The limits of Pakistan’s democracy

Who draws the line?

In response to the military’s own notice saying “notification is rejected,” the civilian government is likely to remain quiet, allowing evolving political environment to fade the incident

Pakistan military’s outright rejection of the PM office’s notification concerning the inquiry on the Dawn leaks issue has reignited and intensified debate regarding the fundamental imbalance between military and civilian institutions. “Notification on Dawn leak is incomplete and not in line with recommendations by the inquiry board. Notification is rejected,” said the military’s media wing in a tweet in response to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to remove two senior officials of the foreign office.

One can only lament that even after almost ten years of civilian rule, the civil-military intuitional divide remains as discernible as it was during any time in the past. From a constitutional and theoretical perspective, the military as an institution responds to, and follows, the prime minister’s orders; Article 243 (I) of Pakistan’s constitution states that the federal government shall have the control and command of the armed forces.” However, in the world of real-politic, constitutional and theoretical concerns do not extend beyond the realms of academia and journalism.

The current civil-military friction doesn’t bode well for Pakistan’s democratic future, whose vulnerability will only intensify issues that require the attention of all institutions. In fact, the fundamental problem in this regard is how divided our military and civilian elite are when it comes to reading into challenges that Pakistan faces as a country. Historically, the highlight of Pakistan’s civil-military divide revolves around the phenomenon of which institution understands Pakistan national interest best. The national “argument” related to Pakistan’s intensifying ideological, security and economic challenges remains as divisive as both institutions attempt to take control in defining the very “argument” and eventually formulating policies around it.

For instance, the general perception that the establishment has mainly favoured conflict with India and Afghanistan as a foreign and security policy priority while the civilian elite intends to follow an approach based on reconciliation in order to bridge the differences through the art of diplomacy, is one example that outlines the clash between both institutions’ interests and priorities.

Another example that has become the very reason for the latest encounter between the military and civilian government is the issue ofDawn Leaks. The content reported in the Dawn report – regardless of its authenticity – highlights how the federal government suggestion for a policy change, dealing with taking on all militants irrespective of their utility in domestic or foreign security affairs, was countered by the non-civilian elite with a view that such a policy cannot be followed for reasons that deal with New Dehli and Kabul’s pressures, or rather wishes of similar sort. Here, rather than finding common ground on the matter of counter insurgency and terrorism, the issue of how and why the meetings details got leaked became the centre of attention.

The pressure that ensued in the aftermath of the meeting has made the federal government a victim of the entire episode where the focus of the latter has surely fallen on ensuring its own survival rather than focusing on the strategic issue that was part of the meeting reported by Dawn.

At the time of the appointment of the new military chief, it was widely discussed that General Bajwa would stand with Prime Minister Sharif; however, the recent incident has only confirmed that, it’s the institution that at times dictates the chief’s own policy priorities. As I have discussed elsewhere: “Apparently the only constant, as far as the role of the army chief is concerned, is institutional interest and everything else, including civil-military relations, revolves around those interests. Therefore, what the civilian leadership can ensure through its choice of the chief is a general that may allow the government continues working normally only if that government conforms to the military’s interests. What the government cannot ensure is a chief who would allow the civilian elite a free ride in terms of formulating policies that directly clash with the military’s own domestic and foreign policy security policies.”

Prime Minister Sharif’s already weakened position after the Supreme Court’s verdict on the Panama Papers and mounting political pressure from other quarters, leave little room for maneuverability for the federal government. The formation of Joint Investigation Team in the Panama Papers corruption scandal that also includes member of the Inter Services Intelligence, gives the military a pivotal position when it comes to leveraging against the civilian government.

In response to the military’s own notice saying “notification is rejected,” the civilian government is likely to remain quiet, allowing evolving political environment to fade the incident. Going forward, it’s the civilian government that is likely to make concessions or approach the military leadership for any sort of reconciliations.

The recent divergence of interests between the country’s two major institutions is apparently a reminder of an already established narrative that democracy in Pakistan is welcome as long as it follows the line defined by the military’s broad institutional interests. Moreover, it’s also a reminder that any sort of semblance of a civilian supremacy will be pushed back, if not covertly than overtly.