The more things change, the more they stay the same?
Recent surgical strikes in and around North Waziristan (NW) have caused small groups to flee the agency, but as scared civilians brave the weather and head for Bannu and DI Khan, larger numbers, from the TTP, are going the other way – across the border into Afghanistan.
The strikes followed the TTP’s beheading of 23 FC soldiers held by its Mohmand chapter. And with talks frozen, and militants refusing unconditional ceasefire, they seemed to back rumours of a wider NW operation as spring sets in. The political leadership, too, is now frustrated with the Taliban’s tactics, and a full-scale operation is increasingly seen as inevitable.
Yet a successful all-out operation will require participation of players far beyond the military, some of which are not only outside the government’s influence, but in some cases also opposed to its interests.
Thinning out
As much as these curtain-raiser strikes might signify the trend of things to come, the cross-border trek typifies the first of Taliban’s likely responses.
“Simply bomb them and they will thin out across the border”, said a COIN official on condition of anonymity.
“By now both Pakistani and American governments know that (Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security) NDS facilitates TTP sanctuaries across the border. They, and the Indians, also fund and arm the TTP. Without securing the border the operation will have limited effect, and there will be blowback in other parts”.
There is also much confusion about the government’s, especially intelligence agencies’, current position with the Haqqanis. The Americans have been pushing for an operation against the Network for years, even implying ‘harbouring’ sanctions for Islamabad after officially branding it an international terrorist organisation in September ’12.
And to secure that border, Islamabad will have to put up a very serious case with Kabul, where President Karzai’s politics often portrays Pakistan as a bigger villain than the Taliban. So far neither the government nor the media has given much thought to the TTP’s external linkages, even as that arrangement is sure to dilute the operation.
The situation is made more serious because military action is expected to trigger reprisal attacks in major urban centres. The PM made some headway with Mr Karzai recently in Turkey, but nothing to the point of educating the international community, or even Pakistanis, about the Afghan hand in TTP’s campaign for sharia.
There is also much confusion about the government’s, especially intelligence agencies’, current position with the Haqqanis. The Americans have been pushing for an operation against the Network for years, even implying ‘harbouring’ sanctions for Islamabad after officially branding it an international terrorist organisation in September ’12.
And recently sections of the American and local press have been hinting that a comprehensive sweep of NA might also include the Haqqanis. The latter mentioned the Network had fallen out with the government after the Nov2 Hakeemullah drone strike. The government had, it said, assured the Haqqanis that Hakeemullah would not be targeted when he consulted with the shura on negotiations, and they subsequently assured his safety in Danday Darpa Khel.
The drone strike, reportedly, led to a split, which culminated in killing of Naseeruddin Haqqani in Islamabad on Nov10. Naseeruddin was the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the group’s powerful patron, former Afghan Taliban government official, and a long time ISI ally. The reporting implied Pakistani intelligence’s puppeteering was responsible for both assassinations, and the Haqqanis vowed revenge and sided with the TTP.
But COIN officials contacted by Pakistan Today refuted such findings.
“There is no truth in the claim that the Haqqanis have turned”, they said, adding that “it is much more likely that Naseeruddin was taken out by the NDS”.
“Last week’s killing of TTP top gun Asmatullah Bhitani (which the same section of the press blamed on another TTP faction) was also most likely orchestrated by the Afghans”. Bhitani was pro-negotiations, and killing him removes a prominent voice for peace in militant circles.
The more things change
Older hands at the great game, especially those familiar with the long partnership with the Haqqanis, also dismiss these claims.
“The Washington Post story and the others are just propagating a false narrative”, said Gen (r) Hameed Gul, ISI chief when Haqqanis and friends were hailed as heroes in Pakistan and America, and part of the Difa e Pakistan council. “There is no question of military action against the Haqqanis”.
The Network has been an essential component of military strategy throughout the insurgency. It formed an influential bulwark against the TTP, helped control TTP’s shia genocide in Kurram Agency in ’11, and provided security guarantees that opened the Thall-Parachinar road after four years. Besides, confronting it not only meant increasing the TTP’s base of resistance, but also alienating deobandi circles across the country.
With talks failing, terrorism increasing, TTP able to flee across the border in case of air strikes, and cross-border intelligence agencies confounding alliances built over years, what direction is government strategy likely to take in the immediate future?
“Considering pros and cons, it is just too late in the day to ditch the Haqqanis”, said Saifullah Mahsud, executive director at the fata research centre, an Islamabad based think tank focusing on the insurgency.
But with talks failing, terrorism increasing, TTP able to flee across the border in case of air strikes, and cross-border intelligence agencies confounding alliances built over years, what direction is government strategy likely to take in the immediate future?
“I don’t see a comprehensive operation coming anytime soon to be honest”, added Mr Mahsud. “It seems such strikes will be the trend. Whenever they hit, we hit back. The intensity might increase but any further escalation while the Taliban can disperse easily seems unlikely”.
The religious and political right, where Gen (r) Gul is prominent, sees things differently. The talks continue, they say, and the air-raids were important “punitive strikes” meant to punish rebel groups within the TTP that are working to sabotage the peace process.
But COIN circles paint a slightly different picture. No doubt military action is inevitable, according to them, but it will have to be intel-intensive.
“Military strikes will be important, but again, they will have limited impact. A comprehensive approach will take more time, and require old fashioned penetration of militant groups (roughly 40), meaning talking to some, influencing others, and punishing the few that continue fighting”, they said.
This would be an extension of the same good Taliban, bad Taliban debate so ridiculed in the foreign, especially American, media. In keeping with classical COIN doctrine, only when militant groups are pitted against each other – with pro-peace factions backed by the government – will foreign supported elements be isolated, exposed, and dealt with.
In the meantime, both talks and action are likely to continue, with the threat level steadily enhanced.
“There will be no game-changer, at least in the near term”, Mr Mahsud said. “For now, the more things change, the more they stay the same”.
