The US disconnection

My last article on Iraq and Libya had concluded with the question “who is next.” Several friends have suggested that, given the inauspicious turn in our relations with the US, it would be Pakistan. I am not so sure because the complexity of the scene obviates a facile answer. One would rather attempt a dispassionate analysis of the current situation for the reader to draw his own conclusions.

Undeniably, America’s stance has progressively hardened. From denial of safe havens to the Haqqanis to military action against them followed by allegations of official links with the network to the most recent that ISI is exporting terror to Afghanistan through its proxy, represents an ominous curve. Coming in the wake of the attack on the US embassy in Kabul the allegation implicitly traces its origin to the Pakistani authorities.

My personal view that this charge is brazenly inappropriate is immaterial since it was made by no less a person than Admiral Mullen. The proposition that, in a troubled relationship, a subordinate partner could instigate military action against the diplomatic compound (of all places) of the dominant power, beggar’s belief.

To its credit, the Pakistani leadership, political and military, has been circumspect and poised in its reaction. One did not witness the jingoistic rhetoric so often on display in such situations.

Along the way, Pakistan made one cardinal mistake. It was obvious from the beginning that we cannot operate against the Haqqanis without paying an unacceptable price internally.

Till very recently, our government had taken the position that it will act in North Waziristan when our national interest so allowed even though it was evident all along that this operation would ravage our polity and could not be undertaken. The statement that Pakistan will select its own timing for the operation created an understandable sense of expectation in the American mind which they now want implemented.

This ambivalence contravened a key principle of statecraft that friend and foe alike should never be kept in doubt about one’s bottom line. If North Waziristan was our red line it should have been drawn across the page much earlier. The concomitant adjustments in the relationship could then have been achieved with much less disruption.

The aforementioned approach, encompassing a forthright admission of our compulsions, is still worth one last try. To be productive, it would have to be accompanied by ironclad guarantees that Pakistan will not use the network as a spearhead for acquiring strategic depth in Afghanistan. Credible assurances that in post-US Afghanistan, the Taliban would cooperate closely with the international community to root out the infrastructure of global jihad, would need to be provided.

Most crucially, the Haqqanis would have to be persuaded to immediately cease all attacks on US and NATO forces from their sanctuaries in Waziristan. Pakistan would also need to signal its readiness to support an intra-Afghan peace process that would result in the creation of a rainbow dispensation in the country in which all political persuasions would be represented. Monopolisation of power by our favorites would not be pursued.

On its part, the US would have to agree to allow the Haqqanis a place on the negotiating table and not exclude Pakistan from the process. The political structure that emerges from these consultations should then decide on the issue of permanent American bases in Afghanistan. The Karzai government does not enjoy the legitimacy to take such a far reaching decision.

If all this fails and the trumpet of war is sounded, its long term repercussions would be incalculable. In the immediate aftermath, however, this nation will get united as never before in a tidal wave of anti-Americanism. Whether this brand of adhesive will inspire us to create a self-reliant Pakistan with rational priorities or toss us into the cauldron of militarism, bankruptcy and chaos, is difficult to say. The latter scenario will be destructive not merely for us but for the whole region and possibly beyond.

As America ponders its options, it should bear in mind that military action in Waziristan would mean aggression against a longstanding and perhaps most deferential ally. Apart from accelerating the popular ferment currently sweeping the Islamic countries, it would alert their governments to the dangers of embracing a superpower capable of not just abandoning but actually turning on its partners.

The Haqqani factor also needs to be seen from a wider perspective. If the gigantic US investment in Afghanistan is hostage to a few thousand armed men then that investment has been poorly spent. If the fate of the American legacy in the country is so heavily dependent on 5000 tribal warriors that legacy will barely outlive the departure of its architects even if the Haqqanis are decimated. Such fragile structures fall under the weight of their own contradictions without the application of external stimuli. Durability of America’s legacy in Afghanistan can be assured through an inclusive approach, not more war.

The reader should now make his own judgment whether Pakistan is next.

The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at [email protected]