Another US failed approach in the making
If US is concerned about Pakistan’s regional security policy and wants an overhaul then Washington needs to patch up its own approach toward Islamabad that doesn’t recognise or adhere to Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns across the Durand Line
The Trump administration’s policy review regarding Afghanistan and recommended changes have raised some major questions. The new administration in Washington is interested in making two major changes to the country’s Afghan policy that was put in place by the former US president, Barak Obama.
First, instead of the ‘draw-down policy’ in terms of the US troops in Afghanistan, Trump’s advisors are interested in making a troop surge in the country. Second, the new administration in Washington is also considering to toughen its approach toward Pakistan due to the country’s alleged support for various insurgent groups, particularly the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network that continue to remain the US’s toughest challenges in the country since the war began more than a decade ago.
But the key question remains: Can the US’s new policy of increasing troop presence in Afghanistan, coupled with a carrot and stick approach toward Islamabad on the Afghan question bring about solution to the protracted conflict in the country? The answer would simply be “no” for the very approach which US is considering to implement, has been applied before and that too with a more forceful manner and a broad regional support. However, the notion that if Pakistan is placed under sanctions and threatened with drone strikes, it may, over the time, crumble under Washington’s demands of following certain security policies such as taking on the Haqqani network and routing out Afghan Taliban’s sanctuaries from the country.
The troop surge in Afghanistan is a failed approach that Washington tried at the beginning of the war albeit without any significant results. When President Obama took office in 2008, he promised to send an additional thirty thousand troops to Afghanistan. Had he deployed those additional troops to Afghanistan, the number of military personal in Afghanistan, including NATO troops, would have crossed more than hundred thousand. This to an extent would have crossed the level of US’s military escalation in Vietnam about three decades ago. Regardless, in the last few years, security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated with the Afghan Taliban controlling more than forty percent of the country. The Afghan military has more than two hundred thousand active military soldiers but their ability in the area of counter terrorism and counter insurgency has virtually been disastrous. The new phase of “more troops are better” is unfortunately not going to help contain insurgency in the country unless the domestic military and political infrastructure is overhauled.
Recently, the US secretary of state, Rex W. Tillerson, indicated that a settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban is the ultimate goal of the Trump administration. The policy makers in Pakistan for a long have also lobbied for a settlement that places Afghan Taliban at one end of the negotiating table and the country’s eventual governing structure. In this context, US’s troop surge in Afghanistan is clearly a wrong turn as far as any negotiations between Kabul and Taliban are concerned, for it directly contradicts with Taliban’s primary demand of foreign troop’s withdrawal from the country for any negotiations to begin.
On the other hand, Washington’s approach of pressing Pakistan is as counterproductive as the notion of military surge in Afghanistan. Certainly, the recent drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribe areas are an indication that Washington is willing to strike inside Pakistan if the latter doesn’t comply with the former’s demands. Many analysts have even gone as far as arguing that with Trump is office, it’s likely that Islamabad should be worrying about a possible drone strike in Quetta, a city that allegedly houses the Afghan Taliban leadership.
Nevertheless, regardless of Washington’s heavy handed approach, it’s unexpected that Islamabad will change its policy posture toward Afghanistan. In fact, any significant pressure on Pakistan from Washington would further push Pakistan into Beijing’s sphere of influence.
A week ago, The New York Times published an Op-Ed, titled, ‘For Peace in Afghanistan, Talk to Pakistan’ which argued that “Pakistan’s goal is not continued chaos in Afghanistan. Nor does it wish for a Taliban victory, as this would strengthen their militant kin in Pakistan. What Pakistan wants is a reconciliation process that ushers the Taliban back into the political fold in Afghanistan, without allowing the militants to control the country once again. The Taliban would counterbalance Indian influence in Afghanistan, and an inclusive political settlement would prevent their radical ideology from taking hold or spilling across the border.”
If US is concerned about Pakistan’s regional security policy and wants an overhaul then Washington needs to patch up its own approach toward Islamabad that doesn’t recognise or adhere to Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns across the Durand Line. The New York Timesarticle further noted that Washington’s “stick” approach is unlikely to change Pakistan’s behaviour, because its existential concerns are tied to broader regional priorities. To get Pakistan to alter its approach in Afghanistan, the United States must understand and address Pakistan’s strategic anxieties.” For Pakistan, the US has always been an ally which remains engaged as long as it favours the latter’s interests. In this context, for Pakistan, Washington may withdraw from Afghanistan tomorrow which is why Islamabad is not going to follow any of the US’s policy directions when it comes to its regional security polices unless its own concerns are adequately addressed.
