learn. India will continue to benefit from Pakistan’s mistakes and both countries will continue to harbour selective banned outfits, which will prove valuable for their respective nefarious designs in different capacities.

Pakistan has failed as a state and as an ideological nation. Its counter-terrorism policies have been selective and it has repeatedly harboured terrorist outfits, which provides an explanation for the narrative of the ‘good and bad Taliban’. Pakistan has itself provided various circumstances where other international players have been able to take advantage of the situation. Nawaz Sharif has failed once again and he needs to translate his words of condemnation into action now, because the nation deserves peace and security. The need of the hour is to implement stern counter-terrorism policies via NACTA while it struggles to unite all 33 intelligence agencies in Pakistan on one platform, because all these sub wings of ISI are not used to sharing information with their own people, let alone coordinate with other state institutions. NACTA came forward with tall claims in the beginning but it has been gravely unsuccessful in implementing those counter-terrorism policies. The furtively notorious ‘S Wing’ of the ISI needs to stop negotiating and using terrorists for its own hideous motives, as this strategy is no longer in the interest of the state.

India needs to revise its own military strategy and let go of the obsession, and start focusing on its own problems rather than funding and assisting selective banned outfits in other territories. India has gained significant momentum in enlarging its powerbase in Afghanistan. This is another alarming situation. Afghanistan has been the hub of proxy warfare since the 1970s, and continues to be in a volatile state, and refuses to alienate itself from the larger geopolitical game. The exit of American forces from Afghanistan and leaving India largely in control of Afghan territory is not beneficial for Pakistan at all. Pakistan must make amends with Afghanistan in time otherwise it will become vulnerable due to its geostrategic position on the map. India has bought Afghanistan’s allegiance through various means and intends to use this growing influence within the region for its ulterior motives of diminishing Pakistan’s hold within its own territory. Pakistan needs to stop supporting the Afghan Taliban and help Afghanistan in solving in its counter-terrorism endeavours otherwise it would be detrimental for Pakistan’s long-term goals. If Pakistan supports Afghanistan in its counter-terrorism measures, this would help in building a mutual relationship of strategic trust, which would eventually be beneficial for both countries, as opposing terrorists reside in both the countries. Despite their controversial history, Afghanistan and Pakistan need each other for strategic assistance in terms of intelligence sharing, whereas India would benefit from a disagreement between them.

Therefore, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan should rethink their respective strategies to curb terrorism, while stopping themselves from interfering in foreign territories. Pakistan needs to understand the gravity of the situation and take drastic measures in a transparent manner otherwise it will dig its own grave.