American drone strikes and other developments

• This is an evolving scenario

On 24 January 2018, an American drone struck a target deep inside Kurram Agency in FATA. This was part of a series of strikes (during the period October-January) that analysts say is the measured execution of President Trump’s threats since his 21^st August 2017 speech outlining his policy for Afghanistan and South Asia.

Evidently, drone strikes, which were halted after Taliban leader Mullah Mansur’s death in May 2016 in a similar attack, have resumed. For a number of reasons, this occasion is somewhat different than in the past.

First, the Pakistan government has reacted sharply saying ‘such unilateral actions… are detrimental to the spirit of cooperation between the two countries in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan condemns drone strike in Kurram Agency carried out by the Resolute Support Mission (RSM)… which targeted an Afghan refugee camp’. Second, the target of the attack was a compound in an area of Kurram agency bordering Orakzai agency, and closer to the settled area of Hangu, which houses an Afghan Refugee Camp. It is claimed that one of the three people killed in the attack was a mid-level commander (Nasir Mehmood) of the Haqqani Network. The implication is that Haqqani network continues to operate from the sanctuaries available in Pakistan. Third, in an exceptional reaction to the foreign office spokesperson’s statement, the US embassy termed the claim of strike at a refugees’ camp as false: ‘The claim in a foreign ministry statement that US forces struck an Afghan refugee camp in Kurram Agency is false’. Clearly, the location is contested and not the attack, a departure from the past practice of disowning such strikes. Finally, and in yet another exceptional act, a spokesman of the Pentagon in Washington, Colonel Michael Andrews, said this to VOA: ‘In response to Pakistan government claims that the US military conducted airstrikes in Pakistan this week, I can confirm that there were not any department of defense airstrikes outside of Afghanistan’. This is an extraordinary statement having significant implications for the US policy.

Before we comment on the above, let us also point out some surreal developments taking place outside the gaze of public eyes. Several local and international news reports suggest that the US administration is pushing Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table or resume the suspended dialogue. One report claims (Express Tribune, February 1) that the request had come from none other than the CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel, having had extensive experience of participating in actual combat in the Afghan theatre. He spoke to General Qamar Bajwa, COAS, on the subject and urged him to use his offices for this purpose.

This is a startling finding that shows that the ‘Taliban are now in full control of 14 districts (that’s 4pc of the country) and have an active and open physical presence in a further 263 (66pc)

Interestingly, things have started moving real fast. Reuters has reported on the authority of senior Taliban leaders that a three-member delegation visited Pakistan this week to resume the stalled dialogue with the approval of the supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. An official of the foreign office, without disclosing his/her identity, has also confirmed the Taliban visit and resumption of talks. It is further stated that the US has not asked anything specific from Pakistan, in the wake of President Trump’s many threats, particularly the revolting New Year’s tweet, except to help the US to resume the dialogue.

The Islamabad talks follow another back-channel between the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami in Turkey. Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, however, has denied there was any authorised participation from the Taliban in Turkey talks.

This is an evolving scenario. It is not clear if all stakeholders are on the same page. The flurry of attacks in Kabul even prior to the arrival of the fighting season is seen by many as a signal from Taliban that they would not be holding talks from the position of weakness. But the rise in ISIS activity is also seen as a reason behind spurring action from both the main contending parties, underlining the importance of early resolution of the conflict.

The resumption of the US drone strikes, on the other hand, carries mixed signals. On the one hand, it could mean intensification of pressure on Pakistan to help bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, whereas, on the other, a disconnect between the Pentagon and the CIA is evident from the statements from the two sides. Evidently, the two organs of the US government may not be acting in unison or, worse, may be pursuing different goals.

The Kurram drone attack has engendered heated exchange between the two countries. Pakistan’s claim that an Afghan refugee camp was attacked was a vindication of its long-standing position that there were no sanctuaries hosting Taliban militants, and that, if at all there were certain elements, they had morphed and melted within the refugees’ population. In this background, Pakistan’s decision to reject any further extension in the deadline for their repatriation to Afghanistan was essential to deny such elements the opportunity to take refuge in such places. In her recent visit to London, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Allice Wells, has reportedly objected to Pakistan’s decision to repatriate Afghan refugees along with its efforts to seal the Pak-Afghan border with fencing and by erecting a wall. It is curious to see the US and Afghanistan object to Pakistan’s efforts to prevent unauthorised movement across a porous border when they constantly blame Pakistan for nursing sanctuaries.

There are two more developments that may help understand the evolving scenario. First, in an extensive study, a BBC report has found that the Taliban now control or threaten much more territory than when foreign combat troops left in 2014. This is a startling finding that shows that the ‘Taliban are now in full control of 14 districts (that’s 4pc of the country) and have an active and open physical presence in a further 263 (66pc), significantly higher than previous estimates of Taliban strength’. Also, ISIS has a much more diffused presence and compared to the Taliban is a small force. However, it is gaining ground in the vicinity of its presence.

Second, the Special Inspector General on Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in its latest quarterly report has shown that poppy cultivation was the highest in 2017 and that the US efforts to combat this menace have not been fruitful despite considerable investment. More importantly, SIGAR has accused the defense department of blocking publication of data on “the number of districts, and the population living in them, controlled or influenced by the Afghan government or by the insurgents, or contested by both”. This is the information contained in the BBC report.

Viewed in this background, the attempts to resume the stalled dialogue are a welcome development. But nobody should indulge in undue expectation of positive results any time soon. We should also not take our eyes off the hidden agendas of the many players in the game whose schemes would be foiled by any prospect of peace in Afghanistan. Equally important, it is high time for the Trump Administration to develop a cohesive policy whether it would continue the path of prolonging the conflict or allow the incipient efforts from its military to carry forward the dialogue process to a meaningful resolution.