Devastating

Tough questions on how militants are so resourceful

The wounds of the attack that killed 93 Hazara Shias, the subsequent four-day sit-in accompanied by the deceased in the dead of winter in Quetta that created nationwide sympathy and blew away the indifferent Balochistan government are still so fresh, so raw. And now the beleaguered community has been made to relive the horror. With 83 dead, people still buried under the debris and the number of critically wounded so high, the death toll is likely to rise. With Governor Magsi at the helm, the government acted with much alacrity, providing prompt succour to the injured to the extent of drafting the C130 military planes to airlift the injured, and a million rupee compensation to the heirs of the dead. But the failure of the law-enforcing and intelligence agencies in preventing the tragedy twice in a month and a bit remains far too pronounced, and raises the oft-asked questions again. Yet again Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has accepted responsibility – as if the gruesome atrocity was a badge of honour.

What emboldens LeJ? The fact that there are many in our polity society who subscribe to the fanatical bent weaned in the infamous Zia years when a certain brand of religion was promoted, giving sanction to all sorts of extremism, including wanton killing. There are groups known to have been created by the deep state in the 1980s (the genesis of LeJ incidentally dates back to 1985), and some consider that this motley collection despite the mayhem they have caused the county and opprobrium that they have earned worldwide still continue to operate under the watchful gaze of the very same sponsors who created them.

The questions indeed are many. Why sectarian outfits continue to play a role in national politics? Why organisations such as the Defence of Pakistan Council and others hold such value to the national political parties for them to act coy in their condemnation? How their influence in local level electoral alliances can be condoned for short term political gain? How and why have the sectarian killers and militants of all hues have access to such vast quantities of explosives with such consummate ease? Why have the extensive state apparatus and the otherwise ubiquitous intelligence agencies remained so unaware of their shenanigans despite such a heavy footprint in Balochistan?

But the question that trumps them all, indeed the most fundamental one that has remained unanswered for so long, relates to the relationship between the deep state and the sectarian groups. What and how can the lack of action against violent sectarian outfits be explained? And why two key members of the LeJ escaped a high security prison in Quetta just before the upturn in attacks on the Hazara Shias? In this backdrop, the most important question haunting every right-minded Pakistani remains: Will the Pakistani state change tract? The world and more importantly the deeply scarred Hazara Shia community are watching.