Today, Iran and Saudi Arabia are competing for mastery over the Middle East; in the seventies ZA Bhutto and the Shah of Iran Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi competed for the same. Unlike the cut-throat competition between the Saudis and the Iranians, in which daggers are drawn and accusations of proxy wars and terrorism are hurled against one another, the struggle between Bhutto and Shah was subtle and sophisticated. Unlike the ongoing mudslinging match between the Arabs and the Persians, the Shah and Bhutto were friends who helped each other out.
The Shah was, of course, the senior partner in this relationship. Being the hegemon of the Middle East with the American backing, the Shah was wary of the communist threat to this region and because of Pakistan’s close geographical proximity to the erstwhile Soviet Russia—the ‘Mecca’ of world communism—and affinity of Mao-cap sporting Bhutto with Chinese helmsmen, he kept Bhutto in good humour by granting $800 million in loans and credits and when Bhutto said that he “found it embarrassing to ask for assistance” to buy military equipment, the Shah gave about $700 million, becoming the biggest aid-giver to Pakistan; however, he cautioned Bhutto that Pakistan should buy only defensive and not offensive weapons lest the Indians raised objections which was well in accord with the US policy in South Asia as is evident from a remark of the then US National Security adviser, Henry Kissinger, as quoted by Alex Vatanka in his latest research: “Shah’s policy has thus in fact contributed to promotion of stability and moderation among countries of South Asia—objectives which completely accord with our own.” Bhutto did not like this paternalistic attitude of the Shah about the type of military hardware his country should or should not buy yet he kept quiet because after the lifting of the US arms embargo, he wanted to shop big and so requested $1 billion from the Shah which the latter refused and subsequently confided to Kissinger, “They [Pakistan] have no money. They asked me for $1 billion. I don’t have it. The Saudis do but they don’t have the close relations we do.”
Being a statesman par excellence, Bhutto could foresee that the Arabs would eventually overtake the Shah in terms of wealth and the accruing corresponding political influence. Without any formal rupture with Iran, Bhutto veered Pakistan towards the Arabs by first championing the cause of Palestine and later staked his claim for the mantle of the Muslim world by claiming that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan symbolised the empowerment of all the Muslims. He did not stop there and went ahead in a big way by holding a pan-Islamic summit conference of many Muslim heads of states and governments in Lahore in February 1974 which the Shah, despite repeated requests from Bhutto, refused to attend as he was fuming and fretting: “Why the hell should I let [King] Faisal dictate the [conference] dates.” And when his chief courtier Asadollah Alam reminded that his refusal would be a slap in the face of Bhutto, the Shah shot back, “Send our prime minister and tell the Pakistani ambassador that I consider the conference to be a waste of time.” Bhutto would not give up. He invited Shah’s sister Princess Ashraf, who was also his personal friend, over to Pakistan to prevail upon the Shah to attend the conference and added that he also expected her to request the Shah to provide the Iranian oil on cut price to Pakistan and when the princess faithfully raised the request before his brother; the Shah, livid with anger, retorted, “Never! Mr Bhutto is so anxious to please the Arabs that he has even started talking about the ‘Gulf’ without the hint of the all-important adjective ‘Persian.’ If he wants cheap oil, then he [should] damn well sort something out with his Arab friends.”
And Bhutto did please his Arab guests in a grand manner at the conference by stating that “Pakistan is uncompromisingly committed to the Arab cause” and thundered that “Except for an interval during the Crusades, Jerusalem has been a Muslim city—I repeat, a Muslim city.” This was music to the Arab ears. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi went wild with joy and not only did he hail Bhutto as his “older brother” and declared that Pakistan was the “citadel of Islam” in Asia but also became the first Arab leader to ship the Libyan oil to Pakistan at the cost of production leaving the Shah high and dry. The summit conference turned out to be a masterstroke of Bhutto’s diplomacy because after the conference, Pakistan received $990 million in financial aid from the Arab countries; this figure was all the more spectacular because since 1974, Pakistan had not received a single dime in financial assistance from any Arab country.
The littoral Arab states of the Persian Gulf were considered the “sovereign backyard” of the Shah so he was naturally displeased because by monopolising relations with these Arab states, Bhutto had started poaching in Iran’s backyard. With literally no means at hand and just by sheer intelligence and statesmanship, Bhutto got the better of Shah. The friendship went cold. The Shah could neither forget and nor forgive Bhutto for this breach.
