Candid Corner
- At this stage, a thin line separates peace from further destabilisation
There are as many theories about the endgame in Afghanistan as the number of people one happens to talk to. Everyone has an opinion, and a strong one at that.
Much has happened in the last 18 years to lead one to think in a certain way. But this is also clouded at times because of a premeditated occupation with propelling the fast-evolving paradigms assume a definitive shape– one way or the other.
Much is also wrong with most of the theories emerging from the embers of a busted effort spread over 18 years to get the better of the Taliban who seem to have emerged ascendant on two principal counts: one, their resolve and patience not to give up and, two, the US preoccupation with exiting an increasingly embarrassing scene in haste, thus damaging both their negotiating position and potential for securing any enduring gains.
Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to the US assumed additional significance in enhancing Pakistan’s role in securing a peace deal in Afghanistan that will be acceptable to all stakeholders. While such an engagement entails prospects for making the country and its leadership more relevant in the emerging milieu, it also carries a mammoth risk factor that could plunge it into an imbroglio it may find difficult to extricate itself from in later times– the very same kind of imbroglio it found itself embroiled in during the recent and distant past which, by all objective and dispassionate appraisals, proved damaging even for its genuine bottom line stakes. Principally, Pakistan’s role would encompass both pre- and post-peace-deal Afghanistan. More specifically, it would pertain to its further involvement in securing the US-Taliban peace deal and enforcing its across-the-board implementation later.
It is all but certain that the US and the Taliban have the blueprint of a peace deal that they want to ink their signatures on. In the wake of the US announcement to exit the Afghanistan arena by a certain date not too far into the future, and instead of going through various stages minutely and sensitively before arriving at the deal, a policy of uncomfortable haste was adopted to rush to the finishing line. The US is now going through a process of working backwards to having the agreement accepted by all stakeholders, most notably the incumbent government in Kabul that it was instrumental in installing in the first instance. This is where it is now confronted with a major challenge, and it is on this count that Pakistan is being enticed into expanding its role.
Pakistan’s induction into the three major powers’ moot in Beijing on July 10-11 was no flash in the pan. It was meant to send a message that Pakistan was being complimented for the role that it had played thus far in facilitating the ongoing negotiations between the US and the Taliban. But, more importantly, it was being prepared to playing a bigger role in the future pertaining to ensuring that, in the post-peace deal environment, no party (read ‘Taliban’) takes any unilateral step or steps which would be detrimental to the interests of the other stakeholders.
Besides playing the role of a vibrant facilitator in the ongoing peace talks and remaining actively involved in pushing the process further to its logical culmination, I have serious doubts whether Pakistan is tailored to extending that role to becoming the ‘mediator’ or the ‘guarantor’
Political and strategic pundits are speculating on the prospect of internal strife increasing further in Afghanistan once the peace deal has been signed and the new power centres emerge clearly, with the Taliban holding the centre stage. Conjecture is also ripe whether the Taliban would continue to espouse the traditional mindset that the world witnessed when they ruled the country last, or whether there has been any significant change in the way they look at things in the context of human rights, more specifically women’s rights.
The only reference made of this in the declaration issued at the conclusion of the “Intra-Afghan Peace Conference” held in Doha on July 7-8, which states that the “women rights in political, social, economic, educational, cultural aspects/areas will be assured in the frame of Islamic values”. This hardly signifies any softening of the position that the Taliban have always nurtured as interpretation of the “Islamic values” would be undertaken by the people they would appoint for the task, not the Americans, or the Pakistanis, or anyone else. These “Islamic values” would, thus, be interpreted as those people were ordered to.
When I spoke to the people who brokered the dialogue about the prospect of any change of mindset underlining the Taliban attitude, they were generally pessimistic suggesting that it was very difficult to evaluate it one way or the other, though they did indicate a certain minimal level of flexibility that was evident in conversation with the women participants of the dialogue. But, this could simply be because the Taliban would not like to derail the process at this stage, which is heading smoothly towards handing over power to them in the not too-distant future.
This is where Pakistan is expected to play its part– first, convincing the Taliban to talk to the Kabul government, second, enhancing the flexibility quotient over what the Taliban demonstrated during the course of negotiations and, third, ensuring that they don’t go for the surge once the foreign forces have been withdrawn.
Similar was the trap that strangled Pakistan in the past and, in its eagerness to end the long-lasting conflict in the neighbouring country which has grave implications for its own security, it may get caught up in the act again.
Pakistan has played it well so far, as was amply on display during the Prime Minister’s US visit. But that should be taken more as optics rather than substance. The substantive part would come, if at all, after going the distance and facing its likely setbacks and pitfalls together. Will the changed approach of the US, which is now being amply nuanced, hold sway under any adverse developments, or will the veneer prove to be as thin as in the past? That’s why I advocate that Pakistan should not enter an unchartered territory unless it has taken a comprehensive stock of its strengths and weaknesses and has reviewed its wherewithal to ensure whether it is fully geared to handling any unforeseen eventualities.
I also say this because the US will continue to have strategic interests in this part of the world even when they have withdrawn bulk of their forces. The full scope of their involvement may become clear over a period of time, but their continued stay in Afghanistan would largely depend on the environment that is generated, both prior and subsequent to the signing of the peace deal.
Besides playing the role of a vibrant facilitator in the ongoing peace talks and remaining actively involved in pushing the process further to its logical culmination, I have serious doubts whether Pakistan is tailored to extending that role to becoming the ‘mediator’ or the ‘guarantor’. I say this because, alongside some goodwill that it may carry among the Taliban, there are forces which remain inimical to Pakistan’s disproportionate involvement in the Afghan affairs.
Pakistan has to tread its path carefully lest it take a step that may cultivate further strife and destabilisation among various stakeholders. In such an eventuality, bulk of the blame would rest on its shoulders – and it would be a heavy burden to carry!
