The superpower embrace

In my article last week, I had tried to draw a distinction between the previous partnerships between Pakistan and the US and the one forged in September 2001. During the previous two occasions, the alliance fell apart largely after having achieved its declared objectives. The current partnership, as recent events bear testimony, has been placed under the severest strain even when the goal post is still a considerable distance away.

Many factors would seem to account for this predicament but for our purpose a look at the more prominent would suffice.

To start with, it was not a natural alliance. Pakistan was obliged to team up with the Americans to strike against a group of non-state elements who had committed a gruesome atrocity against the United States but had not caused us any harm. A mixture of incentives and threats persuaded us to provide multiple modes of logistical and operational support to the international coalition to topple the Taliban in their capacity as Al-Qaeda protectors. What remains unclear to this day is the exact nature of our commitment in the war on terror.

Two issues are particularly significant. Was our share of the burden limited to neutralising the Al-Qaeda network and allowing the coalition forces the use of our airspace and logistics to overthrow the regime of Mullah Omar or did we also agree to actively participate in the destruction of the Taliban? The statements emanating from Washington and Islamabad suggest that an unambiguous agreement on this particular point was not reached.

Recently, senior officials in the Pakistani government, including the president himself, have underscored the necessity of finalising “clearly defined and documented” rules of engagement. Really; ten years after the event? It took us a decade of fighting to begin to realise the necessity of elaborating “rules of engagement” to delineate our precise role in this war. Leaving such a critical issue unattended was a cardinal mistake given the blurred nature of the conflict which we had agreed to join.

Were the Taliban not our closest allies in 2001? Was Pakistan not the only state with fully operational diplomatic ties with the Islamic Emirate? Had not most of Mullah Omar’s legions graduated from our madrassahs having unbreakable cultural and ethnic bonds with their Pakistani kinsmen? All the more reason that the rules of engagement should have been spelt out in detail, reduced to writing and signed. To believe that it would be possible, in due course, to nudge the coalition in our preferred direction was to misread the underlying dynamics of super power alliances…

To the credit of our policy makers, the line has finally been drawn. Despite the threats, blandishments and highly toxic accusations we have stood our ground, so far. Recent high level visits have opened a window of hope, albeit a miniscule one, for a peaceful and inclusive approach. This does not however downsize the margin of the original error which has been the cause of so much mistrust between the two parties and had brought the relationship virtually to the breaking point.

When Admiral Mullen opened his guns at us, a multitude of commentators and scholars urged the government to ditch the United States and to align itself completely with China in anticipation of its support in the event of a showdown with the former. Some high sounding statements to the effect that “China’s security is our security” were also made impervious to whether the sober minded Chinese would take such proclamations seriously. Be that as it may this proposition assumes that China would be prepared to side with us against the Americans and ready to suffer the price this would entail.

Without going into the merit of the argument it needs to be recognised that in today’s interdependent world the either/or option is no longer on the table. That luxury available to smaller states during the East-West ideological rivalry disappeared with the tearing down of the Berlin wall. So strong are the global dependencies and linkages that no power, even one as close as China, would entertain an either/or situation in respect of a third country particularly with which it enjoys a hugely profitable economic relationship. The fact of interdependence cutting across political and ideological barriers has negated the viability of such simplistic approaches.

In the changed global environment, great powers, which currently include China, are disinclined to allow a relatively minor player to disrupt the equilibrium forged amongst them through years of painstaking effort. Countries like Pakistan would need to learn to operate and frame their policies within the bounds of this reality.

The more feasible option for Pakistan would be to continue to meaningfully engage the Americans through a sustained and intense dialogue to jointly explore a realistic solution to the Afghan problem which encompasses the minimum interests of all the parties to the conflict and takes into account the core legitimate concerns of countries directly affected by the character of the future dispensation in Kabul.

The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at [email protected]