A terrorist gets a safe house

The Hazara question and the Baloch question go together

Malik Ishaq has surrendered himself. No charges have been framed. The most dangerous man in Pakistan – the enemy number one – has chosen to be escorted to a bunker bed in his jail cell till it is safer for him to step outside.

When the going gets tough, Malik Ishaq prefers to be a VIP guest at one of the lodges constructed for the country’s finest – until the threat to him is mitigated or he is needed to negotiate on ‘important security matters.’

On the other side, Hazara Town in Quetta has just finished burying 90 of its own. The organisation that Malik Ishaq fronts, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, has claimed the bombing. The half a million Shia Hazaras that inhabit Hazara Town fear stepping out of their homes. At least a few of them will risk their lives to join the growing exodus seeking asylum in far off lands. The rest will hope that the latest refusal to bury their near and dear ones for four days will secure them.

As Malik Ishaq takes a breather, the task for which he was let out has been accomplished. Since he was released by the Supreme Court in 2011, 1,500 Shias have been killed across the country. Gruesome Shia massacres have been conducted in Gilgit-Baltistan and Parachinar as everyday Shia targeted assassinations continue in various parts of the country every day.

But that is perhaps not the most important task he completed for the security establishment. This was completed in Quetta: to make people forget the Baloch and begin to think of the Hazara – to secure for itself control over the province. The strong criticism of the military’s role in Balochistan has been wiped out in the course of two months and calls for the military to ‘take control of Quetta’ (and thus Balochistan) have been sounded out as the ‘voice of the Hazara community.’

The same voice became the rallying call for the Shia dharnas across the country that managed to paralyse life for two days.

This was as the Balochistan Governor Magsi was insisting that the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is “too scared” [to act against the LeJ] and senior journalist Hamid Mir insisted that it had “delibrately created death squads” in Balochistan. Speaking at the dharna at the Governor’s House, Lahore, human rights activist Asma Jahangir had called for firing all intelligence chiefs if they do not agree to decisively act against the LeJ.

Earlier, one of the Shia scholars speaking at the dharna, called ‘calling the army’ the equivalent of “jumping into the crocodiles mouth when running from the wolf.” He went further and suggested that the “Shia youth needed to take control of Quetta.” Talking to the people attending the dharnas, each shared memories of the 1980s when the Sipah e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) was created under General Zia’s watchful gaze. In fact, none of those attending appeared under any delusion on who was backing the LeJ: in Balochistan and across Pakistan.

Unlike the dharnas that started after the January 10 massacre, this time this criticism found itself articulated from the podium. Back when the Governor’s Rule was implemented on January 16, this was considered an “opportunity for the security establishment to show which side it was on.”

This time round three demands came forward again: to hand over Quetta to the army; targeted operations against the LeJ in Balochistan, and arming and training the Hazara community to defend themselves.

The question again was: if there was such critique amongst the Shia community, why was it protesting to ask the army to take Quetta? The regular response has been: “The relatives of the Quetta attack victims are desperate and we support them.” However, such questions cannot be answered with such simplicity. During the four-day sit in after the January 10 attack, the Hazara Democratic Party continued to organise protest separate from the dharna led by the Majlis-e-Wahdatul Muslimeen (MWM). The MWM appears to be the pro-army group in the political matrix – and also the one controlling the official version of events. When the agreement to bury those who died in the February 16 attack was announced by the MWM spokesman, the families were taking a different line and confusion prevailed until the morning.

A Hazara refugee from Quetta explained that some of the Hazara clerics are also on the payroll of the agencies. He also identified some of those leading the current protest. When this writer asked him,“Why do they not forge an alliance with the Baloch nationalists if they believe the LeJ has the establishment’s support?” The response was sharp: “One of our leaders was quoted in the press defending Baloch nationalists. This was a period when minor overtures had been made. A week later he was shot dead on Khuzdar Road. The message had been delivered and we knew the messenger. No one ventured on this path again.”

By the time the Supreme Court ‘took notice’ (legal jargon has its sense of oxymoron) of the Hazara killings, the military had felt it necessary to officially deny links with sectarian outfits and an operation of sorts was orchestrated in Quetta. We were told that over 100 people, including the “mastermind of the February 16 attack” have been arrested. If finding the “mastermind” of the attack was so easy, could the raids have not been conducted earlier? Especially after the intelligence agencies have admitted to the Supreme Court that “they had intelligence that a truck would be used for another attack.” Deliberate negligence, some would term this as, but this is the nature of the game in Pakistan. Does the fact that no challan has been presented in any of the 1,300 plus Shia Hazara killing in Quetta over the last 13 years not show state complicity?

As it stands, Malik Ishaq knows it is a risk for him to be ‘free.’ He has an election to contest in three months and he would be best positioned to contest it from the safety of a high-security jail. Maulana Azam Tariq, one of Ishaq’s predecessor in the LeJ and another darling of you know who, followed the same route in the 2003 general elections. It was only after Tariq was released from jail that he became the third SSP/LeJ head to be assassinated.

Malik Ishaq’s so-called ‘detention’ shall be presented as a success. What could be more prompt action than arrested the ‘main man’ in the LeJ, we shall be told. The truth, however, is murkier. Which other country could have its most wanted terrorist ‘surrender’ himself – and be arrested – without framing any charges? Ishaq has calculated that jail is safer than his fortified house in Rahim Yar Khan and the state apparatus is willing to play along.

As it stands, Ishaq, used as a negotiator with ‘rogue LeJ militants’ in the 2009 attack on the GHQ, knows he is indispensable to the deep state and so is his organisation. There could be no better indication than his willingness to go to the state for protection. Perhaps like before he has even been promised a monthly stipend from his political patrons as he rests until he is needed again.

The writer is the General Secretary (Lahore) for the Awami Workers Party. He is a journalist and researcher. Email: [email protected].