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US’ Afghanistan Policy: an ideological discourse

“…after the 9/11 attacks, Musharraf had to agree to be US’ constant ally in the war against terrorism, achieving the status of a front line state – and Pakistan’s previous critically acclaimed geo-strategic partnership took a turn for the worst”

Last week Trump’s speech stirred anger and anguish amongst various Pakistanis. His comment on Pakistan being the ‘safe haven for Taliban’ was met with utmost criticism by political leaders such as Imran Khan, Siraj ul Haq, Sherry Rehman and various others. This heavy criticism by the political leaders is viewed as the appropriate response and many of their supporters strongly believe that this was needed, however, Pakistan’s historically tumultuous relationship with the United States suggests otherwise.

Soon after the 9/11 attacks, Musharraf had to agree to be US’ constant ally in the war against terrorism, achieving the status of a front line state. Pakistan’s previous critically acclaimed geo-strategic partnership took a turn for the worst and the events of the last sixteen years are a prominent example of the nature of relationship between the first and third world countries. These PAK-US dialogue stand at an epitome of neo-imperialistic notions of grandeur for which Pakistan has always been in debt while the US’ State Department has always been a vicious recovery staff.

This, however, has not curtailed the problem of Terrorism at large and with new actors such as Daesh and ISIS gaining stronghold, it has become apparent that the world is becoming a more dangerous place. The rise of Taliban has been persistent, contrary to popular belief. No amount of US military presence in the region has been able to effectively defeat the might of these terrorist outfits or restore balance amongst the Afghans.

While US President Donald Trump has restored Americans’ faith in the US foreign policy, it has been done so, incomplete and erratically. Firstly, the ‘new policy’ can best be described to be in a conjuncture with the policies of both George W Bush and Barrack Obama, both of which failed in Afghanistan. While adamant to put down the Taliban with on-ground forces currently standing at 10,000, no comprehensive strategy has been formulated about the withdrawal and no plan seems to be in motion yet. It appears that this press conference was what Trump does best, talk.

At this moment an incomprehensive strategy would do more harm than good. A state strong militarisation, capacity building of the elite forces, fostering a pro-US stance amongst the Afghans and getting Afghanistan on the band wagon of democratisation is too widespread a dream to be realised. Efforts in the last sixteen years have borne no results. This indicates that no amount of ground forces can put down the threat of terrorism.

By the logic of this, US’ foreign policy towards Afghanistan fails. Nor does it validate to any amount that India’s presence in the region would do any good. Trump’s statement further highlights that to US Afghanistan is a point of political vacuum for the entire Asia through which an interconnected series of proxies would determine the bigger Central Asian giant amongst China, India and Pakistan.

All this suggests that US doesn’t want to effectively put an end to the threat of Terrorism for the fear of it is too grand and validates US’ extensive militarisation and engagement in other countries outside of its own. This suggests that Afghanistan is a post-Cold-War theatre, a battleground for countries to present their might.

Little is being done to save the Afghans from the Taliban, the ongoing insurgency and the possibility of civil war as soon as US withdraws its troops. What US lacks in its policy for Afghanistan is an understanding of the Taliban. If we assume that there is an infinite number of weapons in the world and that both US and Taliban have the same access to this infinite pool, nothing more to lose in their fight against the oppressor, to present to their global ‘audiences’ the fight of right over wrong, then our key to defeating the enemy is understanding the goals to which each is working. What US foreign policy in Afghanistan further lacks is this understanding-the ideals and values around which these insurgents have built consensus, that they want to achieve.

Much like Vietnam, US doesn’t know what it wants from this war, to what end is it engaging, and to yield what. The narrative for ‘free world’ was sold beautifully globally, but hasn’t been able to deliver and is losing its consensus quickly enough. Afghanistan has become a graveyard for the US military and policy making with little or no knowledge of the means to end this war.

This offers an ideological shift-one that moves beyond the use of military to understanding the ideology motivating the Taliban to go ahead and beyond. A group of people who don’t share the same ideals; ideals of democracy, freedom, right to life, education etc., can’t be brought under the same umbrella of freedom with which many of us abide by. This same group that glorifies violence and considers their suicide attacks a victory, the right to oppress others a victory can’t be dealt with violence as this further legitimises their progress. US realises that the threat is larger if it withdraws, it now needs to understand why it is so.

US policy towards Afghanistan needs to be revisited in terms of ideological discourse with an insight into the need for the war to persist from both sides and the combatants that US is fighting.

Without an understanding of this, Afghanistan will come out as one of the most brutal arenas of limited war this free world of 21^st century has ever seen. There is no valour in instigating arch rivals against each other as proxies can outlive entire generational progression. US needs to now make it clear where it is heading; in a bid to prove the world that it can fight the war or that it can end it!