- Taliban said no
Now that the Taliban have effectively, and finally, taken the wind out of this peace process’s sails, perhaps everybody can understand just how unrealistic their expectations have been. Afghanistan’s insurgency has been gaining momentum for more than a decade – since the 2006 Spring Offensive to be more precise – and has already outlasted two two-term US presidents. How smart was it to expect them to suddenly hang their guns, largely on US conditions, just because the US wants out? And once they made it clear that any progress would require an annulment of the Kabul government, installation of an interim government in its place, and a number of Taliban commanders as a part of it, why did everybody act as though they had simply not heard the most important condition?
Now, after yet another investment in peace, it seems the process is unfortunately headed back to square one. Release of prisoners and discussing an eventual US departure is all very fine – it got the talks this far – but what’s the use if the Taliban will just not come round to talking to Ashraf Ghani’s administration? The implication, quite clearly, is that if they won’t recognise the government they’ll continue fighting it, which ought to become easier once the Americans are all gone.
So the only assumption that can be drawn from the information available in the newsroom is that the insurgents are aiming for a still greater piece of the pie. They know they’ll never take Kabul again. But they also know they can squeeze a lot more, since they dictate the time table now. That, however, means that everybody must return to the drawing board all over again. They may have had the right intentions, but so far they have been running in the wrong direction. And Ghani’s election gambit, that he’d get the Taliban talking by then, is already lost. It seems Khalilzad stayed back in Islamabad for nothing. Let’s see what plan he brings next time he’s here.
