Is it working?
It seems the military’s post-NW phase of Zarb-e-Azb will be revealed sooner rather than later. Talk of the agency being almost completely cleared has started doing the rounds more frequently and soon enough the plight of the IDP’s will come to an end. Interestingly the military has made certain gestures about the direction the operation will take after Waziristan. That it would come to the cities was assured. But the general perception was that it would still focus on TTP elements that have formed sleeper cells in urban centres, not the other variety of militants, especially groups that have enjoyed support from within the establishment.
But comments from Peshawar Corps Commander Lt Gen Khalid Rabbani, that eliminating terrorism will require expanding the operation to Southern Punjab and other provinces, might prove a game changer. If true, it would mark a dramatic break from policies of strategic depth, etc, that have brought untold miseries to common people, especially minorities. And should old proxies really be dismantled, progressive circles would no doubt welcome the development, not the least for the political and diplomatic changes it would imply. But it must not be forgotten that such policy will not be without a very heavy cost.
The blowback that the Taliban talked about in the days leading to the NW operation seems to be materialising slowly, after three months of the operation. It shows that the TTP has indeed been dealt a heavy blow by the operation and its command and control structure has been severely downgraded. Pre-emptive operations ahead of the operation, too, minimised the chances of reprisal attacks. But going after sectarian outfits long established in urban centres will be a very different ball game, and the public must be made aware of both the necessity and possible outcomes of such a sequence of events. Not only have they established strong ideological following in the decades of their existence, these groups are also capable mini-armies. Confronting them can trigger violence across the country, meaning things will get worse before they get any better. Things have already come to the point that rooting out such outfits is fraught with danger. It is extremely important, therefore, to mobilise provincial governments and civilian agencies so local populations can be made part of the bigger effort. The army alone will not be able to accomplish this task. And if not done properly, Zarb-e-Azb will have no future beyond Waziristan.
