Revising our stance is a necessity
Every year unfolds its own intricacies. The year 2017 seems to have ensnared Pakistan into six main foreign policy challenges.
First, Pakistan is a victim of the illusion that by joining the 41-nation Islamic Military Alliance (IMA) formed in the Middle East (ME) against terrorism, not only would Pakistan’s international presence increase but Pakistan would also acquire a larger role to play in the ME. However, Pakistan is now fast realising the fact that it was beguiled into the alliance through its ex-army chief who was made the commander of the alliance the now-declared intentions of which are having the potential for spilling over the sectarian conflict of the Arab world into Pakistan. Unfortunately, Pakistan is overlooking the fact that its huge workforce in the ME does offer a presence and role of a subaltern state and not a leader state. Pakistan is coming to grips with the challenge of its true presence and role in the ME.
Second, Pakistan is a victim of another illusion that Pakistan is generous with the world for fighting the war on terror and that the world be beholden to Pakistan for the same. However, at the Riyadh Summit held in May this year, by not extending any gratitude to Pakistan for its anti-terrorism efforts, US President Donald Trump signalled that the US considered Pakistan part of the problem and not part of the solution. Pakistan is overlooking the fact that the war on terror was primarily launched against al-Qaeda the founder of which was found in May 2011 hiding in a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Consequently, several countries think that Pakistan is not fighting any war on their behalf but for its own sake. Related to this point, the foreign policy challenge is that Pakistan has been left of its own accord to confront the spectre of terrorism. Nevertheless, the attendant dilemma is that, on the one hand, Pakistan is fighting the war on terror at home while, on the other hand, Pakistan has got readily embroiled in the Middle East affairs where another war, along with all its repercussions, awaits Pakistan.
Third, in 2017, Pakistan is still faced with the challenge sprouting from the allegation of perpetrating and perhaps perpetuating terrorism in the region. Whereas the signing of US-India nuclear energy agreement in October 2008 brought US and India closer to each other on the cooperation front, the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 brought US and India closer to each other on the anti-terrorism front. Similarly, Afghanistan’s obstinate censure of Pakistan on every bomb blast exploded in Kabul has disparaged Pakistan. In June 2017, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s demand through the Kabul Process to have an international pact with Pakistan to end “cross-border terrorism” further undermines Pakistan’s credibility as a reliable peace-loving neighbour. Nevertheless, it often seems that the escalation of conflict on the Pak-Afghan border has some sort of consanguinity with the rise of clash on the Line of Control part of the Pak-India border.
Fourth, in 2017, Pakistan has been facing the challenge of volatility coming from two corners. The first is India where Narendra Modi is ruling over the country whereas the second is the US where Donald Trump is holding the reigns of the country. If the Modi face of India is pugnacious, the Trump visage of the US is also belligerent. Pakistan is getting overly leaning on China and by extension on Russia at the expense of its tilt towards the US despite the fact that Pakistan has enjoyed a long term defence relationship with the US. Pakistan is not taking seriously the meaning of the cold shoulder the US is offering to Pakistan. Such lack of understanding offers Pakistan a foreign policy challenge.
Fifth, in June 2017, Pakistan’s attaining the full membership status of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) beckons another challenge. Pakistan thinks that the economic prosperity that would be brought along with the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an extension of the SCO, will outstep or perhaps outrun terrorism. If poverty and terrorism are assumed two distinct issues (and which actually are despite all perceived correlations), the SCO or the CPEC offers a solution for poverty and not for terrorism. Here, Pakistan is overlooking the fact that it has to eradicate terrorism on its own even for the sake of the success of the CPEC: the eradication of terrorism is a pre-requisite for making the CPEC successful to wipe out poverty. For bringing the scourge of terrorism under control, military operations to retrieve South and North Waziristan are insufficient. Instead, Pakistan has to revisit its Afghanistan policy as a foreign policy challenge, as peace in Afghanistan is a precondition to yielding the dividends of peace on Pakistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s joining (and persisting with) the IMA is an anti-thesis to reifying the concept of brining economic prosperity to the country. Instead of preparing for enjoying peace and prosperity through the CPEC, Pakistan is actually knocking at the door of another conflict to bring it home.
Interestingly, Pakistan’s joining the IMA has laid bare an intra-state reality that the civil-military dissonance festers. The first clue is that without seeking a formal permission coming through the parliament, the army thought it permissible to send its former chief and about five thousand serving army men to join the alliance. The elected government could not have accorded him the permission to head the IMA by circumventing the parliament, if the government had not been mired in the Panama leaks. Certainly, in the ongoing post-Panama leaks phase, the army has found an ample leeway (vis-à-vis the civilian elected government) to assert itself. The second clue is that on the DAWN leaks, the army (through the ISPR) denounced publicly through twitter the implementation of the findings of the relevant inquiry report coming from the PM house. The third clue is lately when the army has announced an Umra performing offer for the members of Pakistan’s cricket team winning the Cricket Champion’s trophy against India in England. Taken together, all these three clues offer a sense of parallelism fashioned by the army in Pakistan.
The civil-military relations are no doubt Pakistan’s internal matter but these relations have the potential for affecting the contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy. For instance, while joining the IMA Pakistan was thinking that it would take upon itself the task of striking a balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, after joining the IMA, Pakistan has found itself confronted with a new challenge: how to correct the recently surfaced Saudi-Qatar imbalance in the ME. Pakistan finds itself helpless in plummeting acerbity between Saudi Arabia and Qatar – not to say of reducing bitterness between Saudi Arabia and Iran. To its dismay, Pakistan has found that the ME is impermeable to the diplomatic finesse Pakistan has been cherishing over the years: the rancour is peculiar to the ME. Above all, abruptness and authoritarianism with which the fellow Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, are castigating and chastening Qatar, there are lessons for Pakistan to learn about its own actual size and role. Though joining the IMA was more an army’s initiative than of the civilian government, both are now feeling the heat of the blunder. How to come out of this morass honourably is the sixth foreign policy challenge.