By Saad Awan
- Long shadow of the Afghan jihad
With the Soviet Union long gone and Russia emerging from its ashes as a new super-power, we seem still unable to unfetter ourselves from the repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
One thing we can learn from history is that it is never deemed worth learning; the second thing is that, in historical context, this attitude towards history has always been an unforgiveable mistake
While formulating any action plan to tackle a social problem, the past cannot be rendered to the textbooks of history. Take, for instance, the most fundamental of the issues now webbed deeply into our social fabric: extremism and the dogmas supporting it.
We have been bombarded with the rhetoric of historic lessons, ranging from the political and social choices of the past that leashed out the genie from the bottle, namely terrorism, to the factors that justify such acts. But the anti-terrorism policy seems detached at best from the realities of the past.
The most popular choice of the socio-political rant makers in this regard has been the path Pakistan took in tackling the “Soviet problem”. With the Soviet Union long gone and Russia emerging from its ashes as a new super-power, we seem still unable to unfetter ourselves from the repercussions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Terrorism, we are told, has been largely a by-product of our “social engineering” of masses in Madrasahs, so the “engineered lot” conveniently joined the ranks of jihadis, when and if required, to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
All the Frankensteins of social sciences never thought of an antidote of their creation. Here we are now, revising the mantra of that historic manipulation of both religious and political thought at the national level, which is still haunting us. The only good that can be taken from that part of our history is a reasonable sense of awareness of what we are dealing with.
We are further told by some quarters, with bombastic zeal, that to meet some necessary ends we had to create a monster par excellence by facilitating the militant outfits, and that it is incumbent upon us to cherish the mercenaries of the Soviet war as our saviours.
Had we learnt from history, such dogmas would have been compounded at source. But as is the case, the jihadi sentiment still finds favourable patronage at all levels. Be it the mushroom growth of some madrassahs towing to particular religio-political party or the beneficiaries of Afghan jihad in the fold of political and welfare circle, they all have in them a somewhat burgeoning desire to reclaim the glories bestowed upon them during Afghan Jihad. No doubt political parties that were armed heavily enough to necessitate a goal through short-sighted strategies have been reduced to a mere shadow of their hay days.
What can the policy makers take from this still all too relevant dark shadows of an enigmatic past? This past surely allows us an insight into what we may end up with if such dogmas are left unchecked and unnoticed. The necessary outcome should then force us to at least keep an eye on the remnants of our unguided and poorly conceived jihadi past and not to use their current manifestation into a political realm as a “political commodity of choice”.
A social experiment gone horribly wrong is only glamourised by those who were the object of that experiment, i.e. those who built their thought process under the influence of jihadi propaganda during the Soviet-Afghan war. It is sometimes, then, a waste of energy in trying to incorporate, with a full license of trust, those who were indoctrinated by design to evolve as uncompromising war-machines or as its propagators, as was the policy choice of those calling the shots at the time of Soviet adventurism to the south and years succeeding it.
What can also not be ignored is the fact that the support for the dollar led jihad against the communist invaders harbours in its spirit a sectarian doctrine of hate that was a necessary catalyst to provide the mercenaries with a holy cause that also suited the Saudi royals in making their petro-dollars well spent for them. Our recent history does spell out clearly the dangers of sectarian loyalties and ease of access to the human capital required for terrorism through sectarian fanaticism. Along with the necessary recruitment potential the sectarian loyalties are known to provide a basis for funding from inland and international channels alike.
It is not a far-fetched thought, and sentiments and statements from religious parties testify again and again, that those who have tasted the dollar value of their sectarian powers are still lurking around to cash in and believe that an ideal situation for a holy duty of jihad, embellished with all its perks and privileges, is around the corner. Such fertile grounds with moral support and doctrinaire sectarian spirit only needs a clandestine dollar push to ignite another terror band.
Learning form history should have at least enabled us in dismantling the moral support of propaganda stricken zealots of Zia era and to check the further spread of their injected visions of jihad. Awareness of a historic blunder should also teach us in taking the leaders of individual sect driven political parties, and fund driven welfare cum political cum religious parties never as tools of political leverage against any political force. Rather, the dollar footprint behind all not so banned religious organisations must be clearly mapped to freeze the puppet masters of religious fanaticism.
That becomes all too relevant when the results of the recent by-elections show the support for religious outfits changing trends.
One thing we can learn from history is that it is never deemed worth learning; the second thing is that, in historical context, this attitude towards history has always been an unforgiveable mistake!
Saad Awan is a teacher, trainer and writer.
