Croaked the raven: “do more”.
To fathom the policy contours of Pak-US relations, especially when the conditions of relations are flowing from the US to Pakistan, the Kerry Lugar Berman Act of 2009 (passed into law in October 2010) is a cogent guide. Though the Act has outlived its legal and financial utility, the contents still allow a reader to apprehend the priorities of the US towards Pakistan. For instance, in the Pak-India context, it demanded Pakistan raze the camps of Lashkare Tayyeba perpetrating terrorist actions in India. Further, in the Pak-Afghanistan context, the Act required that Pakistan bulldoze the hideouts of both the Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura active in disruption in Kabul.
During the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the US on 26 and 27 June, US President Donald Trump appreciated the efforts of India to fight (Islamic) terrorism. A few days later, in the beginning of this month, US Senator John McCain visited Islamabad and Kabul and insisted that the threat of terrorism was still coming from Pakistan threatening the existence of the Kabul regime.
Last year, Pakistan claimed that it had had some influence on certain Taliban groups to come to terms with the Kabul regime. Perhaps, Pakistan delivered on this account by persuading Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to reconcile with the Kabul government of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in September 2016, though Hekmatyar had no declared association with any type of Taliban. During his recent visit, when Senator McCain reiterated “do more” mantra of the US, Pakistan felt annoyed. Pakistan has no other Afghan warlord bigger than Hekmatyar’s stature to convince to come to terms with the Kabul regime. Interestingly, the persistent emphasis of the US on Pakistan to “do more” for Afghanistan indicates that the US overly relies on Pakistan. Most American writers toe the same line, thereby meaning that both the US policy makers and writers are convinced of US’s being handicapped to Pakistan’s will in Afghanistan.
To justify “do more”, Senator McCain said that the US was relying on Pakistan’s support to stamp out the Haqqani network and consequently eliminate terrorism ravaging Kabul. Expressed through “do more,” the inferred dependence of the US on Pakistan is both the strength and weakness of Pakistan. Strength because the US values Pakistan’s worth whereas weakness because US censures Pakistan for every wrong happening in Afghanistan. The belief cherished by the US expressed through “do more” is that the key to peace in Afghanistan lies with Pakistan. One school of thought says that this belief offers a chance of face saving to the US, which can advertise in the world that its predicament in Afghanistan is due to Pakistan’s vested interests, which are still been countenanced by the US. However, the second school of thought says that the US does not need any face saving in Afghanistan: Bigger than any face-saving bid is the internationally recognised crisis of governance in Afghanistan. Hence, embedded in “do more” may not be the fears of the US but an effort of the US to make Pakistan forgo all its inhibitions.
If one conjectures that Senator McCain’s stance carries weight, it may be because Sirajuddin Haqqani (son of Jalaluddin Haqqani) became the deputy head of the Afghan Taliban in July 2015 and confessed to have orchestrated several lethal attacks on Kabul. However, the accession is not only a recent phenomenon, but it also indicates that the decisions taken by the Haqqanis are not under the influence of Pakistan. Otherwise, it would have been imprudent on the part of Pakistan to let any Haqqani become a leader of the Afghan Taliban who could invite the ire of both Afghanistan and the US.
Senator McCain also said that the US expected from Pakistan to persuade the Afghan Taliban to renounce violence. It is asking too much from Pakistan which could not persuade the Afghan warlords in the post-1991 phase to settle for peace in Afghanistan, despite the fact that Pakistan mediated the Peshawer Accord (April 1992) and the Islamabad Accord (March 1993, endorsed in Mecca). Both accords were violated to carry on an internecine conflict, though Pakistan enjoyed more influence on the Afghan warlords than on the Afghan Taliban now. Secondly, Pakistan could not persuade Afghan warlords to renounce violence and Pakistan has not become successful in persuading the Pakistani Taliban to renounce violence either. The US seems naïve to understand the proclivity of Afghans.
When Senator McCain landed in Kabul, he unveiled a threat to Pakistan by saying, “If they [Pakistan] don’t change their behaviour, maybe we should change our behaviour towards Pakistan as a nation.” The threat is more a diplomatic challenge than anything else. It is an uphill task to convince the US that not everything happening in Afghanistan is in the hands of Pakistan. It is difficult to grasp for a Pakistani now that at the cost of its own men (both civilian and military) Pakistan can support any militant network to upset the Kabul regime. Senator McCain has actually said between the lines that the US is now ready to settle the issue of Afghanistan at the expense of Pak-US relations.
That the US is planning to send more troops to Afghanistan is no surprise – just like the resurgence of the Afghan Taliban whenever they find an opportunity. Any surge in US troops may push the Afghan Taliban back but that may not be a permanent solution. The US has been found faltered on two counts. First, despite all Doha dialogue rounds (starting in 2013), the US failed to persuade the Afghan Taliban to participate in the 2014 elections. The major adversary to both the Doha talks and the participation of the Afghan Taliban in any future political set-up in Afghanistan was the then Afghan President Hamid Karzai. If the Afghan Taliban had participated in the elections and become a stakeholder in Afghanistan’s affairs, the US would have no need to blame Pakistan for every Afghan dilemma. Second, the Afghan Taliban are out of the power corridor and they cannot sit idle. The US has failed to convince the incumbent Kabul regime of Ghani to accommodate them as governors of certain provinces – to pacify them and satisfy their urge for representation. Instead, the US thinks that the solution is more troops.
In short, the US could neither persuade Karzai to be tolerant to the Afghan Taliban in 2014 nor has Ghani yielded to accommodating the Afghan Taliban – yet Washington believes that threatening and pushing Pakistan to “do more” can deliver dividends in Afghanistan. Interesting!
