Ten years after 9/11

Ten years have passed since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 that caused major upheaval in the global system and the socio-political landscape in some countries. Pakistan is one such country that faced unprecedented internal and external pressures during these years. Terrorist threats have intensified and there is no hope that Pakistan will be able to overcome this challenge in the near future. The world views Pakistan as one of the major sources of terrorism but Pakistan views itself as the victim.

The UN and several international organisations condemned the 9/11 attacks and vowed to fight terrorism. The United States, being the target of the terrorist attack, was able to obtain unprecedented international support for countering terrorism. The UN General Assembly passed resolutions that asked the member states for cooperation for countering terrorism and provided a legal cover to the US action against the Al-Qaeda.

The US air attacks on Afghanistan were launched on October 7, 2001. The intervening period was used by the US for necessary preparation and an attempt was made to convince the Taliban Government in Kabul to expel the Al-Qaeda leadership, especially Osama bin Laden, from Afghanistan. There were also demands by non-official circles in the US and many Western countries for handing over Osama and his close associates to the US for trial for the death of around 3000 people and destruction of property.

When the 9/11 incident took place, the ISI Director General, Lt-General Mahmood Ahmad, was in Washington and the two meetings with senior US officials after the attacks must have made it clear to him that the US Administration was furious over the terrorist attacks and wanted Pakistan’s cooperation for countering Afghanistan-based Al-Qaeda.

Pakistan approached Mullah Omar to explore if he realised the gravity of the situation and how far he was amenable to the suggestion to expel Al-Qaeda leadership from Afghanistan. It sent two “peace” missions to Mullah Omar.

The first mission was led by Lt-General Mahmood Ahmad. All non-official reports indicate that the he did not advise restraint to Mullah Omar and how to avoid the possible American attack. The second delegation included several religious leaders and senior commanders of the ISI. These religious leaders were not expected to advise restraint because most of them shared Islamic-denominational-sectarian identity with the Taliban and had in the past championed their cause. There was no evidence available that they had changed their disposition after 9/11. Despite the fact that Pakistan had officially abandoned the Taliban and joined the US-led effort to contain terrorism, the message from Pakistan to Mullah Omar was not a clear-cut advice to step back and sever links with the Al-Qaeda.

It is not possible to suggest that Mullah Omar would have acted on Pakistani advice if the two delegations had given a definite message for seeking a political solution. However, this would have shown that Pakistan’s military circles and the society were united in fighting terrorism. The ambiguity manifested in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 characterised Pakistan’s disposition towards terrorism in the subsequent years.

The most popular description in Pakistan of how the Musharraf regime abandoned the Taliban is that Musharraf agreed straight away when he received a phone call from the US Secretary of State and that some senior American official had threatened that Pakistan would be bombed back to the stone-ageif it continued to support the Taliban.

Leaving aside the controversy about who said what, the report of the 9/11 Commission and other evidence suggests that Pakistan took over 24 hours to decide about its policy and all US demands were not accepted. This decision was made by Pervez Musharraf in consultation with his close associates. The matter was later taken up at the Corps Commanders’ meeting where some commanders expressed reservations but accepted the decision. The civilian cabinet was informed about the decision. On October 7, hours before the American attack on Afghanistan, a number of senior army officers, including Mahmood Ahmad, were retired.

Islamic political parties launched street protest after the US initiated air raids in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, which could not take off because the mainstream political parties, like the PPP and the PML(N), did not join it. Being head of the military government, Musharraf did not consult any political party. The PPP and the PML(N) were in confrontation with Musharraf because Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were in exile. These political parties neither associated with the decision to join the war on terrorism nor did they oppose it.

Though the Musharraf regime supported the global efforts to counter terrorism, it developed a tacit understanding with the Islamist parties and groups, especially the MMA that ruled KP, 2002-2007, to accommodate each other. The Islamists were allowed to propagate Islamic-jihadist perspective and pursue accommodating disposition towards the Taliban. In return, the Islamist parties did not openly challenge the Musharraf regime, enabling the latter to keep pressure on the PPP and the PML(N).

Islamist-jihadist worldview developed strong roots in the society because the state managed socialisation processes and the education system dating back to the years of the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq continued to inculcate religious orthodoxy and pro-militancy sentiments in society. By the middle of the first decade of the 21st century this generation had reached the middle and lower-middle echelons of civilian government and the military.

Militancy and pro-Taliban sentiments got strengthened because the US shifted its focus towards Iraq from the summer of 2002. It attacked Iraq in March 2003 where it got bogged down. Economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan was neglected, enabling the Taliban to reemerge from 2004-2005 by cashing on the US-Karzai failure to give a hope for better future to Afghans.

Today, Pakistan is more embroiled in terrorism with extremely high material and human losses. The elected civilian government does not appear to have enough foresight and material and technical capacity to cope with terrorism. The society is divided on the causes of terrorism and how to cope with it. The Islamists and the Political Right consider the US as a greater threat to their vision of Pakistan than the Taliban and other militant groups. They spend more time mourning past events or condemning American policy rather than developing a long-term strategy to cope with Pakistan’s economic and terrorism related problems. The future of Pakistani state and society appears more uncertain today than was the case in September 2001.

The writer is an independent political and defence analyst.