- The Afghan peace process
The US war in Afghanistan remains the longest, most-inconclusive conflict in recent history. This 17-year long, largely forgotten war has reshaped how academicians approach US as a hegemon now and the precepts under which international relations as a discipline is being addressed. It has also breathed in new areas of discourse which had largely remained un-talked about.
The Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, considered the right way of relieving the Afghans of Taliban tyranny and replacing it with a sustainable democratic government, has become an oblivious, idealistic dream. Albeit the terminology has been so carefully designed to foster consensus on the inclusion of the Afghans as a stepping stone for their greater democratic transition; the inefficacy with which this matter has been approached, has left it as an inconclusive matter.
I use the term inefficacy to describe the inconsequential nature of the matter and how it has been dealt with, under a US-created, US-led model. In the almost two decades that this war has been around, the on-ground forces and the intelligentsia have been unable to understand the extent of the problem, and the reasons why it continues to prolong. While the term ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ peace process is directly aimed at creating a model that would work for the greatest number of Afghans, and the world at large, we are still at odds with understanding what is it that the Afghans want.
The US-led NATO alliance thought that it had penetrated deep within the state by handing over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan to the instituted coalition government in 2014. The US soon then started devising its exit strategy, but today both the state of US and the sanctity of Afghanistan are far from it. The persistent suicide attacks (the recent attack in Maidan Wadak province) and the challenges posed by the Taliban, has thwarted generations of Afghans from any kind of socio-economic progression. Thus, the underlying problem remains, the US and the world is still unaware about the enemy it is dealing with, and the magnitude of the problem.
Before being elected to the presidency, Donald Trump in his many fiery speeches assured the world of a massive pull out and called for an end to US’ overseas engagement. The years following his election have seen a struggling Trump, at odds with the world. While his populist rhetoric was in line with the Rightist sentiments that resonated with the thousands of Americans, the precarious nature of affairs that the US finds itself in has created a gap where the Trump administration, Rightist in its stance, is taking a more pragmatic approach in engaging with the regional powers to find a better solution to the problem.
The robust nationalist stance that the present government has set at the international forums such United Nations General Assembly session in 2018, and the idea of ‘hired gun’ when the US cut its aid to Pakistan – has afforded Pakistan a better position at the negotiating table
This engagement with the regional forces has led the US to approach Pakistan, as an important regional actor, despite the earlier Twitter brawl between the two states’ leaders and growing concern from the US that Pakistan needs to do more to root out the insurgent elements from within and those that continue to cross borders to the other side.
The robust nationalist stance that the present government has set at the international forums such United Nations General Assembly session in 2018, and the idea of ‘hired gun’ when the US cut its aid to Pakistan – has afforded Pakistan a better position at the negotiating table.
And for the first time, the US and the world have recognised the Taliban as stakeholders, and given them a chance to be a part of this series of composite dialogue being held in Doha. This shows that for armistice, a thorough composite dialogue between all parties is required so that a greater understanding of on ground realities can be created and the dream of a rather stable region can actually be realized. It also shows that military power can be easily matched with military power, but for regional stability these can only be used as pressure tactics. Then, the only chance at regional stability can come from the recognition of the state actors in a particular scenario, their position in international affairs, and the use of a diplomatic dialogue to arrive at a solution that suits the greatest number of actors.
Stakes are always raised ahead of the talks. Either its US’ negation of going ahead with the talks or the Taliban attack on the Afghan intelligence agency – the peace process can’t be abandoned and the other actors such as India and Russia would also have to be engaged if a sustainable Afghan peace process is to be realised.
