Contradictory signals from the TTP – gestures of peace along with savage strikes against military and civilian personnel – have led to confusion about the organisation’s real motives, with the military preferring talks and public opinion swaying in favour of continued army action.
The most recent example was Ehsanullah Ehsan’s offer of talks on Sunday provided PML-N, JUI-F and JI chiefs acted as guarantors, just on the heels of deadly attacks targeting minority Shia in Hangu and a military installation in Lakki Marwat, killing scores and injuring many more.
Confirmation of the trend: Few in the international press understand that the TTP is an umbrella organisation comprising dozens of militias headed by warlords that owe fealty to Hakimullah Mehsud, but in reality are open to periodic sweeteners when it suits them. “It is very possible for some lower tier commanders to sabotage efforts at negotiations even if their top brass is willing,” intelligence officers told Pakistan Today on condition of anonymity. “Some are more easily influenced, and bought, by al Qaeda”. It bears noting that TTP was initially bankrolled by foreign al Qaeda militants and has steadily parted ways with the Afghan parent body, which is still run by Mulla Omer, by advocating attacks against the Pakistani military.
Hakimullah’s sudden liking for peace talks in December, although with ridiculous preconditions, was an indication that successive military operations and drone strikes have considerably degraded the TTP’s operational capability in the tribal area. Its position is further weakened by advances by Afghan Taliban across the border, especially since they are sure to feature in any post-Karzai setup in Kabul. Hakimullah’s calculated change of posture, confirmed by Ehsanullah’s measured offer, is also a likely security hedge for post-2014 Afghanistan, when US/NATO/ISAF forces are scheduled to depart. Offers of truce on the Pakistani side, security officials say, are primarily to keep favour with the Afghan Taliban who are sure to come to power next door.
“Even though the Lakki Marwat hit was accepted as a revenge attack, it is possible for al Qaeda to exploit differences within the TTP to derail whatever little chances of de-escalation Hakimullah might want to pursue,” they added. “Strangely, these hits might even confirm the trend towards negotiations”.
Molvi Faqir card: Official counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has principally revolved around setting up so called good Taliban against the bad, an approach severely criticised in the foreign press. US officials and media disapprove of the policy because what are good Taliban for Pakistan – who do not attack Pakistani targets – are not necessarily as nice for ISAF forces, since they continue with the resistance in Afghanistan.
Tension between the ISI and CIA increased recently when the latter took out Mulla Nazir, the pro-government strongman in SWA, in a drone strike last month. Pakistani intelligence has also long propped Bajaur warlord Molvi Faqir, former TTP number-2, to influence the TTP high command in favour of a negotiated settlement.
An agreement with Faqir resulted in virtually zero violence in his area around 2010, even if the military failed to build on the momentum, and Faqir was disciplined by an embarrassing demotion to ordinary foot soldier. Yet he continued to command a large following, and intelligence officers close to the COIN strategy regarded him as the lynchpin of the entire peace effort. Recent news reports that Faqir has been re-embraced into the TTP’s highest echelons of power in an effort brokered by Mulla Fazlullah (of the Swat operation) seem to have considerably complicated matters. If true, it puts Hakimullah in a position of significant strength, despite rumours in the foreign press of his loosening grip on power. But, considering TTP’s strategy shift, it could also mean saner heads are prevailing, and Faqir’s position of talks is finding increasing favour with Mehsuds who dominate the TTP. Analysts doubt if politicians named by Ehsanullah will be willing to play ball, but the military is clear that the TTP is finally coming round to ending the militancy. It remains for the media to observe the emerging pattern, and translate mixed signals coming from the TTP for the larger public, the majority of which still favour military confrontation.
