Invoking a countdown

Army should stay out and allow democracy to sort itself out

By invoking article 245 of the constitution and asking the armed forces to “act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so”, the government has, inter alia, conceded that:

a) It has failed in its primary task of providing safety and security to its citizens;

b) It has no faith in the multi-layered security apparatus that is earmarked with the specific task of looking after these matters, and

c) It is suffering from a deep paranoia about the forthcoming long march being spearheaded by one of the leading political parties which others may also join.

But, much more important than that is the sinister motive behind the invocation: to drag the army into defending a government (and its leadership) that has lost legitimacy and has failed to deliver on its avowed promises as the agonies of the underprivileged have kept multiplying with every passing day since the last elections.

Another key factor that may have influenced the government in taking the critical decision is the overriding perception among a large number of its close coterie of advisors that the army is somehow behind the PTI move to launch an assault on a weak and tottering democratic edifice. That may have prompted Nawaz Sharif to ask the army to control a situation that he perceives it is responsible for creating in the first place. A smart move, but will it help stem the tide?

The move also comes in the aftermath of the brutal Lahore incident when the government used the state apparatus to its most inhuman and lethal effect that resulted in the cold-blooded death of fourteen people with grievous injuries to scores of others, some of whom may have to live the rest of their lives without essential limbs.

The key question that arises is: when faced with the burgeoning challenge to the incumbent government and its corrupt leadership, will the army also act with comparable brutality that was displayed by the civilian security agencies in Lahore? If the answer to the query is in the affirmative, what will its effects be on the political situation in the country and how will this impact the army’s standing with the people and the extremely critical role that it is playing at other, more relevant frontiers? Also, will a brutal response actually stem the tide of protest that appears to be gaining ground with the passage of time?

If the answer to the original query is in the negative and the army refuses to use brutal force, what options it will have in its arsenal to exercise when confronted with a rather large, fully-charged crowd? Will it knuckle under and back off asking the government to take control and use the civilian security forces under its command, or will it advise the government to do the minimum needful as was the case when Nawaz Sharif led the long march from Lahore for the restoration of a sacked former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court?

That brings us to an interesting scenario. What will that minimum needful be? Who will evaluate this and how will this be enforced? What role the army will play in this onerous task? Will it become a party to the proposed solution and act as an independent observer and enforcer, or will it back off after the first stage and leave the dirty work to the government? And, yet more, will this be acceptable to other parties in the equation if they, at all, accept the original mediatory role to be played by it?

A matter that started with a minimal demand for thumb-impression verification in four national assembly constituencies by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) seems to be spilling over to spoil the infatuation with immortality mania of an extremely inefficient, ineffectual and decidedly the most corrupt government that also appears to be insincere with the requirements of defending the interests of the state. All the later-day knee-jerk reactions of the government including the sacking of the NADRA chief in the middle of the night, increasing obduracy in the face of mounting political pressure and lack of viable and credible alternatives offered to redress a continually aggravating situation have contributed to creating an impregnable mess that the country is immersed in today.

Dragging the army in to control the situation is an extreme step that reflects the extreme nature of threat which the government perceives it is confronting. The last Zardari government, when faced with a challenge of similar nature and magnitude, did not resort to the extreme and allowed the long march to take its course and, on the intervention of the army, reluctantly agreed to restore an inimical judiciary that kept tormenting it throughout the remaining years of its incumbency. Nawaz Sharif, being the foot-shooter that he is, appears unwilling to agree to a viable middle course and is hell-bent on exploiting the emerging situation to outdo the opposition to a flawed election that catapulted him into the seat of power.

In the ultimate analysis, the choice would be between either Nawaz Sharif succeeding in sabotaging the prospect of a credible electoral system that would preclude, as best at may be possible, the fear of it being exploited by any party, or the country succeeding, irrespective of the success or failure of individual leaders or parties, in formulating a genuinely effective, efficient and transparent electoral system with inbuilt capacity and operational mechanisms that would serve and promote the legal and constitutional interests of the state.

The choice for the army is tricky. Will it prefer to appear siding a duplicitous and corrupt government to the exclusion of others in its bid to perpetuate its despotic, illegal and immoral hold on the entire state apparatus, or will it prefer to be on the side of the state in helping the evolution of a truly genuine and democratic electoral system that would help only the deserving to take their seats in the parliament? The ultimate fate of the state may depend on a decision taken now. A judicious step for the army would be to stay out and let democracy sort itself out!