Running around in circles

“Do more” followed by “We have produced results”

The appointment of a former IB chief to hold talks with all stake holders in the Indian controlled Kashmir is a welcome step. Indian government now needs to release Hurriyet and JKLF leaders and their relatives and activists to encourage the Kashmiri separatist leadership to enter into talks with New Delhi. What is more India should enter into dialogue over Kashmir with Pakistan which is also a party to the Kashmir dispute. A major reason behind the spread of terrorism in South Asia is the unresolved Kashmir issue which has bred hostility between India and Pakistan. This affects their attitude towards the terrorist networks operating in the region. Islamabad accuses India of using TTP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and others for launching attacks from Afghanistan inside Pakistan. New Delhi blames Pakistan for backing JuD and JeM  for attacks inside India and in occupied Kashmir. Only credible moves towards resolution of the Kashmir issue can pave the way for cooperation between the two countries  against the  terrorist networks in the entire region.

The US needs to persuade India to engage with Pakistan. Feeling secure on the LoC and international border with India, Pakistan would be able to transfer the bulk of its military resources to its western frontier to stop the cross border movement of the terrorists. It would have enough troops to take on the remaining terrorist concentrations. It would also  coordinate more efficiently with the US along the Durand Line in hammer and anvil operations. At a moment when Pak-India hostility is on the peak a US strategy envisaging a greater role for India in Afghanistan can only add to Pakistan’s security concerns. Tough messages won’t work. Pakistan resisted all pressures to  launch an operation in North Waziristan till it found that it was in its own supreme interest to cleanse the Agency of terrorists. Pakistan has also managed to sit out the US  sanctions in the past. It would be a major failure on the of part of the US not to address the concerns of an ally which is willing to cooperate  with both the US and Afghanistan.